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Orphan of Invention:  Why the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
Was Unnecessary
We are taught since childhood the old proverb “Necessity isthe mother of invention.”1  Perhaps so, where survival is
at stake, or where commercial motivations create a premium for
inventiveness.  Motivations are quite different in the legislative
arena, however, and “necessity” takes on a whole new meaning
in political contexts.
A frequently invoked principle of statutory construction is the
judicial presumption that legislatures do not enact unnecessary
statutes.2  The premise underlying this presumption is that legis-
lative lucubrations must have some judicially discernible mean-
ing, if only one looks hard enough or long enough to find it.  At
the same time, the concept of unnecessary legislation is scarcely
unknown, though the frequency with which it is encountered in
the legal literature depends upon how broad an interpretation of
“unnecessary” one chooses.
If, for example, one chooses to stretch the “necessity” point a
bit, one could even say that the phenomenon of “unnecessary”
legislation is fairly commonplace in a variety of constitutional law
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tion to Professors Michael P. Malloy, Helan A. Garten, Joseph A. Franco, Victoria J.
Dodd, and also to Dennis J. Lehr, Esq., the doyen of the Washington, D.C. banking
bar, for all their advice, encouragement, and helpful comments as this Article was in
preparation.
1 For the politically correct, the phrase goes at least as far back as Roman times,
and thus may be forgiven any lurking gender bias.  Gender balance may be found in
the existence of other parturition-oriented proverbs, such as, “The word is father to
the deed.”
2 Hence, courts are loathe to construe a statute in a manner that would render
some or all of its provisions superfluous or unnecessary. See , e.g.,  Ratzlaf v. United
States, 510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994); Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S.
552, 562 (1990).
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contexts, where the doctrinal treatment of statutes subject to an
“intermediate scrutiny” standard of judicial review is to strike
them down if their scope is “broader than necessary” to serve a
legitimate governmental interest.3  Even without stretching the
point, however, it is not unusual to find opponents of a bill under
consideration arguing that, for one reason or another, the legisla-
tion is simply unnecessary.4
This Article argues that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(GLEBA),5 was, in fact, unnecessary for the banking industry,6
3 E.g. , Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 967-68 (1984)
(First Amendment); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768 (1982) (First Amend-
ment); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. McKeithen, 226 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 2000)
(Takings Clause).
4 For example, in 1949 the Department of Justice opposed legislation to resusci-
tate the notion of contributory infringement by cutting back on judicial applications
of the patent misuse doctrine.  “Represented by John C. Stedman, Chief, Legislation
and Clearance Section, Antitrust Division, the Department argued that legislation
was unnecessary because the Mercoid  decisions were correct, because they had not
produced as much confusion as the proponents of the new legislation claimed, and
because the legislation would produce new interpretive problems.”  Dawson Chem.
Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 208 (1980) (citing Hearings on H.R. 3866
Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary , 81st Cong. 50-56
(1949)).  Similarly, the Justice Department opposed the McCarran-Ferguson Act on
the ground that Parker v. Brown , 317 U.S. 341 (1943), made that legislation unneces-
sary. See  Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 609 (1976) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).  Somewhat more notorious were the Reconstruction Era arguments by
certain members of Congress that the Fifteenth Amendment and enfranchising  leg-
islation were unnecessary because the Fourteenth Amendment already prohibited
racial discrimination in voter qualifications. See  Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
194-95 (1970) (Harlan, J., with Brennan, White, Marshall & Stewart, JJ., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
5 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLEBA), Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
6 Saying that a piece of legislation is “unnecessary” does not necessarily encom-
pass an assessment of its wisdom  as a matter of public policy.  That assessment is
beyond the modest scope of the present discussion.  The wisdom or folly of GLEBA
is best left as the subject of another article.
Moreover, that GLEBA was unnecessary from the banking industry’s point of
view does not suggest that it was not desirable for other constituencies, including, in
no particular order, (1) the Federal Reserve, which wished to be primus inter pares
as a financial regulator, and which dearly wished to have the Comptroller of the
Currency’s operating subsidiary initiative, see  discussion infra  notes 273-93 and ac-
companying text, curtailed; (2) the insurance industry, which wished to turn back the
clock on gains by banks (principally national banks, with the aid of innovative OCC
interpretations, as discussed in Part II, infra) in penetrating the insurance business;
(3) the SEC, which finally succeeded in getting rid of the bank exemptions from the
federal securities laws, see infra  notes 459-74 and accompanying text; (4) Citigroup,
which wished to legalize, post hoc, the merger of Citicorp and Travelers without
having to unscramble the omelette a few years later with the divestitures that would
have called into question the business sense of the original transaction (nonconform-
ing operations conducted by Travelers that accounted for approximately twenty-five
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because the so-called “financial modernization” wrought thereby
was already available to the vast majority of commercial banking
organizations7 without incurring the social costs that are invaria-
bly the statutory “price tag” accompanying congressional grants
of new powers to regulated industries.  If necessity is the mother
of invention, then that which is unnecessary is merely an un-
wanted offspring, or, to coin a phrase parallel to (but the oppo-
site of) the metaphor in the proverb, an “orphan of invention.”
GLEBA putatively lifted existing “barriers” to bank entry into
the securities and insurance businesses.  This Article will demon-
strate that those barriers were illusory and that GLEBA is
largely an orphan of the invention, responsive to the diversifica-
tion needs of the banking industry, that had gone before.
Two broad regulatory principles inform this analysis.  The first
is functional equivalence ; the second is affiliation .  Each of these
represents a fundamental theme—an Urlinie ,8 to borrow an anal-
ogy from music theory—from which basic tenets of financial ser-
vices regulation unfold.
The thesis of this Article is that application of these two princi-
percent of its assets and forty percent of its revenues, see  Travelers Group, Inc., 84
Fed. Res. Bull. 985, 988 (1998)); and (5) to some extent, the securities industry,
which desired to change the one-way street of increased bank penetration of their
business into a two-way street (and, though this was foiled at the last minute during
the legislative process, the possibility of doing so through wholesale financial institu-
tions that could avoid the more heavy-handed varieties of Federal Reserve holding
company regulation, see  Marc Selinger & Kenneth Talley, Financial Services Re-
form:  Wholesale Bank Provision Dropped From Financial Services Modernization
Bill , BNA BANKING DAILY, Oct. 28, 1999).
7 In fact, the statute was only “necessary” to justify, ex post, the 1998 merger of
Citicorp and The Travelers Corporation to form Citigroup. See Travelers Group,
Inc., 84 Fed. Res. Bull. at 988.  To justify its gamble, Citigroup reportedly made a
huge amount of political contributions and lobbying expenditures in Congress (esti-
mated at about $300 million!). See , e.g. , Robert Scheer, Robert Rubin’s Great Good
Fortune; Isn’t the Former Treasury Secretary’s Windfall at Citicorp a Wee Bit Fishy?,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 23, 2000, at A21; Robert Scheer, We Sleep As
Mammoths Gambol:  Heavily Lobbied Bill Being Pushed Through This Week Will
End Measures Put in Place in the Depression , L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1999, at B9; Dean
Anason, Advocates, Skeptics Face Off on Megadeals , AM. BANKER, Apr. 30, 1998, at
1-2 (quoting Rep. Maurice D. Hinchey as saying that Citigroup was “essentially
playing an expensive game of chicken with Congress”).
8 The term refers to an analytic concept developed by the famous German music
theorist Heinrich Schenker to denote a “fundamental line” constituting a key ele-
ment of the background level of  musical composition (for tonal music, at least) from
which Schenker postulated all such works are “composed out.”  For English lan-
guage discussion of Schenker and his theories, see FELIX SALZER, STRUCTURAL
HEARING:  TONAL COHERENCE IN MUSIC (1952); ALLEN FORTE & STEVEN E. GIL-
BERT, INTRODUCTION TO SCHENKERIAN ANALYSIS (1982).
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ples (or, in the case of the latter, its obverse, which we shall call
“disaffiliation”) to banking law and regulation, as they had
evolved to the point in 1999 when GLEBA was enacted, would
have allowed commercial banking organizations9 to engage as
full  competitors in the securities and insurance businesses,
thereby obviating the need for financial services legislation,
which exacts so high a price tag from the industries affected (and
possibly for the economy as a whole).10  Part I of this Article will
briefly introduce and define the two principles; Part II will re-
view the progress of commercial banking organizations’ penetra-
tion of the insurance business and demonstrate how the
Comptroller of the Currency’s application of the principle of
“functional equivalence” had, by 1999, already positioned com-
mercial banking organizations to be full competitors with insur-
ance providers; Part III will apply principles of “affiliation” to
demonstrate that commercial banking organizations, even under
the Glass-Steagall Act11 regime, could avail themselves of utterly
unfettered access to the wholesale securities business;12 and Part
9 By “commercial banking organizations,” reference is made to the entire universe
of the commercial banking business participants, of which bank holding companies
are but a subset (though clearly the most important subset, on the basis of percent-
age of commercial banking assets in holding company form).
10 See infra  notes 419-24 and accompanying text.
11 The Glass-Steagall Act is the name commonly used to refer to certain sections
of the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162, particularly sections 16, 20, 21, and
32 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.A. § 24 (Seventh) (West 2001); 12 U.S.C. § 377
(1994) (repealed 1999); 12 U.S.C.A. § 378 (West 2001); 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1994) (re-
pealed 1999)).
12 The term “wholesale” is used to refer to non-brokerage securities activities,
including especially those activities identified in section 20 of Glass-Steagall, 12
U.S.C. § 377 (repealed 1999), namely the “issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale,
or distribution of securities.”  Retail activities by both banks and bank holdings com-
panies, such as discount brokerage, see Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 468
U.S. 207 (1984); In re  Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Bank-
ing L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 99,284 (Aug. 26, 1982), aff’d sub nom . Sec. Indus. Ass’n v.
Comptroller of the Currency, 577 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d,  758 F.2d 739
(D.C. Cir. 1985), and full-service brokerage, see  Decision of the Comptroller of the
Currency Concerning an Application by Am. Nat’l Bank of Austin, Tex., to Estab-
lish an Operating Subsidiary to Provide Investment Advice, [1983-1984 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 99,732 (Sept. 2, 1983); OCC Interp. Letter
No. 386, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,610 (June
19, 1987); Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 584 (1986), aff’d sub
nom.  Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 821 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (institu-
tional customers); Bank of New England Corp., 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 700 (1988) (retail
customers), had long since ceased to be controversial.  Indeed, they had long been
on the Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation Y laundry list of pre-approved activities.
See  12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(15) (1998).
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IV will briefly summarize the key changes wrought by GLEBA
and the price exacted from the industry.
I
A. Functional Equivalence
As the term suggests, functional equivalence  is a conclusory
statement, expressing the view that two different things should
be regarded as substantially the same, if not identical, for a par-
ticular purpose.  The concept is as commonplace in everyday life
as it is in analytic-theoretic discourse in a variety of academic
disciplines.13  Trivial examples would be to say, for example, that
what is variously called a “wrap” or a “rollup” at the lunch
counter is functionally equivalent to a sandwich, even though two
13 The term is often used in the natural sciences. See, e.g., Rockefeller University,
Blobel’s Contributions to the Field of Intracellular Protein Trafficking, at  http://
www.rockefeller.edu/pubinfo/timeline.html (last updated Jan. 18, 2000) (summariz-
ing biological research of Günter Blobel, including 1978 work providing “the first
example of an integral membrane protein shown to contain an NH2 terminal se-
quence extension that is the structural and functional equivalent  of the signal se-
quence of presecretory proteins”) (emphasis added); Ocean Drilling Stratigraphic
Network, About the Plate Tectonic Maps, at  http://www.odsn.de/odsn/services/pale-
omap/about_map.html (last visited May 21, 2002) (referring to digitized projections
of plate tectonic maps as the “functional equivalent” of a reverse transformation of
stereographic projection developed and used to convert digitized data); Ian R. Ad-
ams & John V. Kilmartin, Localization of Core Spindle Pole Body (SPB) Compo-
nents During SPB Duplication in Saccharomyces Cerevisiae , 145 J. CELL. BIOL. 809
(1999) (stating that SPB is the “functional equivalent” of the centrosome in yeast);
Univ. of Cal., Davis, Section of Microbiology, Protein-Nucleic Acid Interactions, at
http://www-mic.ucdavis.edu/sklab/physical.htm (last visited May 21, 2002) (“the RP-
A protein is presumably the functional equivalent  of the SSB protein”) (emphasis
added); Ralph S. Quatrano, Mechanisms of Cellular Differentiation During Plant
Embryogenesis, at  http://www.biology.wustl.edu/ faculty/quatrano.html (last visited
May 21, 2002) (“Projects concerned with study of the ABA-regulated Em gene are
now focused on the regulatory protein VP1 from maize (and ABI3, its functional
equivalent  in Arabidopsis) . . . .”) (emphasis added).  However, the term is also
encountered on the intersection of disciplines, such as science and religion, see , e.g. ,
Victor J. Stenger, The Functional Equivalent of God (1998), at  http://
www.infidels.org/library/modern/vic_stenger/ross.html (last visited May 21, 2002)
(book review by physics and astronomy professor of HUGH ROSS, THE CREATOR
AND THE COSMOS:  HOW THE GREATEST SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES OF THE CENTURY
REVEAL GOD (1995)), as well as in pure humanistic or political discourse, see , e.g. ,
Stephen P. Weldon, Secular Humanism:  A Survey, at  http://www.humanist.net/frh/
rh/weldon3.html (last visited May 31, 2001) (secular humanism is a “functional
equivalent” of traditional religious views); Libertarian Party Online, Against Cen-
sorship, at  http://www.lp.org/lp-blue-ribbon.html (last visited June 4, 2002)
(“[e]lectronic bulletin boards, communications networks, and other interactive elec-
tronic media as we hold them to be the functional equivalent  of speaking halls and
printing presses”) (emphasis added).
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pieces of bread are not being used, or that a cruller is function-
ally equivalent to a donut, even though the donut is round and
has a hole in the middle.  Even in the legal system, the concept of
functional equivalence is used in not very profound contexts.14
To be sure, one finds judges occasionally making casual use of
the expression.15
This discussion concerns itself with a deeper application of the
concept, one that has substantial legal significance.  For present
purposes, by “functional equivalence” we mean an overtly ana-
lytical  process leading to a conclusion that is the result of what is
quintessentially a factual inquiry.  The purpose of that factual in-
quiry is to ascertain whether there is sufficient support for the
proposition that two superficially disparate items should be
treated identically by the law.  It is potentially dispositive in the
same familiar way that, in our common law system, judicial find-
ings of fact are often dispositive of the court’s conclusions of law.
Hence, in its legally significant avatars, functional equivalence
might be preliminarily defined as follows:
“Functional equivalence” is a determination of “fact”16 that
leads to two different items receiving the same (or substan-
tially similar) legal treatment.
In more symbolic terms, suppose X and Y have in common
that they can be described by the same generic noun or noun
phrase—e.g., each represents a course of conduct, a pharmaceu-
14 For example, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6), if supported by matters outside the pleadings, can be the func-
tional equivalent of a motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment
under Rule 56, or a letter from counsel can be treated as the functional equivalent of
a stipulation by the parties, e.g., “that the number of interrogatories each party may
serve upon the other may exceed 25 in number.”  Williams v. N.Y. Univ. Med. Ctr.,
No. 01 Civ. 871 (CSH), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12467, at *2 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 2, 2001).
15 E.g. , Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 534 n.24 (2000) (“Though he squandered
the opportunity [to make a confession to the King] by authoring a plain contrivance,
[Sir John] Fenwick could have reasonably assumed that a sincere confession would
have been rewarded with leniency—the functional equivalent  of a plea bargain.”)
(emphasis added).
16 As used here, a determination of “fact” means what most lawyers would nor-
mally think of when they envision the familiar judicial factfinding technique.  Such
“findings of fact” may, from time to time depart from what one would consider
purely objective fact.  To the extent, however, that any such finding of fact is inevita-
bly laden with or informed by the idiosyncratic values of the judicial factfinder, as a
critical legal studies approach would postulate, then functional equivalence would
perhaps be more accurately described as a mixed determination of fact and law.  I
am indebted to Duncan Kennedy for this clarification.
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tical product, a financial instrument—but are otherwise dissimi-
lar, and that X is subject to a particular legal rule, R.  Based on
an analysis leading to the factual  conclusion that Y is the “func-
tional equivalent” of X, the legal  conclusion to be reached is that
R should be applied to Y.  Explication is also possible using a
modified form of the familiar logical tool, the syllogism, as
follows:
(1) X is subject to regulatory treatment R;
(2) Y is the functional equivalent of X;
(3) Therefore, Y should likewise be subject to R.
A series of examples will illustrate the application of this prin-
ciple in a variety of concrete settings.
Functional equivalence is often invoked in the criminal law.
For example, omission, misdescription, or conclusive presump-
tion of an element of the offense in jury instructions can be
harmless error where other facts necessarily found by the jury
are the “functional equivalent” of the omitted, misdescribed, or
presumed element.17  A more complex example:  In dismissing
the indictment in the second prosecution18 of former Clinton ad-
ministration Associate Attorney General Webster Hubbell by
the Independent Counsel investigating possible violations of law
relating to the Whitewater Development Corporation, the Su-
preme Court concluded that even a prosecution that did not in-
tend to introduce any of the documents produced by Hubbell
pursuant to a grand jury subpoena under a grant of use immunity
would make “derivative use” of the information contained
17 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993). But see  Neder v. United States,
527 U.S. 1, 14 (1999) (questioning the application of such an approach).
18 The first prosecution was terminated pursuant to a 1994 guilty plea by Webster
Hubbell to charges of mail fraud and tax evasion arising out of his billing practices as
a member of the Rose Law Firm in Little Rock, Arkansas from 1989 to 1992.  Pursu-
ant to that plea agreement, Hubbell was sentenced to a prison term, but in exchange
for some leniency “promised to provide the Independent Counsel with ‘full, com-
plete, accurate, and truthful information’ about matters relating to the Whitewater
investigation.”  United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 30 (2000).  The second prose-
cution resulted from the Independent Counsel’s attempt to determine whether Hub-
bell had breached that agreement when, after being granted immunity to compel his
compliance with a grand jury subpoena, he then produced a whopping 13,120 pages
of documents and records and responded to a series of questions that established
that those were all of the non-privileged documents in his custody or control that
were responsive to the subpoena. Id.  at 31.  The contents of those documents pro-
vided the Independent Counsel with the information that led to this second prosecu-
tion for various additional tax offenses, mail fraud, and wire fraud. Id.
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therein.19  The Court observed:
It is apparent from the text of the subpoena itself that the
prosecutor needed respondent’s assistance both to identify po-
tential sources of information and to produce those
sources. . . . Given the breadth of the description of the 11
categories of documents called for by the subpoena, the collec-
tion and production of the materials demanded was tanta-
mount to answering a series of interrogatories asking a witness
to disclose the existence and location of particular documents
fitting certain broad descriptions.  The assembly of literally
hundreds of pages of material in response to a request for
“any and all documents reflecting, referring, or relating to any
direct or indirect sources of money or other things of value
received by or provided to” an individual or members of his
family during a 3-year period . . . is the  functional equivalent of
the preparation of an answer to either a detailed written interro-
gatory or a series of oral questions at a discovery deposition .
Entirely apart from the contents of the 13,120 pages of materi-
als that respondent produced in this case, it is undeniable that
providing a catalog of existing documents fitting within any of
the 11 broadly worded subpoena categories could provide a
prosecutor with a “lead to incriminating evidence,” or “a link
in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute.”20
Hence, a prosecution based on information that the govern-
ment could not establish it would have obtained independently
of the leads contained in the immunized documents was the func-
tional equivalent  of a prosecution based on immunized testi-
mony, and therefore forbidden.
In another example, the Court held that the collection of a
state tax imposed on the possession and storage of drugs ran
afoul of the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause21 as “the
functional equivalent  of a successive criminal prosecution,”22 be-
cause the tax, inter alia, (1) was “remarkably high”; (2) had “an
obvious deterrent purpose”; (3) was “conditioned on the com-
mission of a crime”; (4) was “exacted only after the taxpayer had
been arrested for the precise conduct that gives rise to the tax
obligation”; (5) was unnecessary to the state’s asserted civil inter-
est in raising revenue, where that interest could be equally well
served by increasing the fine imposed on the activity; and (6) de-
parted radically from “normal revenue laws” by taxing contra-
19 Id.  at 41-43.
20 Id.  at 41-42 (emphasis added).
21 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
22 Dep’t of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 784 (1994) (emphasis
added).
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band goods perhaps destroyed before the tax was imposed.23
Functional equivalence has also been seen in a variety of civil
contexts, including some of constitutional moment. Clinton v.
City of New York24 held the Line Item Veto Act unconstitutional
as violative of the Presentment Clause;25 the Court found that
cancellations by the President pursuant to that statute “are the
functional equivalent  of partial repeals of Acts of Congress that
fail to satisfy Article I, § 7.”26  In another example, holding that
an artist’s First Amendment rights were implicated when Amtrak
refused to display his political advertisement on a billboard in
New York’s Pennsylvania Station,27 the Supreme Court con-
cluded that Amtrak (a government corporation formally known
as the National Railroad Passenger Corporation) was the “func-
tional equivalent” of a federal government agency for purposes
of constitutional guarantees of individual rights against the fed-
eral government.28  Central to this conclusion was that Congress
created Amtrak by special law,29 for the furtherance of govern-
mental objectives, and retained for the government permanent
authority to appoint a majority of that corporation’s directors.30
An example in the civil procedure context:  A case dealing with
jurisdiction and the requirement of minimum contacts noted that
while periodic business trips to New York to solicit business did
not confer jurisdiction, “renting a hotel room . . . on a systematic
and regular basis might be the functional equivalent  of an office
in New York and therefore be sufficient to establish presence
within the state.”31
Functional equivalence is an oft-spotted denizen of the finan-
cial regulatory thicket as well and has been invoked by the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in a variety of litigation
and regulatory contexts.  For example, during the 1980s, the SEC
23 Id.  at 780-84.
24 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
26 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 444 (1998).
27 Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995).  The Court ex-
pressed no opinion on whether the artist’s First Amendment rights had, in fact, been
violated. Id.  at 400.
28 Id.  at 394; see also id.  at 404 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
29 See  Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-658 (1994 & Supp. III
1997).
30 Lebron , 513 U.S. at 384-86, 397-98.
31 Landoil Res. Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 1039, 1043,
1046 n.10 (2d Cir. 1991) (emphasis added); accord  Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 226 F.3d 88, 98-99 (2d Cir. 2000).
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urged the Supreme Court to reject an argument that fraud claims
brought against brokerage firms by investors under section 10(b)
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 193432 and the SEC’s Rule
10b-5 thereunder,33 as well as under the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act,34 were not arbitrable despite
customer agreements between the parties providing for arbitra-
tion of any controversy relating to the accounts.  The Commis-
sion argued successfully as amicus curiae  that although Congress
intended to protect investors through the provision of a judicial
forum for the enforcement of their rights under the federal secur-
ities laws, this intention would not be contravened by sending
such claims to arbitration because arbitration had become the
“functional equivalent” of the courts.35
The concept of functional equivalence arises in diverse securi-
ties and commodities regulatory contexts.  In Basic, Inc. v. Levin-
son ,36 for example, the Court noted that silence was not
actionable because it was not “misleading” under Rule 10b-5, ab-
sent a duty to disclose, and that “no comment” statements in the
context of press inquiries during confidential, preliminary merger
discussions are the “functional equivalent” of silence.37
A somewhat more complicated example: Regulations impos-
ing disabilities on investment transactions by members and em-
ployees (and former members and employees) of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) include a prohibition on
such a transaction involving an actual commodity if the transac-
tion is effectuated not only by an instrument regulated by the
CFTC but also by an instrument “functionally equivalent” to an
32 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
33 SEC General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001).
34 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).  The RICO statute provided an
attractive adjunct to securities fraud claims because of the availability of treble dam-
ages under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
35 Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities and Exchange Commission at 12, Shearson/
Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (No. 86-44).  The Court agreed
with that position, but was influenced to accept the functional equivalence point in
no small part by the Commission’s aggressive regulatory posture ensuring that dis-
closures accompanying arbitration clauses in customer agreements prepared by bro-
kerage houses were adequate.  Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 232, 233-34 (1987); see also id.  at 257 & n.14 (Blackmun, J., with Brennan &
Marshall, JJ., dissenting in part).
36 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
37 Id.  at 239 n.17.
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instrument regulated by the CFTC.38  Similar investment disabili-
ties apply, in differing degrees, to employees (more restrictive)
and to governing board and committee members (less restric-
tive)39 of commodities self regulatory organizations (SROs),40
and the latter restrictions are also applicable to individuals who,
while not technically members of the governing board, are,
deemed to be the “functional equivalent” of governing board
members.41  In another context, namely that of the SEC’s 1996
revisions to its rules regulating money market funds,42 the Com-
mission, when considering the put diversification standards of
Rule 2a-7,43 concluded that issuer-provided demand features44
should be excluded from those diversification requirements45 be-
cause they were properly viewed as the “functional equivalent”
38 Regulation Concerning Conduct of Members and Employees and Former
Members and Employees of the Commission, 58 Fed. Reg. 52,656, 52,657 n.3 (Oct.
12, 1993) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 140.735-2(b)(2)(ii) n.3 (2001)).  The CFTC noted:
A transaction involving an instrument that is the “functional equivalent to
an instrument regulated by the [CFTC]” would include, for example, but is
not limited to, a transaction in a stock index effectuated through the
purchase or sale of an option traded on a national securities exchange
where the stock index also underlies a futures contract regulated by the
[CFTC].
Id.  at 52,657 n.3.
39 Under CFTC Regulation 1.59, employees are absolutely prohibited from trad-
ing in any commodity interest traded on or cleared by their employing contract mar-
ket or clearing organization, while governing board members and committee
members, on the other hand, are prohibited only from using material, non-public
information for any purpose other than the performance of their official duties.  The
disparity in treatment exists because the CFTC believes that inclusion in the regula-
tory definition of “employee” of salaried governing board members might create
disincentives for competent individuals to serve in that capacity.  Final Rules Con-
cerning Amendments to Insider Trading Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 47,843, 47,844
(Aug. 4, 2000).
40 Examples of commodities SROs include, in no particular order, the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange, the Chicago Board of Trade, the New York Mercantile Ex-
change, and the Minneapolis Grain Exchange.
41 Insider Trading Regulation, 65 Fed Reg. at 47,844.  Again, the rationale is that
such individuals (e.g., ex officio members and emeritus members) can, by dint of
their experience, “provide valuable guidance to the governing board” but would be
disinclined to do so if subjected to broader restrictions on trading. Id.
42 Revisions to Rules Regulating Money Market Funds, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,956 (Mar.
28, 1996).
43 The put diversification standards under Rule 2a-7 apply to “securities issued by
or subject to Puts from the institution that issued the Put.”  SEC Rule 2a-
7(c)(4)(v)(A), 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(4)(v)(A) (2001).
44 These are puts by the issuer of the underlying securities.
45 If not so excluded, the fund would have to aggregate an issuer-provided put
with the security subject to the put for purposes of determining compliance with the
put diversification requirements of Rule 2a-7.
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of short-term securities that are rolled over periodically.46
Elsewhere, the Commission granted an exemption under sec-
tion 6(c) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended,47
from the definition of “investment company” under the stan-
dards for such exemption as set forth in Rule 3a-5.48  In granting
the exemption, the Commission considered an arrangement, ne-
cessitated by the tax laws of a foreign country, whereby notes
issued under a trust indenture qualifying under Rule 144A would
be issued,49 with proceeds payable to the foreign parent company
and with the indenture trustee being able to proceed directly
against the parent50 in the event of a default on the notes.51  This
arrangement, the SEC concluded, was the “functional
46 Revisions to Rules Regulating Money Market Funds, 61 Fed. Reg. at 13,963.
47 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80b-21 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) [hereinafter 1940 Act].
48 SEC Rules and Regulations, Investment Company Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.3a-5 (2001).  The rule provides an exemption from the definition of investment
company for certain companies organized primarily to finance the business opera-
tions of their parent companies or companies controlled by their parent companies.
Id.  One of the provisions requires that debt securities of the entity seeking the
exemption be guaranteed by the parent. Id.  § 270.3a-5(a)(1).
49 SEC Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2001), creates a safe harbor that allows
the sale of privately placed securities to “qualified institutional buyers” without re-
quiring that the securities be registered under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) [hereinafter 1933 Act].  The intent of the rule is
to promote liquidity in the private placement market and to enhance the attractive-
ness of the United States market for foreign issuers by eliminating the barriers which
forced United States investors to purchase foreign securities overseas rather than
through United States intermediaries. See , e.g. , Lisa K. Bostwick, Note, The SEC
Response to Internationalization and Institutionalization:  Rule 144A Merit Regula-
tion of Investors,  27 GEO. J.L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 423, 431 (1996); EDWARD
GREENE ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS:
A GUIDE FOR DOMESTIC & FOREIGN ISSUERS & INTERMEDIARIES 141-42 (2d ed.
1993).  For purposes of Rule 144A, a “qualified institutional buyer” is an institution
that owns or invests on a discretionary basis $100 million of securities and is an
insurance company; an investment company; an investment advisor; a corporation,
partnership, or business trust; an employee benefit plan sponsored by a governmen-
tal entity; an employee benefit plan under the Employee Retirement Income Secur-
ity Act of 1974; a non-profit organization; a small business investment company; a
broker or dealer that owns or invests more than $10 million; a U.S. or foreign bank
or savings association with an audited net worth of at least $25 million; or any other
organization all of whose beneficial owners are themselves qualified institutional
buyers.  17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1).
50 In the governing documents, the foreign parent had specifically consented to
jurisdiction in New York and had appointed an agent for service of process there.
51 In the event of a default on note payments, the indenture trustee, a commercial
bank, was empowered to declare the outstanding amount of the notes and any ac-
crued but unpaid interest with respect to the loan to be immediately due and paya-
ble. Furthermore, under the terms of the trust indenture agreement, if the trustee
did not exercise its rights following a default, holders of at least twenty-five percent
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equivalent” of a guaranty by the parent52 (thereby qualifying for
the exemption).53
Functional equivalence is no stranger to banking regulation ei-
ther.  It has featured prominently in a number of contexts, partic-
ularly, as we shall see, in the adumbration by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) of what constitutes the
“business of banking” under the National Bank Act.54  A partic-
ularly contentious example was Investment Company Institute v.
Camp ,55 where the “managing agency accounts” offered for sale
by Citibank (then First National City Bank of New York) and
approved by OCC were held to be the functional equivalent  of an
open-end investment company.56  Another example took place at
the dawn of interstate banking,57 when bank holding companies,
facing a sea of legislative and regulatory uncertainties,58 ad-
in aggregate principal amount of the outstanding notes could direct the trustee to
exercise the rights or could themselves accelerate the notes.
52 See  SEC, Investment Company Act Release No. 24786, 65 Fed. Reg. 77,939
(Dec. 13, 2000).
53 See supra  note 48 and accompanying text.
54 12 U.S.C.A. § 24 (Seventh) (West 2001); see generally infra  notes 170-74 and
accompanying text.
55 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
56 Id.  at 622-23.  That conclusion rendered the arrangement unlawful under sec-
tions 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (Seventh), 378.
57 Nowadays, nearly twenty years after the earliest state statutes that proliferated
in the mid-1980s and that authorized regional or nationwide acquisitions by out-of-
state bank holding companies, with interstate branching having been permitted for
almost a decade by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) for federally chartered
thrift institutions, see  OTS Statements of Policy, 12 C.F.R. § 556.5 (2001), and with
the enactment of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338, permitting interstate branching for com-
mercial banks, much of the novelty has worn off.  Indeed, the banking law students
of today find the Douglas Amendment to the BHCA, branching restrictions, and
unit banking to be so terribly old-fashioned, even anachronistic, that they can
scarcely credit that these things existed during their lifetimes.
58 At the time, both the prospects for widespread enactment of state regional in-
terstate banking laws and the constitutionality of such laws were in doubt.  Most
such statutes were regional in scope and required reciprocal treatment for the state’s
own banking organizations to be effective; initially only Arizona enacted a nation-
wide interstate banking statute, and then shortly thereafter California amended its
statute to provide for a national trigger in 1987.  The validity of various state enact-
ments was tested, and ultimately they survived both constitutional and statutory
construction challenges. See  Northeast Bancorp v. Bd. of Governors, 472 U.S. 159
(1985); Indep. Cmty. Bankers Ass’n, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 820 F.2d 428 (D.C.
Cir. 1987). But cf.  Indep. Cmty. Bankers Ass’n of S.D. v. Bd. of Governors, 838
F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding unconstitutional South Dakota statute authorizing
entry by out-of-state bank holding company, subject to certain conditions on the
operation of the bank it acquired in South Dakota).
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dressed the business aspect of the problem with so-called
“stakeouts”—nonvoting equity investments (preferred stock or
nonvoting common stock) in banks or bank holding companies
located in states other than the home states of the investing bank
holding companies.  The Board viewed many of these nonvoting
equity interests as the functional equivalent  of voting control, and
prescribed standards to be followed for stakeout investments to
avoid “control” problems.59
This by no means exhaustive series of examples demonstrates
that functional equivalence is alive and well in legal doctrine and
is applied across a broad spectrum of factual circumstances and
legal disciplines.  An understanding, based on the preliminary
definitions of the functional equivalence concept given above,
would be incomplete, however, for failure to take into account
certain limitations on its application.
The principal limitation is that functional equivalence analysis
is inappropriate where the result would be inconsistent with spe-
cific statutory definitions enacted as part of the regulatory
scheme.  The Federal Reserve learned this lesson to its chagrin
when, in the mid-1980s, it endeavored to regulate “nonbank
banks” under the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA).  Prior
to the enactment of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of
1987 (CEBA),60 section 2(c) of the BHCA defined the term
“bank” to include only those institutions that both  accepted de-
posits that the depositor had a legal right to withdraw on demand
Likewise not free from doubt, even years later, was the validity of OTS’s inter-
state branching policy, but this, too, was ultimately upheld on judicial review.  Con-
ference of State Bank Supervisors v. OTS, 792 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C. 1992).
59 See , e.g. , Statement of Policy on Nonvoting Equity Investments by Bank Hold-
ing Companies, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,966 (July 16, 1982) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225.143
(2001)).  Prior to the Board’s Policy Statement, a number of stakeout agreements
had been announced, e.g., Citicorp/Central National Chicago, Chemical/Florida Na-
tional, Chase Manhattan/Equimark, First National Boston Corp./Casco-Northern,
Marine Midland/Industrial Valley, First Bank System/Bank of Iowa, Marine Mid-
land/Centran, and the tripartite AmSouth/Trust Co. of Georgia/South Carolina
National.
For a discussion of stakeout investments and the Board’s response, see generally
Michael S. Helfer & Russell J. Bruemmer, Interstate Nonvoting Equity Agreements
and “Control” Under the Bank Holding Company Act:  The Impact of the Federal
Reserve Board’s 1982 Policy Statement,  39 BUS. LAW. 383 (1984); cf . United States v.
Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 137 (1975) (Brennan, J., with Douglas &
White, JJ., dissenting) (noting that “the ‘functional equivalent’ of a holding com-
pany-subsidiary relationship could perhaps be created through informal affiliation”).
60 Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 (CEBA), Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101
Stat. 552.
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and  engaged in the business of making commercial loans.  Bank-
ing products that were functional equivalents  of demand deposits
and commercial loans did not come within this narrow definition,
and “nonbank banks” were simply institutions that featured one
or the other (but not both) prongs of the statutory definition,
while offering products that were functional equivalents of the
remaining prong (e.g., making commercial loans but offering Ne-
gotiable Order of Withdrawal or “NOW” accounts rather than
demand deposit accounts).  In 1984, the Board endeavored to
bring those institutions within its BHCA jurisdiction by amend-
ing its regulation implementing the BHCA (Regulation Y)61 us-
ing a functional equivalence approach, i.e., the Board
promulgated new rules providing that nonbank banks offering
the functional equivalent of traditional banking services would
thereafter be regulated as banks.  First, the Board sought to ex-
pand the definition of “commercial loan” by bringing within its
compass “the purchase of retail installment loans or commercial
paper, certificates of deposit, bankers’ acceptances, and similar
money market instruments, [as well as] the extension of broker
call loans, the sale of federal funds and the deposit of interest-
bearing funds,”62 all of which the Board characterized as func-
tional equivalents of commercial lending.  Second, the Board
sought to expand the definition of “demand deposit” to include
functional equivalents of checking accounts, encompassing all in-
terest-bearing transaction accounts (including “NOW”
accounts).63
These attempts at reinterpretation of the key components of
the statutory definition of “bank” were successively invalidated
by decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit64 and ultimately by the Supreme Court in Board of Gov-
ernors v. Dimension Financial Corp.65  The Court concluded that
it was not a legitimate exercise of the Board’s interpretive au-
thority under the BHCA to redefine by regulatory fiat what Con-
61 Fed. Res. Sys. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control (Regula-
tion Y), 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.1-225.200 (2001).
62 Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control; Revision of Regulation
Y, 49 Fed. Reg. 794, 818 (Jan. 5, 1984) (promulgating now-superseded 12 C.F.R.
§ 225.2(a)(1)(B)).
63 Id.  (promulgating now-superseded 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(a)(1)(A)).
64 See  Dimension Fin. Corp. v. Bd. of Governors, 744 F.2d 1402 (10th Cir. 1984),
aff’d,  474 U.S. 361 (1986); First Bancorporation v. Bd. of Governors, 728 F.2d 434
(10th Cir. 1984).
65 474 U.S. 361 (1986).
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gress had expressly defined in legislation.  What constituted a
demand deposit “as a matter of practice” was not the same as
what Congress had specified in so many words:  deposits that the
depositor “has a legal right to withdraw on demand.”66  Nor were
“commercial loan substitutes” that were essentially money mar-
ket transactions appropriate proxies for what the financial com-
munity (and, by extension of that parlance, the Congress)
understood was within the purview of the term “commercial
loan.”
For present purposes, the key point is that the use of functional
equivalence in these contexts is institutionally (and constitution-
ally) impermissible in our system of separation of powers, even if
the agency acts in good faith to implement what it perceives as
the overarching purpose of the statute:
Application of “broad purposes” of legislation at the expense
of specific provisions ignores the complexity of the problems
Congress is called upon to address and the dynamics of legisla-
tive action.  Congress may be unanimous in its intent to stamp
out some vague social or economic evil; however, because its
Members may differ sharply on the means for effectuating that
intent, the final language of the legislation may reflect hard-
fought compromises.  Invocation of the “plain purpose” of leg-
islation at the expense of the terms of the statute itself takes
no account of the processes of compromise and, in the end,
prevents the effectuation of congressional intent.67
The Court concluded by emphasizing this fundamental limita-
tion on the regulatory use of the functional equivalence
technique:
Without doubt there is much to be said for regulating financial
institutions that are the functional equivalent of banks.  NOW
accounts have much in common with traditional payment-on-
demand checking accounts; indeed we recognize that they gen-
66 Id.  at 368.
The Board would now define “legal right” as meaning the same as “a mat-
ter of practice.”  But no amount of agency expertise—however sound may
be the result—can make the words “legal right” mean a right to do some-
thing “as a matter of practice.”  A legal  right to withdraw on demand
means just that:  a right to withdraw deposits without prior notice or limita-
tion.  Institutions offering NOW accounts do not give the depositor a legal
right to withdraw on demand; rather, the institution itself retains the ulti-
mate legal right to require advance notice of withdrawal. The Board’s defi-
nition of “demand deposit,” therefore, is not an accurate or reasonable
interpretation of § 2(c) [of the BHCA].
Id.
67 Id.  at 373-74.
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erally serve the same purpose.  Rather than defining “bank” as
an institution that offers the functional equivalent of banking
services, however, Congress defined with specificity certain
transactions that constitute banking subject to regulation.  The
statute may be imperfect, but the Board has no power to cor-
rect flaws that it perceives in the statute it is empowered to
administer.  Its rulemaking power is limited to adopting regu-
lations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed in
the statute.68
A similar result was reached when, after the dramatic entry of
banks into the discount brokerage business in the early 1980s, the
SEC sought to subject them to broker-dealer regulation in pari
materia  with non-bank securities brokers.69  In 1985, the SEC
promulgated Rule 3b-9 under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the 1934 Act), in order to require banks engaged in the
securities brokerage business for compensation to register as bro-
ker-dealers under the 1934 Act,70 with all the additional regula-
tion that that entailed.71  Like the Board in Dimension , however,
68 Id.  at 374.
69 Discount brokerage services fall within the ambit of permissible agency activi-
ties under section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh).  Early in-
terpretations of that statute by the OCC had limited these activities to purchases and
sales for actual, pre-existing customers of the bank, 1 Bull. Comptroller Currency ¶
36 (Oct. 26, 1936), and had forbidden banks from receiving commissions or other
compensation for the brokerage, id . ¶ 10, allowing them only to provide the service
as an accommodation, even for trust customers, id.  ¶ 35.  (Actually, the Comptroller
believed himself constrained to issue that interpretation because he mistakenly be-
lieved that the language of section 16 absolutely prohibited banks from brokering
stocks even if done, as the statute allowed, “without recourse” and only “upon the
order, and for the account of, customers.”  Yet, because he did not believe that Con-
gress intended to reach this result, the Comptroller was around the same time urging
Congress to amend Glass-Steagall explicitly to allow these bank brokerage activities.
See  Harold James Kress, The Banking Act of 1935,  34 MICH. L. REV. 155, 177-78
(1935) (citing 1933 Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency)).
In any event, that limiting administrative construction was abandoned in the 1980s
by both the Federal Reserve, see  discussion infra  notes 80-98 and accompanying
text, and the OCC, see In re  Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 99,284 (Aug. 26, 1982).
70 See  Applicability of Broker-Dealer Registration to Banks Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 34-22,205, 50 Fed. Reg. 28,385 (July 12, 1985).
71 Thus in addition to registration as a broker-dealer, Rule 3b-9 would have (1)
subjected bank employees, as persons associated with broker-dealers, to the require-
ments of being licensed and passing examinations before they could sell securities or
become involved in the management of a securities firm, id.  at 28,387; (2) imposed
on the banks an affirmative duty adequately to supervise their employees in order to
prevent violations of federal securities laws, id.  at 28,388; (3) subjected the banks to
rules on abusive sales practices (e.g., “churning” customer accounts in order to in-
crease brokerage commissions), id.  at 28,388, 28,390; (4) required compliance with
specific advertising guidelines, id.  at 28,388; (5) subjected banks to periodic SEC
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the SEC faced a tiny statutory obstacle:  the 1934 Act excluded
banks from the statutory definitions of “broker”72 and
“dealer.”73  The SEC sought to remedy this74 by using Rule 3b-9
to redefine the term “bank” to exclude those banks engaging in
brokerage business for profit from the meaning of “bank” in the
statutory definitions of “broker” and “dealer.”75
broker-dealer examinations and inspections, id.  at 28,394.  Additional consequences
of subjecting banks to broker-dealer regulation would have included (6) compelling
banks to become members of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation, an en-
tity with potentially conflicting authority with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration (FDIC); and (7) imposing upon banks the SEC’s net capital requirements for
broker-dealers, which conceivably could conflict with the capital requirements es-
tablished for banks by the appropriate Federal banking agency.
72 At that time, section 3(a)(4) of the 1934 Act provided that “the term ‘broker’
means any person engaging in the business of effecting transactions in securities for
the account of others, but does not include a bank .”  15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1982)
(amended 1999) (emphasis added).
73 Similarly, section 3(a)(5) provided at that time in pertinent part that “the term
‘dealer’ means any person engaged in the business of buying or selling securities for
his own account . . . but does not include a bank  . . . .”  15 U.S.C.  § 78c(a)(5) (1982)
(amended 1999) (emphasis added).
74 The SEC’s regulatory rationale was that Congress, when drafting the statutory
definitions in the 1934 Act, acted under the misimpression that Glass-Steagall pro-
hibited banks from engaging in any kind of brokerage activities.  (While the 1934
Act was being considered and debated, there was, in fact, some congressional testi-
mony to this effect by Thomas Corcoran, then General Counsel to the Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation and a proponent of bank exemption from broker-dealer
regulation. See  Am. Bankers Ass’n v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739, 747-748 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(citing Stock Exchange Practices:  Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking and
Currency , 73d Cong. 6470 (1934); Stock Exchange Regulation:  Hearings on H.R.
7852 and H.R. 8270 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
73d Cong. 86 (1934)).  As that understanding turned out to be incorrect, it was in-
cumbent upon the Commission to give effect to the intent of Congress, manifest in
the overarching purpose of the federal securities laws, by regulating banks that en-
gaged in retail brokerage.
As the D.C. Circuit later pointed out, the weakness in this reasoning—even apart
from its substitution of perceived congressional intent for the actual language Con-
gress enacted—is that it assumes “that if Congress had only known how the Comp-
troller and the courts were going to interpret the Glass-Steagall Act, Congress would
not have exempted banks from the SEC’s broker-dealer regulation.  There is abso-
lutely no evidence in the legislative history supporting (or negating) this assump-
tion.” Am. Bankers Ass’n , 804 F.2d at 749.
75 Rule 3b-9 did this by providing that the term “bank” as used in the definition of
“broker” and “dealer” in sections 3(a)(4) and (5) of the Act did not, subject to
exceptions not here pertinent, include a bank that:  “(1) Publicly solicits brokerage
business for which it receives transaction-related compensation . . .; (2) Directly or
indirectly receives transaction-related compensation for providing brokerage ser-
vices for trust, managing agency, or other accounts to which the bank provides ad-
vice . . . .”  SEC General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17
C.F.R. § 240.3b-9(a)(1)-(2) (1986).
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“Bank,” however, was likewise a defined term in the statute.76
The case thus became indistinguishable from Dimension , and
Rule 3b-9, when challenged by the banking industry, was ulti-
mately77 struck down on a substantially identical rationale.78
“The manner in which Congress defined “broker,” “dealer,” and
“bank” in the 1934 Act reflects a purposeful decision on its part
that the SEC should not have oversight jurisdiction with respect
to banks . . . .”79  Therefore, we must modify our syllogism to
read as follows:
(1) X is subject to regulatory treatment R;
(2) Y is the functional equivalent of X;
(3) Therefore, Y should likewise be subject to R, UNLESS do-
ing so would be inconsistent with the legislative definition of
X under the pertinent statutory scheme.
Yet even this narrowing of our working concept of functional
equivalence fails to account fully for the institutional significance
of statutory definitions.  For even when the pertinent statutory
scheme contains no legislated definition of the term in question,
the existence of such a definition in another  statutory scheme
may be sufficient to undermine a functional equivalence analysis.
While this may make little sense in the abstract, it may have
some force at least where the second statutory scheme is related
in subject matter to the first one and is roughly contemporaneous
with it, thus raising at least the possibility that Congress may
76 Section 3(a)(6) of the 1934 Act provided in pertinent part:
The term “bank” means (A) a banking institution organized under the laws
of the United States, (B) a member bank of the Federal Reserve System,
(C) any other banking institution, whether incorporated or not, doing busi-
ness under the laws of any State or of the United States, a substantial por-
tion of the business of which consists of receiving deposits or exercising
fiduciary powers similar to those permitted to national banks under section
11(k) of the Federal Reserve Act, as amended, and which is supervised and
examined by State or Federal authority having supervision over banks, and
which is not operated for the purpose of evading the provisions of this
chapter . . . .
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(6) (1982) (amended 1987).
77 Initially, the district court had granted summary judgment for the SEC.  While
acknowledging the clear exclusion of “bank” from the statutory definitions of “bro-
ker” and “dealer,” the district court accepted the SEC’s regulatory rationale. See
Am. Bankers Ass’n v. SEC, Civil Action No. 85-02482, slip op. (D.D.C.), rev’d , 804
F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also supra  note 74.  Finding that rationale unpersua-
sive as well as inimical to separation of powers considerations in the interpretation
of statutes, the D.C. Circuit reversed. Am. Bankers Ass’n , 804 F.2d at 748-49.
78 Am. Bankers Ass’n , 804 F.2d at 749 (citing Dimension).
79 Id.  at 744.
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have had in mind the legislated definition in the second scheme
when using the term in the first.  Consider, as a prime example,
the Bankers Trust commercial paper case.
In 1978, Bankers Trust Company (Bankers), a money-center
state member bank, took the first major step down the long road
leading to dismantling the Glass-Steagall Act by entering into the
business of privately placing commercial paper80 with selected in-
stitutional purchasers as agent for the corporate issuers.81  These
issuers had traditionally been banks’ best commercial loan cus-
tomers who had discovered the cost-advantage of funding short-
term debt through the commercial paper market82 as opposed to
bank loans.  Endeavoring to retain at least some of this corporate
business, commercial banks, led by Bankers, sought to compete
in the commercial paper business with the investment banking
firms,83 which petitioned the Board to commence enforcement
action to stop Bankers’ commercial paper placement activities.
This petition was denied by the Board,84 based on its analysis of
80 The term “commercial paper” refers to prime quality, negotiable promissory
notes with short maturities, typically sixty days or less. See  Evelyn M. Hurley, The
Commercial Paper Market , 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 525 (1977); see also  Kenneth V.
Handal, Comment, The Commercial Paper Market and the Securities Acts,  39 U.
CHI. L. REV. 362, 364 (1972) (“[ma]turities range from one day to nine months, but
most paper carries an original maturity between thirty and ninety days”).
81 This activity was initially being done in the bank itself.  After litigation made
the future viability of bank commercial paper private placement uncertain, Bankers
decided to hedge its bets by applying under section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding
Company Act (BHCA), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8), to conduct the selfsame activities in
BT Commercial, a nonbank subsidiary of the holding company, Bankers Trust New
York Corporation (BTNY).  This led directly to the section 20 applications by Cit-
icorp, J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc., and BTNY.  Indeed, the Board’s decision approving
the BT Commercial application was the first pronouncement on the meaning of “en-
gaged principally” under section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 377.
Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 138 (1987).  For discussion of the BT
Commercial decision and its progeny, see generally Keith R. Fisher, Reweaving the
Safety Net:  Bank Diversification into Securities and Insurance Activities,  27 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 123, 149-59 (1992).
82 “Commercial paper is sold, in denominations averaging one million dollars or
more, to large, sophisticated purchasers—money market mutual funds, bank trust
departments, insurance companies and pension funds.”  A.G. Becker Inc. v. Bd. of
Governors, 693 F.2d 136, 138 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
83 Actually, this was less than full competition.  Investment banking houses were
free to underwrite issues of commercial paper.  National banks and state member
banks were forbidden from doing so by section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act, 12
U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh).  In fact, whether Bankers’ commercial paper private place-
ment activities constituted proscribed underwriting was the central issue of the sec-
ond stage of that litigation, from 1984 to 1987. See  Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of
Governors, 628 F. Supp. 1438 (D.D.C.), rev’d , 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
84 Federal Reserve System, Statement Regarding Petitions to Initiate Enforce-
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commercial paper and its conclusion that commercial paper was
the functional equivalent  of a short-term loan and ought to be
treated as such for regulatory purposes, rather than as a “secur-
ity” for purposes of the Glass-Steagall Act.85
Judicial review was sought by the securities industry.  Ruling in
their favor, the district court rejected the Board’s functional anal-
ysis and concluded that the “plain language” as well as the
“broad framework” of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibited com-
mercial banks from trading in commercial paper.86  The court of
appeals, however, in a detailed and scholarly opinion,87 reversed
the decision, concluding that the district court had given insuffi-
cient deference88 to the Board’s expertise, and finding that the
language, legislative history, and policies of Glass-Steagall sup-
ported the Board’s analysis89 and its functional equivalence
ment Action (Sept. 26, 1980).  This request by A.G. Becker & Co. and the Securities
Industry Association (SIA) for enforcement action arose from a decision of the
Board’s general counsel, which, “after extensive discussion with Becker, SIA, Bank-
ers Trust and the SEC, issued an opinion declaring that commercial banks may law-
fully act as agent for the issuer in the sale of commercial paper, ‘provided that the
sales . . . are limited to purchasers to whom commercial banks normally sell partici-
pations in loans.’”  A.G. Becker Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 693 F.2d 136, 138 n.8
(citing Legal Div., Bd. of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys., Commercial Paper
Activities of Commercial Banks:  A Legal Analysis (June 28, 1979)).  Both Federal
Reserve documents were reprinted in the joint appendix of the parties to the Becker
litigation in the D.C. Circuit. See id.  at nn.3, 8.
85 A.G. Becker Inc. , 693 F.2d at 139.
86 A.G. Becker Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 519 F. Supp. 602, 612-16 (D.D.C. 1981),
rev’d , 693 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
87 A.G. Becker Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 693 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1982).  The D.C.
Circuit’s panel decision was a majority opinion, not a unanimous one.  Judge Wilkey,
joined by Judge Tamm, wrote the opinion for the panel.  Judge Robb filed a dissent-
ing opinion agreeing substantially with the district court. Id.  at 152-55 (Robb, J.,
dissenting).
88 Deference was especially appropriate, in the D.C. Circuit’s view, because of (1)
Congress’s having vested in the Board a broad scope of authority for administering
federal regulation of the banking system, (2) the Board’s considerable expertise and
specialized knowledge, (3) the Board’s application of general, undefined statutory
terms (i.e., “notes and securities”) to particular facts, and (4) the extent of the
Board’s factual inquiry, the thoroughness of its review and analysis of the facts and
the relevant legal and policy considerations, as well as the clarity of the agency’s
findings, conclusions, and rationale. Id.  at 140-41.
89 The case was decided well before Dimension , but even had it not been, the
latter case would not have been controlling.  Here, the court of appeals emphasized
the absence of a statutory definition of the key term “securities,” characterized that
sort of statutory drafting as “leav[ing] the agency with the task of evolving defini-
tions on a case-by-case basis,” id.  (citing Puerto Rico v. Blumenthal, 642 F.2d 622,
635 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1976)), and
observed that “[t]he regulatory structure of the banking laws must be permitted to
adapt to the changing financial needs of our economy,” id.  at 141 (citing M&M
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approach.90
As part of its analysis, the court of appeals considered and re-
jected SIA’s argument that the definition of “security” in two
statutes roughly contemporaneous with Glass-Steagall—the Se-
curities Act of 1933 and the 1934 Act91—should inform the de-
termination of what Congress intended the term to mean in
Glass-Steagall itself.  The D.C. Circuit emphasized the disparate
purposes of the enactments—Glass-Steagall to protect banks and
their depositors and the securities laws to eliminate abuses in a
hitherto unregulated securities market, prevent fraud, and pro-
tect investors—and concluded that different interpretations of
the term “securities” “may follow upon the differing regulatory
purposes behind the Acts.”92  The court of appeals also relied on
the Supreme Court’s decision in Marine Bank v. Weaver ,93 which
considered the character of the underlying instrument and the
economic and regulatory realities surrounding it in conjunction
with the underlying investor protection purposes of federal se-
curities regulation, and found that “[a] different focus of analysis
is called for under the Glass-Steagall Act, which aims at protect-
ing the integrity of banks and the financial resources of deposi-
tors rather than investors.”94
Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat’l Bank, 563 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1977) (bank-
ing laws construed to permit “use of new ways of conducting the very old business of
banking”)).
90 In reaching these conclusions, the D.C. Circuit conducted a searching, de novo
review of the language, structure, and legislative history of the Glass-Steagall Act.
A.G. Becker Inc. , 693 F.2d at 142-46.  Furthermore, in an extensive discussion re-
viewing and approving the Board’s functional equivalence analysis, id.  at 147-51, the
court of appeals relied on the Supreme Court’s classic pronouncement in Investment
Co. Institute v. Camp , 401 U.S. 617, 629-30 (1971), that Glass-Steagall represented a
congressional determination that policies which otherwise might support bank entry
into the investment banking business were outweighed by certain “hazards” and “fi-
nancial dangers,” A.G. Becker Inc.,  693 F.2d at 148, and concluded that “[o]nly if
commercial paper displayed the economic  characteristics of a ‘security’ would [its]
marketing . . . by Bankers Trust cause the hazards [that Glass-Steagall] was designed
to prevent.” Id.  Thus the Board “correctly focused on whether the commercial
paper marketed by Bankers Trust functioned economically as a loan or as a secur-
ity.” Id.
91 Both statutes encompass commercial paper because both define “security” to
include “any note.” See  15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (1933 Act); id.
§ 78c(a)(10) (1934 Act).
92 A.G. Becker Inc. , 693 F.2d at 146.
93 455 U.S. 551 (1982) (holding that bank certificate of deposit is not a “security”
for purposes of the federal securities laws).  For more on Weaver , see infra  notes
104-05 and accompanying text.
94 A.G. Becker Inc. , 693 F.2d at 147.  The Weaver  opinion’s emphasis on the need
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After so much extensive analysis by the Board, with its
vaunted expertise, and so scrupulous and detailed an opinion by
the D.C. Circuit,95 the Supreme Court’s reversal96 came as a sur-
prise to many.  The Court declined to defer to the Board’s inter-
pretation of the undefined term “securities”—an interpretation
that the Court found unduly narrow97—and preferred a broader
reading informed by the more expansive definition (which clearly
encompassed commercial paper) employed by Congress in the
contemporaneous securities laws:
There is . . . considerable evidence to indicate that the ordi-
nary meaning of the terms “security” and “note” as used by
the 1933 Congress encompasses commercial paper. Congress
enacted the Glass-Steagall Act as one of several pieces of leg-
islation collectively designed to restore public confidence in
financial markets.  See the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48
Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.); the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. § 77a
et seq. ; the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, 15
U.S.C. § 78a et seq. ; and the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803, 15 U.S.C. § 79a et seq.  In each of
these other statutes, the definition of the term “security” in-
cludes commercial paper, and each statute contains explicit ex-
ceptions where Congress meant for the provisions of an Act
not to apply to commercial paper.  These explicit exceptions
demonstrate congressional cognizance of commercial paper
and Congress’ understanding that, unless modified, the use of
the term “security” encompasses it.98
Thus a second modification to our syllogism on functional
equivalence is needed.
(1) X is subject to regulatory treatment R;
for careful economic analysis of the underlying instrument or transaction bolstered
the D.C. Circuit’s view that the sort of careful, functional analysis of commercial
paper and the commercial paper market that had been performed by the Board was
appropriate–indeed, necessary–to resolution of the case.
95 The panel majority’s slip opinion encompassed more than fifty pages of detailed
analysis.
96 Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 468 U.S. 137 (1984).
97 [W]e find unpersuasive the notion that Congress used the terms “notes . . .
or other securities” in the narrow sense that respondents suggest.  First, the
Court noted in [ICI v.] Camp  that “there is nothing in the phrasing of
either § 16 or § 21 that suggests a narrow reading of the word ‘securities.’
To the contrary, the breadth of the term is implicit in the fact that the
antecedent statutory language encompasses not only equity securities but
also securities representing debt.”
Id.  at 150 (citing Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 635 (1971)).
98 Id.  at 150-51 (footnote omitted).
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(2) Y is the functional equivalent of X;
(3) Therefore, Y should likewise be subject to R, UNLESS do-
ing so would be inconsistent with the legislative definition of
X under the pertinent statutory scheme OR a closely related
statutory scheme.
Another limitation arises when the conclusion of functional
equivalence carries with it a regulatory burden that the courts
deem duplicative or otherwise unnecessary.99  This is particularly
true when private litigants (or, on occasion, the SEC) have
sought to engraft an additional layer of securities regulation onto
a pre-existing regulatory structure.  The two leading cases for this
proposition are International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
Daniel100 and Marine Bank v. Weaver .101
Daniel  held that a noncontributory pension plan was not a se-
curity subject to regulation under the federal securities laws.102
Central to that holding was that the substantive terms of the pen-
sion plan were comprehensively regulated by another federal
statutory scheme, the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA), which also mandated certain disclosures,
thereby making it unnecessary to subject pension plans to the
requirements of the federal securities laws as well.  “The exis-
tence of this comprehensive legislation governing the use and
terms of employee pension plans severely undercuts all argu-
ments for extending the Securities Acts to noncontributory, com-
pulsory pension plans.”103  Similarly, Weaver  held that a bank
certificate of deposit was not a security.  There, the instrument in
99 There is an overlay of this principle in the Rule 3b-9 decision too. See  Am.
Bankers Ass’n v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739, 744-45 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
100 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
101 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
102 Daniel  involved a challenge by an employee who was denied a pension upon
retirement because a break in his overall twenty years of service rendered him ineli-
gible under the plan, which required twenty years of continuous  service.  439 U.S. at
553-55.  The pension plan, which had been entered into under a collective-bargain-
ing agreement between a labor union and several employers, required all employees
to participate in the plan but not to pay anything into it. Id.  Daniel, the aggrieved
employee, claimed that the union and petitioner trustee of the pension fund had
made material misrepresentations and omissions of fact with respect to the value of
a covered employee’s interest in the pension plan, and that such misstatements and
omissions constituted a fraud in connection with the sale of a security in violation of
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act (and Rule 10b-5 thereunder) and section 17(a) of the
1933 Act. Id.
103 Id.  at 569-70.
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question was a bank deposit104 subject to another comprehensive
system of regulation, the federal banking laws.  “It is unnecessary
to subject issuers of bank certificates of deposit to liability under
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws since the
holders of bank certificates of deposit are abundantly protected
under the federal banking laws.”105
The SEC has encountered the very same obstacle in connec-
tion with efforts to extend its jurisdiction106 over instruments or
104 The owners of the $50,000 certificate of deposit in Weaver  had pledged it to
the issuing bank in order to guarantee a $65,000 loan made by the bank to a third
party corporation that already owed the bank money and was overdrawn on its
checking accounts.  455 U.S. at 552-54.  The guarantors entered into a contract with
the owners of the borrower, whereby, as consideration for their guaranty, they
would receive, inter alia, an interest in the profits of the business. Id.  Allegedly, the
bank told the guarantors that the proceeds of the new loan would be used by the
borrower for working capital, but in reality they were applied first to pay off the
borrower’s pre-existing, past due indebtedness to the bank. Id.  When the borrower
went bankrupt and the bank announced its intention to use the certificate of deposit
to satisfy the guaranty obligation, the guarantors filed suit claiming, inter alia, that
the bank had violated the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act by soliciting the loan
guaranty, while knowing but not disclosing either the borrowing company’s financial
condition or the bank’s plans to repay the past due indebtedness to itself from the
proceeds of the guaranteed loan. Id.
105 Id.  at 559.
106 That the SEC had grounds for some optimism can be traced to SEC v. Variable
Annuity Life Insurance Co. , 359 U.S. 65 (1959) [hereinafter VALIC I].  Although
that case did feature an argument about SEC jurisdiction being unnecessary because
it would duplicate an existing scheme of regulation (namely, state insurance regula-
tion), it was not a functional equivalence case at all, but a statutory definition case.
VALIC I  concerned whether a variable annuity contract was a “security” as defined
in the 1933 Act and whether a company offering such variable annuity contracts was
an “investment company” as defined in the 1940 Act.  The 1933 Act explicitly ex-
empted “insurance” or “annuity” contracts from the definition of “security,” and the
1940 Act explicitly exempted an institution which met the definition of an “insur-
ance company” from the definition of “investment company.”  Except for these ex-
emptions, the variable annuity contract and the companies that offered them would
clearly fall within the 1933 Act’s definition of “security” and the 1940 Act’s defini-
tion of “investment company.”  (The 1933 Act did not actually contain a definition
of “insurance” or “annuity contract” but merely stated that its provisions did not
apply to “any insurance . . . or annuity contract . . . issued by a corporation subject to
the supervision of the insurance commissioner, bank commissioner, or any agency or
officer performing like functions, of any State . . . .”  15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8) (1994).)
While the exemptions for annuities and insurance companies in VALIC I  were
plainly designed in terms of existing supervision by other agencies, the Court held
that variable annuity contracts and the companies that offered them were not ex-
empt from the statutory definitions in question (“security” and “investment com-
pany”) and hence were subject to SEC regulation.  The ratio decidendi  turned on the
fact that a variable annuity contract contained markedly distinct features from a
traditional fixed-dollar annuity contract, which had been the only type of annuity
Congress had been aware of when enacting the statutes in question (since variable
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activities within the purview of banking.  The Banco Español de
Credito v. Security Pacific National Bank ,107 for example, in-
volved the sale of “loan notes” which were touted in the 1980s by
money center banks as an alternative to commercial paper.108
The factual setting is exemplary of the kind of “invention” that
had helped banks adapt to significant changes in the financial
services marketplace.109  These “loan notes” were part of the
market phenomenon that Marcia Stigum has dubbed banks
“get[ting] out of their old make-a-loan-and-hold-it business into
a new business, namely, the make-a-loan-and-distribute-it busi-
ness.”110  Short-term unsecured loans to corporate borrowers
were participated to a variety of purchasers,111 typically in mini-
mum denominations of $1 million, with recourse not against the
annuities weren’t developed until the late 1950s).  The holder of a variable annuity,
as opposed to a fixed annuity, “participate[s] on an ‘equity’ basis in the investment
experience of the enterprise,” just like the owner of a share of company stock or a
mutual fund does. VALIC I , 359 U.S. at 79 (Brennan, J., concurring). Thus, al-
though a variable annuity contract by name might fit a literal reading of “any insur-
ance . . . or annuity contract,” the Court concluded that Congress, in exempting
insurance-type contracts from SEC regulation, did not intend to exempt what were
essentially equity shares, however they might otherwise be denominated.
VALIC I  is just as important for what it did hold as for what it might have held
but did not.  Central to the Court’s conclusion was the lack of precision in the statu-
torily undefined term “insurance,” an imprecision that provided enough latitude to
permit the Court to decide that a variable annuity did not fall within the term.
VALIC I  was emphatically not  a case holding that although the products fell within
a statutory exemption, sound regulatory policy counseled subjecting them (and the
companies that offered them) to SEC oversight.
107 973 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1992).
108 For more on commercial paper, see supra  notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
109 See supra  note 83 and accompanying text.
110 MARCIA STIGUM, THE MONEY MARKET 1085 (3d ed. 1990).  As part of the
banking industry’s efforts to retain a share of credit-related business diminished by
large public corporations—traditionally commercial banks’ best loan customers—
accessing the commercial paper market, banks began to mass market loan participa-
tions to sophisticated purchasers (typically institutional purchasers, such as pension
funds or mutual funds, as well as wealthy individuals) that were not themselves in
the lending business. Id.  at 1086.  This distinguished these “loan notes” from garden
variety loan participations, where the purchasers were other lending institutions
fully capable of making their own assessments of the borrower’s creditworthiness
and, in many cases, of negotiating the terms of the participation “mano a mano”
with the lead bank. See , e.g. , Am. Fletcher Mortgage Co. v. U.S. Steel Credit Corp.,
635 F.2d 1247, 1254-55 (7th Cir. 1980) (emphasizing independent credit review and
retained contractual rights of loan participant); Union Planters Nat’l Bank v. Com-
mercial Credit Bus. Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d 1174, 1178 (6th Cir. 1981).
111 In Banco Español , the purchasers were foreign banks, domestic banks, thrift
institutions, treasury or money management portfolio departments of corporations,
pension and retirement funds, insurance companies, and mutual funds.  973 F.2d at
57 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting).
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bank but only against the borrowers.112  Purchasers of “loan
notes” differed from participants in loan syndications or partici-
pations113 in that the former were not generally in a position to
evaluate the borrower’s creditworthiness or to negotiate individ-
ually with the selling bank the terms of the offering.  For these
reasons, the SEC believed such purchasers needed the protection
of the federal securities laws.
Plaintiffs in Banco Español  thought so too.  They had origi-
nally found the loan notes congenial investments, because the
notes provided a short-term vehicle in which to place excess cash
for an excellent return, albeit with scant opportunity (or, for that
matter, incentive) to inquire into the creditworthiness of the cor-
porate borrowers.114  But when one of the borrowers defaulted
on over $75 million of notes, the plaintiffs sued for rescission115
under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act).116
The linchpin of the plaintiffs’ case was, of course, that the loan
notes constituted “securities” subject to the protections of the
1933 Act.  After the district court granted summary judgment on
the ground that the loan notes were not securities under the four-
pronged test established by the Supreme Court in Reves v. Ernst
112 Banco Español de Credito v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 763 F. Supp. 36, 38-39
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d , 973 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1992).
113 Traditional loan participations were not generally considered securities. See ,
e.g. , First Citizens Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 919 F.2d
510, 516 (9th Cir. 1990); McVay v. W. Plains Serv. Corp., 823 F.2d 1395, 1399 (10th
Cir. 1987); Union Nat’l Bank of Little Rock v. Farmers Bank, 786 F.2d 881, 885 (8th
Cir. 1986); Union Planters , 651 F.2d at 1181; Am. Fletcher , 635 F.2d at 1255; Devel-
oper’s Mortgage Co. v. TransOhio Sav. Bank, 706 F. Supp. 570, 575 (S.D. Ohio
1989); Deauville Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Westwood Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 648 F. Supp.
513, 518 (C.D. Cal. 1986). But see  Lehigh Valley Trust Co. v. Cent. Nat’l Bank of
Jacksonville, 409 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that a loan participation was
a security); Commercial Disc. Corp. v. Lincoln First Commercial Corp., 445 F. Supp.
1263, 1268 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); cf.  NBI Mortgage Inv. Corp. v. Chem. Bank, [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,066, at 91,800 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (sug-
gesting that a loan participation might  be a security).
For more detailed discussion of loan participations, see generally Jeffrey D.
Hutchins, What Exactly Is a Loan Participation? , 9 RUTGERS-CAM. L.J. 447 (1978);
Debora L. Threedy, Loan Participations—Sales or Loans?  Or Is That the Ques-
tion? , 68 OR. L. REV. 649 (1989).
114 Banco Español,  973 F.2d at 60 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting).
115 Id.  at 57-58 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting).
116 Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act permits a right of rescission for misrepresenta-
tions and omissions in a “prospectus.”  15 U.S.C. § 77l(2) (1994).  Since the Supreme
Court’s decision in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc.,  513 U.S. 561 (1995), courts have
held that section 12(2) applies only to initial public offerings.
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& Young ,117 plaintiffs appealed, and the SEC filed a brief amicus
curiae acknowledging that courts typically excluded loan partici-
pations from the scope of the federal securities laws but arguing
that the loan notes at issue were different, because “the non-fi-
nancial entities among the purchasers clearly were not acting as
commercial lenders, and even the banks that purchased generally
did so not through their lending departments but through their
investing and trading departments.”118  The Commission also
took issue with the district court’s analysis under the Reves  test,
emphasizing the investment purpose of the purchases by the par-
ticipants and the dissimilarity to traditional loan participations in
that the purchasers had far less than the normal amount of infor-
mation about the creditworthiness of the borrower and no op-
portunity independently to verify information about the
borrower.  Instead, the Commission argued, the loan notes were
“offered and sold to numerous entities in a market that meets the
Reves  Court’s definition of ‘common trading for speculation or
investment’ . . . [and] were promoted in language used in securi-
ties markets, and as the ‘equivalent’ of commercial paper . . . .”119
In short, the SEC advanced a “functional equivalence” argu-
ment: Because the loan notes were marketed as investments,
were bought by purchasers acting from an investment motivation
and with the benefit of only the type and quantum of publicly
available information typically available to investors (as opposed
117 494 U.S. 56 (1990).  Although the Reves  test “begin[s] with a presumption that
every note is a security,” id.  at 65, that presumption may be rebutted in two ways:
(A) by demonstrating that the note in question bears a “strong resemblance” to any
instrument on the laundry list of obligations that the Court previously had deter-
mined not to constitute securities (for example, notes delivered in consumer financ-
ing, notes secured by residential mortgages, short-term notes secured by liens on
small businesses or assets thereof, short-term notes secured by assignments of ac-
counts receivable, notes that simply formalize open-account debt incurred in the
ordinary course of business, and notes evidencing loans by commercial banks for
current operations), id. ; or (B) by persuading the Court under the four-pronged test
announced in the case that the note ought  to be on that laundry list, id.  at 67.  The
four factors are:  (1) an “examin[ation of] the transaction to assess the motivations
that would prompt a reasonable seller and buyer to enter into it,” id.  at 66; (2)
whether the note “is an instrument in which there is ‘common trading for specula-
tion or investment,’” id.  (quoting SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344,
351 (1943)); (3) “the reasonable expectations of the investing public,” id. ; and (4)
“whether some factor such as the existence of another regulatory scheme signifi-
cantly reduces the risk of the instrument, thereby rendering application of the Secur-
ities Acts unnecessary,” id.  at 67.
118 Brief of Amicus Curiae Securities and Exchange Commission at 3, Banco Es-
pañol de Credito v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 973 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1992) (No. 91-7563).
119 Id.  at 4-5.
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to that commonly available in loan participations), the notes had
all the indicia of securities and should receive the investor pro-
tection benefits of the federal securities laws.  Unimpressed with
those arguments, a divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed
on the reasoning of the district court, but when the Commission
persisted in joining the plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing, the Sec-
ond Circuit, while denying rehearing, did modify the opinion
somewhat to clarify that “even if an underlying instrument is not
a security, the manner in which participations in that instrument
are used, pooled, or marketed might establish that such partici-
pations are securities.”120  Here, however, the court of appeals
emphasized the fact that sale of the notes was limited to sophisti-
cated purchasers having “the capacity to acquire information
about the debtor” and enjoying, in the main, the protections of
an alternative scheme of regulation.121
Thus, on the basis of Daniel , Weaver , and Banco Español , a
final modification must be made to our syllogism on functional
equivalence:
(1) X is subject to regulatory treatment R;
(2) Y is the functional equivalent of X;
(3) Therefore, Y should likewise be subject to R, UNLESS do-
ing so would be (A) inconsistent with the legislative definition
of X under the pertinent statutory scheme OR a closely related
statutory scheme, OR (B) duplicative of protections afforded
by an independent regulatory regime.
B. Affiliation
Like “functional equivalence,” the concept of “affiliation” runs
the gamut from the colloquial to the technical, and from the le-
gally trivial to the legally significant.  Trivial examples used in
common parlance typically refer to rather loosely-defined rela-
tionships, such as mere membership, as when one is described as
being “affiliated” with an organization,122 an institution,123 or a
120 Banco Español , 973 F.2d at 56.
121 Id.  at 55; see also  John V. Murray & Anthony F. Vittone, The Banking and
Securities Businesses and the Recondite Line Between Them,  110 BANKING L.J. 388,
420-21 (1993); cf.  Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., 27 F.3d 808 (2d Cir. 1994) (hold-
ing that interests in mortgage notes sold to the general public merit investor protec-
tions of the federal securities laws and should be treated as securities).
122 Examples of such affiliation include tennis clubs in England that are “affili-
ated” with the Lawn Tennis Association (such affiliation being an advantage for the
club members in terms of getting access to tickets for the annual tournament at
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political party or other politically motivated group;124 a
franchise-type relationship, as when a television network refers
to its local “affiliates”;125 or an employment relationship, as when
one is described as being “affiliated” with a particular company
or firm.126  Such relationships may carry with them no particular
legal significance, as is usually the case with membership in an
organization,127 or they may become subject to legal regimes
ranging from contract law to labor and antidiscrimination laws
(as with employment) or antitrust laws (as with franchising).128
But these are not legal regimes based on “affiliation”  as the term
is typically understood from the Latin derivation of the word,129
which denotes the existence or creation of an extremely close re-
lationship, akin to one’s relationship to a son or daughter—noth-
ing at all like membership or employment relationships.130
Wimbledon). See  Vivek Chaudhary, Wimbledon Stands By Its Ticket Policy ,
GUARDIAN (London), June 25, 2001, at 2.
123 See , e.g. , Josh Fischman, Facing Down a Killer Disease, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., June 25, 2001, at 59 (quoting, inter alia , a physician at the Joslin Diabetes
Center said to be “affiliated with Harvard Medical School”).
124 See , e.g. , Peter Baker & Kamran Khan, Kidnapped Reporter Is Dead; Tape
Relayed to U.S. in Pakistan Said to Show American’s Execution , WASH. POST, Feb.
22, 2002, at A1 (“Saeed, a native of Britain affiliated  with the Jaish-i-Muhammad
terrorist group fighting India’s rule in Kashmir, shaved his beard . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
125 E.g. , Ted Loos, A Little-Known Award That Is a Big Deal to Insiders , N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 2001, § 2, at 25 (referring to KHOU in Houston, a local CBS
“affiliate”).
126 See , e.g. , Who Are the Nation’s Realtors? A Survey Holds the Answers , L.A.
TIMES, June 24, 2001, at K13 (describing a realtor as “affiliated with the same bro-
kerage company for five years”).
127 But cf.  Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 234 (1961) (prosecution of union
official for making false statement in an affidavit, then required by section 9(h) of
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (1958) (repealed 1959), to the
effect that he was “not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with  such
party”) (emphasis added); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 140 n.1 (1945) (alleged
violation of federal statute providing for the deportation of aliens “who are mem-
bers of or affiliated with  any organization, association, society, or group, that be-
lieves in, advises, advocates, or teaches:  (1) the overthrow by force or violence of
the Government of the United States”) (emphasis added).
128 For a recent decision construing the word “affiliate” as used in a release that
the National Football League demanded the former owner of the New England Pa-
triots sign before he was allowed to sell the team, see VKK Corp. v. NFL, 244 F.3d
114, 130 (2d Cir. 2001).
129 The word derives from “ad filum” or “ad filiam ,” meaning “to or toward a
son” or “to or toward a daughter,” respectively, or “affiliare ,” meaning “to adopt.”
See WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 24
(1966); OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, available at  http://dictionary.oed.com (last
visited Oct. 11, 2001).
130 The most recent edition of Black’s Law Dictionary  defines “affiliate,” some-
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Whereas the “functional equivalence” concept has its roots
deeply embedded in the common law, “affiliation” regimes—by
which I include not only affiliates in the common equity owner-
ship sense but also similar concepts such as “interested per-
sons”131 and “related interests”132—impose legal restrictions or
disabilities133 solely as a result of the relationship and are funda-
mentally statutory134 in nature.135  We can therefore posit a
what unhelpfully, as “being close in connection, allied, associated, or attached as a
member or branch.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 59 (7th ed. 1999).
131 This is a concept used in the 1940 Act. See infra  note 150.
132 See  12 U.S.C. § 375b (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (regulating extensions of credit
by a bank to its executive officers, directors, principal shareholders, or their “related
interests”); id.  § 375b(9)(G) (defining “related interest”).  The same concept is used
in the anti-tying provisions of the BHCA. Id.  § 1972.
133 On rare occasions, the result of affiliation can be the conferral of a benefit ,
such as the provision of the tax laws permitting life insurance companies under spec-
ified circumstances to file consolidated returns with affiliated non-life companies
(and thereby avail themselves of the net operating losses rather typical of, e.g., prop-
erty and casualty companies).  I.R.C. §§ 1501, 1503-1504 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); see
also  Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 177 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 1999).
134 Occasionally one encounters “affiliation” as a concept defined and applied in
agency regulations, where the statute may or may not be silent on the subject, but
this is typically where the legislature has expressly granted interpretive authority to
the agency to further the legislative goal of the particular statute. See , e.g. , 12
U.S.C. § 84(d) (1994) (giving the OCC authority to “prescribe rules and regulations
to administer and carry out the purposes of” the national bank lending limit, id.
§ 84(d)(1), including express authority to define terms used in the statute and au-
thority “to determine when a loan putatively made to a person shall for purposes of
this section be attributed to another person,” id.  § 84(d)(2); some of the ways OCC
has implemented this authority are cited in note 151, infra); id.  § 371c(b)(1)(E) (giv-
ing the Board authority, as part of statutory definition of “affiliate” in section 23A of
the Federal Reserve Act, to determine by regulation or order that a particular com-
pany has a relationship with a member bank or subsidiary or affiliate thereof that
should be treated as though that particular company were itself an “affiliate” as
defined in the earlier subparagraphs of the statute).
135 They may, however, have as a distant cousin a common law antecedent,
namely the concept of vicarious liability that developed in tort law, see RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 23 (1998), and that can also be found in the contempo-
rary statutory regime of the federal securities laws, see  15 U.S.C. § 78t (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998) (imposing secondary liability for violation of the 1934 Act or rules or
regulations thereunder upon persons controlling the person committing the
violation).
Courts typically have held that this statutory vicarious liability under the 1934 Act
does not foreclose alternative liability at common law. See , e.g. , Hollinger v. Titan
Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1576-77 n.27 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc); In re  Atl. Fin.
Mgmt., Inc., 784 F.2d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 1986); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Tex. Commerce
Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1115-19 (5th Cir. 1980); Marbury Mgmt., Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d
705, 716 (2d Cir. 1980).  Doubt has been cast on this proposition, however, by Cen-
tral Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. , 511 U.S. 164, 184
(1994), where the Supreme Court noted that Congress’s decision in section 20 “to
impose some forms of secondary liability, but not others, indicates a deliberate con-
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working definition of the concept as follows:
Affiliation is a statutorily defined index of relatedness that
subjects one or both related entities to a particular legal
treatment.
There is, however, no single, “one size fits all” definition of
that index of relatedness that applies to all statutory schemes.
Typically, each different regulatory regime is predicated upon an
explicit statutory definition of what the legislature means by “af-
filiate.”136  Most frequently, such definitions are expressed in
terms of percentage of stock ownership,137 which may or may not
gressional choice with which the courts should not interfere.” See also id.  at 201
n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Dinco v. Dylex, Ltd., 111 F.3d 964 (1st Cir. 1997). But
see  Seolas v. Bilzerian, 951 F. Supp. 978, 984 (D. Utah 1997) (finding respondeat
superior  liability consistent with remedial purposes of the federal securities laws).
136 Noteworthy exceptions are regulatory regimes created by consent decree, such
as the one that effected the breakup of AT&T and its separation from the so-called
Bell Operating Companies (BOCs).  That consent decree imposed restrictions on,
inter alia, the product and service markets that the BOCs may enter.  The restric-
tions were intended to ensure that the BOCs would not use their monopoly control
over local telephone exchanges to impede competition in other markets. See  United
States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 186-94 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub nom . Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).  Specifically, the decree prohibited the BOCs
from engaging in certain lines of business, including the manufacture of telecommu-
nications products, either “directly or through any affiliated enterprise .” Id.  at 227
(emphasis added).  Subsequent litigation posed the question whether this term—
which was not defined  in the decree—encompassed only entities in which a BOC
had some level of equity interest or whether it extended to a contractual arrange-
ment whereby a BOC would provide funds to an independent company for product
development in exchange for royalties on sales of the product to third parties.  The
courts held that the term “affiliated enterprise” was not limited to equity holdings
but was intended to cover all arrangements in which the BOCs share directly in the
revenues of entities engaged in prohibited businesses. See  United States v. W. Elec.
Co., No. 82-0192 1992 (HHG), U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1153 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 1992), aff’d ,
12 F.3d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
137 Some regimes do not specify any percentage of ownership, but in those situa-
tions the concept of corporate control becomes important.  The Small Business Ad-
ministration, for example, defines affiliation as one or more parties who directly or
indirectly control or have the power to control an enterprise.  “Affiliation arises
where one or more officers, directors or general partners controls the board of direc-
tors and/or the management of another concern.”  SBA Small Business Size Regula-
tions, 13 C.F.R. § 121.103(e) (2001).  “Control means the possession, direct or
indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and poli-
cies of a licensee or other concern, whether through the ownership of voting securi-
ties, by contract, or otherwise.” Id.  § 107.50.  A similar approach was taken by
Congress in the Federal Timber Contract Payment Modification Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 618(a)(7)(A)-(B) (1994). See  Pine Prods. Corp. v. United States, 945 F.2d 1555,
1559-60 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  Similarly, under the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2
U.S.C. § 441a(a)(5) (1994), affiliated committees (where the consequences of affilia-
tion are aggregation of campaign contributions) include those that are “established
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be tied to some notion (whether or not statutorily expressed) of
control.138
For example, the Depression-era Illinois public utility statutes,
which gave the Illinois Commerce Commission jurisdiction over
“affiliated interests having transactions, other than ownership of
stock and receipt of dividends thereon, with public utilities under
the jurisdiction of the Commission,”139 defined “affiliated inter-
ests” to encompass “[e]very corporation, ten per centum or more
of whose voting capital stock is owned by any person or corpora-
tion owning ten per centum or more of the voting capital stock of
such public utility . . . .”140  This formulation is rather expansive,
as it is well below the level of ownership that would normally
constitute control.141  Indeed, the Illinois statute did not explic-
itly deal with an ownership interest-related concept of corporate
or financed or maintained or controlled” by the same person or group.  2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(a)(5).  Federal Election Commission regulations implemented this definition
with a control approach, including a controlling interest in the voting stock or securi-
ties; authority or ability to direct or participate in governance; and “the authority or
ability to hire, appoint, demote, or otherwise control the officers, or other decision-
making employees.”  FEC Contribution and Expenditure Limitations and Prohibi-
tions, 11 C.F.R. § 110.3(a)(3)(ii)(c) (2001); see also  Common Cause v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 906 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
138 The quintessential “control”-type definition of affiliation is found in a variety
of statutes and is formulated as a second person (using the term to refer to juridical
as well as natural persons) which controls, is controlled by, or is under common
control with, the first person. See , e.g. , Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 § 2(27), 15
U.S.C. § 3301(27) (1994); BHCA § 2(k), 12 U.S.C. § 1841(k) (1994); Home Owners’
Loan Act of 1933 § 2(9), 12 U.S.C. § 1462(9) (1994); Savings and Loan Holding
Company Act (SLHCA), 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(a)(1)(H) (1994); Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Act § 3(w)(6), 12 U.S.C. § 1813(w)(6) (1994); International Banking Act of
1978 § 1(b)(13), 12 U.S.C. § 3101(13) (1994); Government Sponsored Enterprises
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 4502(1) (1994).
139 Illinois Public Utilities Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, § 8a(2) (1937), quoted
in  Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300, 303-04 (1937).
140 Id.  § 8a(2)(c), quoted in Slattery , 302 U.S. at 303-04.
141 But cf.  12 C.F.R. §§ 5.50(f)(2)(ii), 225.41(c)(2), 303.82(b)(2) (2001) (setting
forth regulatory presumptions of control at ten percent ownership of any class of
voting stock under the Change in Bank Control Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j) (1994),
promulgated by the OCC, the Board, and FDIC, respectively).  These are rebuttable
presumptions of control that apply if the bank is publicly held or if no other person
owns a greater percentage.  The OTS has adopted a variation on this rebuttable
presumption theme that is triggered when a person both  acquires more than ten
percent of any class of voting stock of a savings association and  is subject to any
“control factor,” e.g., where the acquiror would be one of the two largest holders of
voting stock of the savings association, or would hold more than twenty-five percent
of the total stockholders’ equity of the association or more than thirty-five percent
of debt and equity combined, or would (together with his representatives or nomi-
nees) occupy more than one seat on the board of directors or serve as the chairman
of the board, chairman of the executive committee, CEO, CFO, or any other posi-
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control, though it did incorporate alternative “substantial influ-
ence” elements into its definition of “affiliated interests” that
would be recognized today as commonly employed indicia in
statutory definitions of control.142
An even lower quantum of equity ownership is used in the fed-
eral anti-dumping statute, which defines “affiliated persons” as
those directly or indirectly owning five percent or more of the
voting shares of an organization.143  That statute also incorpo-
rates a “control” standard, by also defining as “affiliated per-
sons” two or more persons controlled by or controlling a
common person.144  Contrast the somewhat higher standard em-
ployed under the federal bankruptcy laws, where an “affiliate” is
defined as an entity that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or
holds with power to vote, twenty percent or more of the out-
standing voting securities of the debtor;145 “control” here refers
only to dominion over the securities, not to any concept of corpo-
rate control, which is absent from bankruptcy statute’s
formulation.
Like “functional equivalence,” “affiliation” is a concept com-
monly encountered in financial services regulation, principally as
a tool to avoid self-dealing and other conflicts of interest.  Typi-
cally in the financial services regulatory arena, affiliation is
linked to notions of corporate (or similar enterprise) control.
One encounters the concept of affiliation frequently in federal
securities laws contexts.  For example, the SEC’s Rule 12b-2
under the 1934 Act defines these concepts as follows:
An “affiliate” of, or a person “affiliated” with, a specified
person, is a person that directly, or indirectly through one or
more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under
common control with, the person specified. . . .
tion with similar policymaking authority in the association.  OTS Acquisition of
Control of Savings Associations, 12 C.F.R. § 574.4(b)(1)(I), (c) (2001).
142 Slattery , 302 U.S. at 303-04 & n.1 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3,
§ 8a(2)(f) (1937) (any corporation with one or more directors or elective officers in
common with the public utility); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, § 8a(2)(g) (1937) (any
corporation which the Illinois Commerce Commission determined “as a matter of
fact after investigation and hearing” to be “actually exercising any substantial influ-
ence over the policies and actions of such public utility”); id.  § 8a(2)(h) (similar to
(g), but incorporating an “acting in concert” concept for individuals and compa-
nies)); cf.  12 U.S.C.A. § 1841(a)(2)(B)-(C) (West 2001) (BHCA’s non-equity inter-
est indicia of control).
143 19 U.S.C. § 1677(33)(E) (1994).
144 Id.  § 1677(33)(F).
145 11 U.S.C. § 101(2)(A) (1994).
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The term “control” (including the terms “controlling,” “con-
trolled by” and “under common control with”) means the pos-
session, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the
direction of the management and policies of a person, whether
through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or
otherwise.146
Affiliation is a key concept in the 1940 Act, among the princi-
pal goals of which was to restrict transactions involving invest-
ment companies and their affiliates, thereby putting an end to a
variety of abusive practices that occurred in the 1920s and 1930s.
Section 17 of that statute,147 for example, contains prohibitions
against an array of such transactions, and section 10(f)148 restricts
an investment company’s acquisition of securities from an under-
writing syndicate comprising certain affiliates.  The complex
treatment of affiliations with different stages of relatedness (e.g.,
“first-tier” and “second-tier” affiliates) need not be spelled out in
any detail herein149 for even a casual reader to appreciate the
importance to the elucidation of these restrictions and prohibi-
tions of the manner in which affiliation is defined under the 1940
Act.  The actual defined term, not “affiliate” but “affiliated per-
son,” uses the five percent level of equity ownership, in addition
to entity control effected by (1) acting in concert with other eq-
uity holders, (2) employment relationships (i.e., director, officer,
partner, etc.), or (3) contractual relationships (e.g., the relation-
ship of the investment adviser to the investment company).150
If anything, prohibitions and restrictions based on “affiliation”
146 SEC General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17
C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2001).
147 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1994).
148 Id.  § 80a-10(f).
149 An excellent summary of these provisions is contained in DIV. OF INVESTMENT
MGMT., U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, PROTECTING INVESTORS:  A HALF CEN-
TURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 475-80 (1992).
150 Section 2(a)(3) of the 1940 Act defines “affiliated person” to include any per-
son owning five percent or more of the voting securities of an investment company;
any person in which five percent or more of the voting securities are owned by the
investment company; any person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or
under common control with, the investment company; any of the investment com-
pany’s officers, directors, partners, or employees; the investment adviser and any
members of an advisory board; and, in the case of a unit investment trust, the depos-
itor.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) (1994).
A related concept, to ensure a minimum number of independent (i.e., sans poten-
tial conflicts of interest) directors of an investment company, is found in section
10(a) of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a), which provides in essence that no more
than sixty percent of the members of the investment company’s board may be com-
prised of “interested persons.”  “Interested persons” include persons who have cer-
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in some form are even more prevalent as a regulatory paradigm
in banking law than in securities law.  Since much of the focus of
banking regulation is on the safety and soundness of banking in-
stitutions, protecting them from abusive transactions with affili-
ates ranks high on the list of regulatory priorities, and so the
federal banking statutes and regulations are rife with such provi-
sions,151 and with definitions of the term “affiliate.”  One finds
such definitions in the Bank Holding Company Act,152 section
23A of the Federal Reserve Act,153 the Savings and Loan Hold-
ing Company Act,154 the Home Owners’ Loan Act,155 the Inter-
national Banking Act,156 the Glass-Steagall Act,157 the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act,158 the Government Sponsored Enter-
prises Act,159 and the Depository Institutions Management Inter-
locks Act.160
tain relationships to the investment company or to the securities industry generally
as well as those with certain relationships with such persons. Id.  § 80a-2(a)(19).
151 Some of these provisions do not make use of the term “affiliate” but deal with
the same concerns using “control” concepts. E.g. , Comptroller of the Currency
Lending Limits, 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(c)(2)(i) (2001) (setting forth attribution rule, for
lending limit purposes, for loans or extensions of credit to borrowers “related di-
rectly or indirectly through common control”), id. § 32.5(c)(2)(ii) (finding attribu-
tion where “substantial financial interdependence exists between or among the
borrowers,” with such interdependence deemed to exist where, on an annualized
basis, fifty percent or more of Borrower A’s gross receipts or gross expenditures are
derived from transactions with Borrower B), id.  § 32.5(c)(3) (applying attribution
rule where Borrower A and Borrower B each receives loans from the bank to ac-
quire control of a business enterprise, with the control level pegged at fifty percent
or more of voting securities or other voting interests), id.  § 32.5(d)(1) (finding attri-
bution for loans to a “corporate group”).  Similar restrictions apply to insider lend-
ing restrictions, including loans to “related interests” of executive officers, directors,
or principal shareholders of member banks under section 22(h) of the Federal Re-
serve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 375b(5)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); the statutory provision
defines “related interests” of a person in a manner similar to “affiliate” definitions,
covering any company controlled by that person with “company” broadly defined to
include various forms of business organization, id.  § 375b(9)(A) and extending as
well to political or campaign committees controlled by, or the assets or services of
which benefit, that person, id.  § 375b(9)(G).
Other, similarly motivated provisions, of course, expressly use and define the term
“affiliate.” See , e.g. , Federal Reserve Act § 23(A)-(B), 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1
(1994) (restrictions on transactions between member banks and their affiliates).
152 See  12 U.S.C. § 1841(k) (1994).
153 See id.  § 371c(b)(1)-(2).
154 See id.  § 1467a(a)(1)(H).
155 See id.  § 1462(9).
156 See id.  § 3101(13).
157 See id  § 221a(b).
158 See id.  § 1813(w)(6).
159 See id.  § 4502(1).
160 See id.  § 3201(3).
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In summary, what this abbreviated discussion is intended to
demonstrate is that affiliation  is quintessentially a statutory, not
a common law, concept, which is applied to a specific situation
targeted by the legislature for a specific purpose.  Administrative
agency definitions of “affiliation” or related concepts are possi-
ble, at least where the statute has expressly conferred such
rulemaking or interpretive authority, but, as we have seen earlier
in Dimension ,161 the agency is not free (absent some very spe-
cific162 statutory authorization, which does not include a generic
authority to prevent evasions of the statute163) to “redefine” an
existing statutory definition.
The consequence of defining Y as an affiliate of X is to apply
a specific legal treatment to Y that would not, in the absence
of such affiliation, obtain; hence the definition must be care-
fully tailored to the particular purpose for which the statute
has been enacted.
In other words, an “affiliate” for one purpose is not an “affili-
ate” for another.  Certain ramifications of these fundamental,
and hopefully unexceptionable, tenets are developed in Part III
below.
II
The success of early efforts by the insurance industry (particu-
larly trade associations of insurance agents) to keep banks out of
the insurance business164 retarded the development of bank in-
surance powers during much of the era of rapid financial homog-
enization that commenced in the late 1970s.  Nevertheless the
OCC, ever a cheerleader for expanding powers of its national
161 Bd. of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986); see also supra
notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
162 Invoking the broad purposes of the legislation, as Dimension  taught us, will
not do.  474 U.S. at 373-74.
163 Id.  at 373 n.6 (rejecting the Board’s contention that express authority to rede-
fine statutory terms had been granted in section 5(b) of the BHCA, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1844(b) (1994), which authorized the Board “to issue such regulations and orders
as may be necessary to enable it to administer and carry out the purposes of this
Chapter and prevent evasions thereof”).
164 See , e.g. , Ga. Ass’n of Indep. Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Saxon, 268 F. Supp. 236 (N.D.
Ga. 1967), aff’d , 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968); Ala. Ass’n of Ins. Agents v. Bd. of
Governors, 533 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976); see also  Garn-St Germain Depository Insti-
tutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 601, 96 Stat. 1469, 1536 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(c)(8) (West 2001)).
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bank constituency165 (which, of course, numbered the majority of
the larger, more sophisticated banks), refused to acquiesce to
these setbacks and developed increasingly better (and increas-
ingly more impervious to judicial review) rationales for bank
penetration of the insurance business.  These advances by na-
tional banks166 proceeded along two fronts: The transformation
of a sleepy statute, the so-called “town of 5,000” provision167 into
a dynamic and potent vehicle for nationwide insurance agency
activities, and the employment of “functional equivalence” anal-
ysis to empower banks to engage, under the general national
bank powers statute,168 in insurance activities free from the geo-
graphic constraints (however rapidly those might be disappear-
ing!) of the town of 5,000 statutory authority.
A. The Bank-Insurance Industry “Tug-of-War”169 and the
Cultivation of the § 92 Power
Since the earliest days in the history of bank holding company
165 Lest the reader be misled by the somewhat sardonic connotations often associ-
ated with the word “cheerleader,” the author should clarify that the statement in
text is merely descriptive and that no criticism of OCC is intended thereby.  Indeed,
OCC’s concern for its constituency was totally appropriate and amply justified by
market developments resulting in increased competition for bank customers by non-
bank firms and the dismantling of the cartelized system of regulation that had for so
many decades coddled the banking industry. See  Kenneth Scott, The Uncertain
Course of Bank Deregulation , 5 REG. 40 (1981) (coining the phrase “cartel banking”
to describe the pre-existing regulatory system).  Thus banks were beset by mass de-
fections of retail deposits to essentially unregulated money market funds (which of-
fered new products functionally equivalent to transaction accounts but with higher
interest rates paid to customers) and of high-quality corporate borrowers to securi-
ties firms and the commercial paper market. See generally  Fisher, supra  note 81, at
130-36 (1992) (describing market trends in this period of upheaval).
166 The focus here on national banks should not be read to diminish the sophisti-
cation, size, or significance of state bank initiatives.  Clearly Bankers Trust Company
and Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, two large, state-chartered institutions, were
at the absolute forefront of bank entry into the wholesale securities business. See ,
e.g. , Fisher, supra  note 81, at 148-58.  Likewise, at least prior to the banking crisis of
the late 1980s-early 1990s and the enactment of section 303 of the FDICIA, 12
U.S.C. § 1831a (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (with its limitation on state bank principal
activities essentially to those permissible for national banks), a number of state
banks (and state legislatures) pioneered bank insurance powers.  Fisher, supra  note
8l, at 196 & n.379 (noting that by 1991, surveys conducted by the FDIC and the
Conference of State Bank Supervisors revealed that more than half the states per-
mitted state-chartered depository institutions some type of insurance powers).
167 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1994).
168 U.S. REV. STAT. § 5136 (1878), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24 (Seventh) (West 2001).
169 The Fifth Circuit (presciently, in light of later events) characterized the turf
battle between the two industries as a “huge commercial tug-of-war.” Ala. Ass’n of
Ins. Agents , 533 F.2d at 231.
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regulation, the question of the propriety of commercial banking
organizations entering the insurance business has been contro-
versial at each of two organizational levels:  the bank itself and
the holding company.
At the bank level, there has been an ongoing debate about,
first, what the precise contours of the “business of banking”170
under the National Bank Act171 are, and second, what the outer
limits are to what can be considered “incidental” to that business
of banking.172  Interpreting the meaning of these phrases has en-
gendered an enormous amount of discussion and debate among
regulators,173 commentators,174 and the courts.175
170 12 U.S.C. § 21 provides, in pertinent part:  “Associations for carrying on the
business of banking  under this chapter may be formed by any number of natural
persons . . . .”  12 U.S.C. § 21 (1994) (emphasis added).  (But it does not define what
is meant by the “business of banking.”)  The phrase appears, again without defini-
tion, in 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh), which authorizes the institution “to exercise by its
board of directors or duly authorized officers or agents, subject to law, all such inci-
dental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking . . . .”  12
U.S.C.A. § 24 (Seventh) (West 2001) (emphasis added).
171 The meaning of the phrase potentially has significance for all banks—not
merely national banks—for two reasons.  First, many states have enacted so-called
“wild card” statutes giving state-chartered banks parity with national banks in terms
of authorized powers.  “As a result of wild card authority, state banks in a majority
of states [have] piggy-backed national bank authority [with respect to insurance ac-
tivities] as it was granted [by OCC] . . . .” KAROL K. SPARKS, INSURANCE ACTIVI-
TIES OF BANKS § 3.03[B][1] (1998 & Supp. 2000).  Second, section 4(c)(5) of the
BHCA permits investments (including controlling investments) in companies en-
gaged in nonbank activities that are “of the kinds and amounts eligible for invest-
ment by national banking associations under the provisions of [12 U.S.C. § 24].”  12
U.S.C. § 1843(c)(5) (1994).
172 In general, the test for what activities are “incidental” to the business of bank-
ing within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) is that set forth in Arnold Tours,
Inc. v. Camp , 472 F.2d 427, 432 (1st Cir. 1972) (holding that incidental activities are
those that “convenient or useful in connection with the performance of one of the
bank’s established activities”).  Among the activities authorized by OCC as “inci-
dental” to the business of banking are acceptance of assignment of a judgment for
collection; sale of annuities; interbank borrowing; certifying checks; compromise of
debts; data processing services; providing financial advice; sale of mortgage pass-
through certificates; and providing municipal bond insurance.
173 See , e.g. , OCC Interpretive Letter No. 812, [1997-1998 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81-260 (Dec. 29, 1997); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 743,
[1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81-108 (Oct. 17, 1996);
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 368, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 85-538 (July 11, 1986); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 271, [1983-1984 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85-435 (Sept. 21, 1983); OCC Interpre-
tive Letter No. 137, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85-
218 (Dec. 27, 1979); FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., MANDATE AND CHANGE:  RESTRUC-
TURING THE BANKING INDUSTRY 26 (1987); James J. Saxon, Bank Expansion and
Economic Growth:  A New Perspective , 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 597 (1963).
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At the holding company level, from the original enactment of
the BHCA in 1956 to the significant BHCA Amendments of
1970,176 the Board gave its approval to a variety of insurance
sales activities by bank holding company subsidiaries177 as
“closely related to banking” and a “proper incident thereto.”178
The Board continued to do so under the somewhat more strin-
gent standard embodied in the 1970 Amendments,179 even en-
174 See , e.g. , Jeffrey D. Dunn, Expansion of National Bank Powers:  Regulatory
and Judicial Precedent Under the National Bank Act, Glass-Steagall Act, and Bank
Holding Company Act , 36 SW. L.J. 765 (1982); Henry Harfield, Sermon on Genesis
17:20; Exodus 1:10 (A Proposal for Testing the Propriety of Expanding Bank Ser-
vices) , 85 BANKING L.J. 565 (1968); Ralph F. Huck, What Is the Banking Business? ,
21 BUS. LAW. 537 (1966); Edward L. Symons, Jr., The “Business of Banking” in
Historical Perspective , 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 676 (1983); Rufus J. Trimble, The
Implied Power of National Banks to Issue Letters of Credit and Accept Bills , 58
YALE L.J. 713 (1949); Walter Wyatt, Right of National Banks To Act As Transfer
Agents , 7 VA. L. REV. 594 (1921).
For a revisionist view, consistent with OCC’s regulatory agenda in the 1990s, see
Julie L. Williams & Mark P. Jacobson, The Business of Banking:  Looking to the
Future , 50 BUS. LAW. 783 (1995); Julie L. Williams & James F.E. Gillespie, Jr., The
Business of Banking:  Looking to the Future—Part II,  52 BUS. LAW. 1279 (1997); see
also  James R. Smoot, Financial Institutions Reform in the Wake of VALIC, 29
CREIGHTON L. REV. 691 (1996); James R. Smoot, Bank Operating Subsidiaries:  Free
at Last or More of Same? , 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 651 (1997).
175 See , e.g. , NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513
U.S. 251 (1995); Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987); Franklin Nat’l
Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373 (1954); Colo. Nat’l Bank v. Bedford, 310 U.S. 41
(1940); First Nat’l Bank v. Hartford, 273 U.S. 548 (1927); First Nat’l Bank v. Mis-
souri, 263 U.S. 640 (1924); First Nat’l Bank v. Nat’l Exch. Bank, 92 U.S. 122 (1875);
Merchants Nat’l Bank v. State Nat’l Bank, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 604 (1870); First Nat’l
Bank of E. Ark. v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1990); Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Clarke,
885 F.2d 1034 (2d Cir. 1989); Nat’l Retailers Corp. v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 604 F.2d 32
(9th Cir. 1979); M & M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat’l Bank, 563 F.2d 1377 (9th
Cir. 1977); Arnold Tours , 472 F.2d 427; Amer. Ins. Ass’n v. Clarke, 656 F. Supp. 404
(D.D.C. 1987), aff’d in part and rev’d in part , 865 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir.), vacated in
part by  865 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Ga. Ass’n of Ind. Ins. Agents v. Saxon, 268 F.
Supp. 236 (N.D. Ga. 1967), aff’d , 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968).
176 Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84
Stat. 1760.
177 These included various distinctly credit-related lines of insurance, such as
credit life, credit accident and health, and mortgage redemption, as well as lines with
less of a nexus to credit extension, such as agricultural, travel, workers’ compensa-
tion, fire, theft, marine liability, and property insurance. See generally  Howard Bas-
kin & Brian F. Spector, Permitting Sale of Insurance by Bank Holding Company
Subsidiaries:  A Revised Analytic Framework , 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 543 (1978).
178 At that time, this test was embodied in section 4(c)(6) of the BHCA, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(c)(6) (1958).
179 See supra  note 176.  In those amendments, Congress restructured this statu-
tory exception to the nonbanking prohibition as the now-familiar section 4(c)(8),
and elaborated on “proper incident” prong of that standard to require proof that
performance of a given nonbanking activity “can reasonably be expected to produce
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dorsing unrestricted sales of insurance within the holding
company system and underwriting  of certain credit-related insur-
ance in the version of Regulation Y that was in effect prior to the
Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469.180
The OCC as a champion of expanded bank powers, and in par-
ticular with respect to insurance, has, of course, an even longer
pedigree.  Going back to the World War I era, a time when life in
America was considerably more bucolic than today,181 we find
Comptroller of the Currency John Skelton Williams drafting and
forwarding to Congress the legislation that ultimately became en-
acted as 12 U.S.C. § 92,182 the so-called “town of 5,000” statute.
benefits to the public, such as greater convenience, increased competition, or gains
in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse effects, such as undue concentration of
resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interest, or unsound banking
practices.”  12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994) (amended 1999).  Courts have accorded
substantial deference to the Board’s findings in this regard. See , e.g.,  Bd. of Gover-
nors v. Inv. Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46 (1981).
The “closely related to banking” prong of the test has been analyzed under a
tripartite test initially adumbrated in National Courier Ass’n v. Board of Governors ,
516 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1975) and subsequently endorsed explicitly by the Board,
see , e.g. , Barnett Banks of Fl., Inc., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 648, 649 (1985), and tacitly by
the Supreme Court, see  Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 468 U.S. 207, 210-11
& n.5 (1984).  Insurance activities generally fell under the first two elements of that
test (i.e., whether banks generally have in fact provided the proposed services, and
whether banks generally provide services that are operationally or functionally so
similar to the proposed services as to equip them particularly well to provide the
proposed services, see Nat’l Courier , 516 F.2d at 1237).
180 See  12 C.F.R. § 225.22(b)(9)(I), (10) (1981).
181 Indeed, it was the phenomenon of rural isolation that gave rise to Comptroller
John Skelton Williams’ concern about the long-term viability of small-town national
banks, particularly in areas where the paucity of available deposits was forcing some
banks to charge “excessive and in some cases grossly usurious” interest rates in or-
der to survive.  53 CONG. REC. 11,001 (1916).  While not condoning usury, Williams
was sympathetic to the plight of these banks and sought to provide them with “addi-
tional sources of revenue” so that they could compete more effectively “with local
State banks and trust companies which are sometimes authorized . . . to do a class of
business not strictly that of commercial banking.” Id.  Allowing small town national
banks to sell insurance was part of Williams’ solution to augment their profitability.
Id.; see generally  Nat’l Ass’n of Life Underwriters v. Clarke, 736 F. Supp. 1162, 1169
(D.D.C. 1990), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.  Indep. Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Clarke,
955 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1992), rev’d sub nom.  U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins.
Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439 (1993), aff’d on remand sub nom.  Indep. Ins. Agents,
Inc. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
182 Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 461, 39 Stat. 752.  Longstanding controversy over
whether this provision had inadvertently been repealed by the Act of Apr. 5, 1918,
ch. 45, § 20, 40 Stat. 512, compare , e.g. , Comm’r v. First Sec. Bank, 405 U.S. 394, 401,
401 & n.12 (1972), First Nat’l Bank v. Smith, 610 F.2d 1258, 1261 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980),
Saxon v. Ga. Ass’n of Indep. Ins. Agents, Inc. 399 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1968) (all
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In 1963, Comptroller of the Currency James Saxon declared that,
in order to use the § 92 authority, a national bank need not have
its main office in a town of 5,000; merely a branch office would
do.183  As branching in that era was heavily circumscribed184 (and
even prohibited altogether in certain states),185 this interpreta-
tion was regarded at the time as essentially a non-event.  A chal-
lenge was ultimately brought years later, when branching
restrictions had been loosened considerably, but was dismissed
on the ground of laches.186
Also in the early 1960s, Comptroller Saxon, an aggressive ex-
ponent of national bank powers, ruled that national banks had
the authority under the incidental powers clause to act as agent
in the issuance of insurance incidental to banking transactions.187
The ruling was challenged by the Georgia insurance agents, who
argued that under § 92 national banks were implicitly forbidden
to engage in any insurance activities in areas with a population
greater than 5,000.188  The district court agreed, holding that the
assuming continued existence of § 92), and  Garn-St Germain Depository Institu-
tions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 403, 96 Stat. 1469, 1511 (purporting to
amend 12 U.S.C. § 92), with  David W. Roederer, Nonexistent Banking Law War-
rants Closer Scrutiny , LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 9, 1984, at 12 (arguing that § 92 is no
longer part of the laws of the United States), and  Indep. Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Clarke,
955 F.2d 731, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (having raised sua sponte  an issue not raised by
the parties and having demanded supplemental briefing, the Court ultimately held
that the statute had been repealed), was finally resolved when the Supreme Court
held that the provision remained on the statute books and was good law. U.S. Nat’l
Bank of Or. , 508 U.S. at 439.
183 This 1963 ruling was ultimately published in the Federal Register  in 1971, Inter-
pretive Rulings, 36 Fed. Reg. 17,000, 17,015 (Aug. 26, 1971), and is now codified
among OCC’s regulations at 12 C.F.R. § 7.1001.
184 See , e.g. , First Nat’l Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252,
253 (1966) (describing restrictive Utah branching law, UTAH CODE ANN., tit. 7, ch.
3, § 6 (Supp. 1965)); First Nat’l Bank in Plant City v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 124-25
(1969) (noting Florida law prohibited branch banking altogether).  Parochial state
branching persisted even into the heyday of financial modernization. See , e.g. , In-
dep. Bankers Ass’n of N.Y., Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, 757 F.2d 453, 456 (2d Cir.
1985) (describing New York’s “home office protection” statute, section 105 of the
New York Banking Law, as prohibiting branching in any community with a popula-
tion of 50,000 or less where another bank has its principal office).
185 Florida (as described in Plant City , 396 U.S. at 124-25), Michigan, and West
Virginia were examples of such “unit banking” states.
186 Nat’l Ass’n of Life Underwriters v. Clarke, 736 F. Supp. 1162, 1165 & n.11
(D.D.C. 1990) (holding twenty-three-year delay unreasonable) (citing Indep. Bank-
ers Ass’n of Am. v. Heimann, 627 F.2d 486, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding twelve-
year delay unreasonable)).
187 See Saxon , 399 F.2d at 1011.
188 See  Ga. Ass’n of Indep. Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Saxon, 268 F. Supp. 236, 237 (N.D.
Ga. 1967), aff’d , 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968).
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more specific § 92, rather than the more general incidental pow-
ers clause of § 24 (Seventh), constituted the exclusive source of
authority for national banks’ insurance activities.189  That holding
was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, which specifically declared that
OCC’s expansive construction of the incidental powers clause
was contrary to congressional intent.190
With the rationale of Saxon  as an impediment to expanding
into the insurance business, the banking industry turned to hold-
ing company affiliates as an alternative path for new insurance
authority.  This maneuver proved a modestly successful strategy
at first.  Not that the Board’s expansive interpretations with re-
spect to insurance powers under section 4 of the BHCA, noted
above,191 did not go unchallenged by the insurance industry; in-
deed they were challenged, and with some success, by regional
and national trade association of insurance agents.  Their initial
challenge was a judicial one that met with mixed results in an
appellate decision invalidating only the broad insurance powers
within the holding company system but leaving intact the credit-
related insurance powers.192
Rather than continue to fight about the net public benefits
(under the “proper incident” prong of section 4(c)(8)) on a given
application before a largely inhospitable agency decisionmaker
and on a case-by-case basis, the insurance agents switched their
focus to Capitol Hill where, in Title VI of Garn-St Germain, they
secured an amendment to section 4(c)(8) declaring that a variety
of insurance activities were conclusively not  “closely related to
banking,”193 subject to seven statutory exceptions.194  The non-
189 Id.  at 238.
190 Saxon , 399 F.2d at 1016.
191 See supra  notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
192 Ala. Ass’n of Indep. Ins. Agents v. Bd. of Governors, 533 F.2d 224 (5th Cir.
1976), modified on reh’g , 558 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1977).
193 Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320,
§ 601, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469, 1536 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1843(c)(8) (West 2001)).
194 The seven exceptions included:  (1) providing life, disability, and involuntary
unemployment insurance, provided it is limited to assuring repayment of outstand-
ing balances on specific extensions of credit by a bank holding company or its sub-
sidiary; (2) acting as agent in the sale of property insurance on loan collateral, where
the coverage is limited to assuring repayment of the outstanding balance on the
loan; (3) engaging in general insurance activities in towns with a population of 5,000
or less; (4) engaging in “grandfathered” insurance activities (antedating May 1,
1982); (5) acting as a managing general agent over retail agents who sell insurance
coverage to the holding company; (6) engaging in any insurance activity if the bank
holding company has less than $50 million in assets, except that such holding compa-
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bank, holding company affiliate route was now effectively
foreclosed.
A sense of urgency, occasioned by increasing insurance indus-
try penetration of the banking business,195 drove OCC back to
the drawing board.  Structurally, of course, the Garn-St Germain
prohibition applied only to activities covered by section 4 of the
BHCA (governing activities of nonbank subsidiaries of a bank
holding company), not section 3 (governing bank holding com-
pany acquisitions of banks but not governing, despite the Board’s
self-aggrandizing efforts to the contrary, what those banks—or,
indeed, their subsidiaries—were permitted to do).196
Thus in the mid-1980s, OCC approved the request of United
States National Bank of Oregon to sell insurance from a branch
in a sparsely populated town not only to existing customers of
the bank but to potential customers located anywhere in the
country.197  The challenge brought by the insurance agents’ trade
association was ultimately198 rejected by the D.C. Circuit on
nies are restricted to selling life insurance or annuities; and (7) continuing to engage
in activities grandfathered under the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of
1970 (i.e., activities approved by the Board prior to January 1, 1971, the effective
date of those amendments).  12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994).
For more detailed discussion of Garn-St Germain and the seven exceptions, see
SPARKS, supra  note 171, §§ 4.02-4.03.
195 One of the earliest forays was the development of competing products, such as
guaranteed investment contracts (GICs) which were functionally similar to bank
certificates of deposit.  Then, in the 1980s, the insurance industry launched more
direct attacks, first by establishing so-called “nonbank banks” (before that loophole
was closed with the passage of CEBA), and second by acquiring savings and loan
subsidiaries, because, unlike the restrictive regime under for bank holding compa-
nies, federal law did not limit the activities of unitary thrift holding companies. See
12 U.S.C. § 1467a(c)(3) (1994).
Note that GLEBA has now eliminated, prospectively, the so-called unitary thrift
holding company “loophole.”  No company, other than a grandfathered unitary
thrift holding company, may after May 4, 1999 acquire control of an insured savings
association other than one that will engage only in the activities permissible for a
financial holding company, see infra  notes 370-401 and accompanying text, or a mul-
tiple thrift holding company.  GLEBA § 401(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1467a(c)(9) (West
2001).
196 See  Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 890 F.2d 1275 (2d Cir.
1989); Citicorp v. Bd. of Governors, 936 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1991); Fisher, supra  note
81, at 197-214.  For an analysis, prior to the Citibank Delaware case, of the Board’s
authority under the BHCA to regulate the activities of subsidiaries of holding com-
pany banks, see Keith R. Fisher, Federalism Contra Federal Reservism:  Bank Hold-
ing Companies and State Bank Powers , 23 U.S.F. L. REV. 317 (1989).
197 OCC Interpretive Letter No. 366, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,536 (Aug. 18, 1986).
198 This was the litigation that led to the momentary hiccough over whether 12
U.S.C. § 92 was still on the statute books of the United States. See supra  note 182.
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Chevron  deference grounds199 vis-a-vis OCC’s conclusion that 12
U.S.C. § 92 placed no limitation on the geographic scope of the
insurance business that might be conducted by a national bank
out of a town of 5,000 or less.200  A similar result was reached
when the Indiana Insurance Commissioner limited the insurance
agency license of a national bank to sales within the small town
where the bank’s branch was located.201  There, the Seventh Cir-
cuit likewise concluded that the Commissioner’s license limita-
tion could not be upheld because, when it came to national
banks, Congress had implicitly given OCC discretion to define
the geographic scope of the § 92 authority.202
That it sufficed to locate a mere branch in the small town did
not answer the question whether the branch could be essentially
a sham or a “mail drop” or whether genuine functions relating to
the insurance agency business had to be housed there.  OCC ulti-
mately provided guidance on that point in a 1996 letter to First
Union National Bank, where the agency required the small town
office to be bona fide and to constitute the “front office” for the
entirety of the insurance operation, including licensing, receipt
and payment of commissions, processing policy applications, and
recordkeeping.203  OCC also suggested, though stopped short of
actually opining in the First Union Letter, that the bank should
be able to maintain offices of the insurance agency in other loca-
tions in pari materia  with what other insurance agencies operat-
ing from small towns in the state were authorized to do.204
199 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Chevron  embodies a two-step procedure.  In the first step, the reviewing court ascer-
tains whether Congress has directly spoken to the issue in the statute in question.  If
so, the court ascertains the meaning of the statutory language without any deference
to the agency’s interpretation, because courts have just as much expertise in statu-
tory construction as do administrative agencies.  If not, the court must defer to the
substantive expertise of the agency except in the rare instance where the agency’s
decision is either so unreasonable or so manifestly inconsistent with the statutory
policy that the court could responsibly conclude that the agency decision violates the
intent of Congress. Id.  at 842-45.
200 Indep. Ins. Agents of Am. v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
201 NBD Bank, N.A. v. Bennett, 67 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 1995).
202 Id.  at 631; accord  Shawmut Bank Conn., N.A. v. Googins, 965 F. Supp. 304 (D.
Conn. 1997).
203 OCC Interpretive Letter No. 753, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,107 (Nov. 4, 1996) [hereinafter First Union Letter].
204 Id.  This position was solidified somewhat in a 1999 letter to Kirk Flores,
Counsel of ANB Amro North America, Inc.  There, OCC requested opinions from
the Illinois and Michigan insurance regulators and satisfied itself that, notwithstand-
ing the absence of any express statutory authority in those states, insurance agencies
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Furthermore, customer solicitations (whether by mail,
telemarketing, or canvassing by agents), were not limited to the
small town.205
A variation on the theme of satellite offices arose in connec-
tion with national bank acquisitions of existing insurance agen-
cies.  If the agency in question were located in a town with more
than 5,000 inhabitants, OCC would permit the acquisition but
would condition its approval on the bank’s relocating the insur-
ance agency to a town of 5,000 within two years.206
Towns of 5,000 or less are not as numerous as they were in
those halcyon days when § 92 was first enacted.  Of course, with
the advent of interstate branching,207 national banks need no
longer look for such communities only within their own state.
Still, with continuing urbanization and population growth, the
long-term utility and significance of 12 U.S.C. § 92 would be
doubtful, but for an expansive and as yet unchallenged OCC in-
terpretation.  Though known as the “town  of 5,000” provision,
this statute, which remains on the books even after GLEBA, pro-
vides that a national bank “located and doing business in any
place  the population of which does not exceed five thousand in-
habitants . . . may, under such rules and regulations as [OCC may
prescribe] . . ., act as the agent for any fire, life or other insurance
company authorized . . . to do business in [the state where the
bank is located] . . . .”208
Use of the word “place” rather than “town” in the statute has
led OCC, in response to an inquiry from the Florida Department
there could operate through satellite offices.  Accordingly, OCC permitted the
bank’s insurance agency subsidiary in a town of 5,000 to open satellite offices on an
interstate basis in both states. See  OCC Interpretive Letter No. 864 (May 19, 1999),
available at  1999 OCC QJ LEXIS 286.
205 First Union Letter, supra  note 203.  Indeed, in another letter, OCC concluded
that solicitation and selling of insurance could be conducted in any manner permissi-
ble for non-bank affiliated insurance agencies in the state, so long as the principal
office of the insurance operation was housed in a town of 5,000.  OCC Interpretive
Letter No. 844, [1998-1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,299
(Oct. 20, 1998).
206 See , e.g. , Katharine Fraser, OCC:  Small-Town Insurance Loophole Not an
Open Door , AM. BANKER, Oct. 13, 1999, at 3 (reporting OCC’s conditional approval
of an application by National Bank of Commerce of Mississippi, Starksville,
Mississippi).
207 Interstate branching was authorized by the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking
and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338.  For inter-
state branching by national banks, see 12 U.S.C. § 36(g) (1994).
208 12 U.S.C. § 92  (1994) (emphasis added).
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of Insurance, to declare that the statute applies to any area desig-
nated a “place” by the United States Bureau of the Census.209
OCC’s analysis centered on so-called “census designated places,”
which, as defined by the Bureau of the Census, include densely
settled concentrations of population that are identifiable by
name but legally are not separately incorporated places.210  “The
import of this decision is clearly not in rural areas—small towns
abound.  The import is that a small place for § 92 purposes may
be in the middle of metropolitan centers, thus bringing national
bank small town insurance initiatives literally into the big
city.”211
Finally, no summary of developments under § 92 would be
complete without mentioning the Barnett  litigation.  There, the
Florida insurance regulators challenged insurance sales pursuant
to § 92 by a national bank, Barnett Bank.  Florida had on its stat-
ute books an anti-affiliation law,212 which prohibited sales of in-
209 OCC Interpretive Letter No. 823, [1997-98 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,272 (Feb. 27, 1998); see also  OCC Interpretive Letter No. 824,
[1997-1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,273 (Feb. 27, 1998).
210 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, at
A-9 (1995).  To qualify as a census designated place, the unincorporated community
must, if located in a rural area, have at least 1,000 people and, if located in an urban-
ized area, have at least 2,500 people.
211 SPARKS, supra  note 171, § 3.02[B][6].
212 At the time of the Barnett  litigation, a significant number (roughly half) of the
states had enacted anti-affiliation statutes. Compare id . § 5.03 (identifying twenty
states with anti-affiliation provisions (Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Vermont, and West Virginia) and another five (Alaska, Arizona, New York, Ohio,
and Texas) with similar statutory limitations on bank insurance activities), with
Michael P. Malloy, The Sound of Two Hands Flapping:  Insurance-Related Activities
of National Banks , 41 ST. LOUIS L.J. 75, 79 & n.44 (1996) (identifying fifteen states
with “statutory provisions that prohibit commercial banks from selling insurance”
and another nine with laws that “may be interpreted as imposing similar limita-
tions”) (citing Linda Greenhouse, Ruling Backs Banks’ Sales of Insurance , N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 1996, at D-1).
These state anti-affiliation laws had previously shown themselves to be remarka-
bly impervious to constitutional challenge.  Among the better known anti-affiliation
statutes was Pennsylvania’s, which prohibited companies selling insurance in that
state (which was the fourth largest insurance market in the country) from affiliation
with a variety of depository institutions and their holding companies, regardless of
whether the depository institution existed in, or even did business in, the state.  40
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 281 (West Supp. 1994).  Ford Motor Company and United
Services Automobile Association, each a savings and loan holding company, chal-
lenged the statute on the grounds that it violated the Supremacy Clause and the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution.  Ford Motor Co. v. Ins. Comm’r, 874 F.2d 926
(3d Cir. 1989).  The Third Circuit held that the Pennsylvania statute was preempted
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surance by banks and their subsidiaries, affiliates, and
employees,213 and the principal legal issue was whether that anti-
affiliation statute was preempted by § 92.  The Eleventh Circuit
upheld the Florida statute,214 and the litigation went up to the
Supreme Court in order to resolve a conflict among the lower
courts.215
Ordinarily, state laws that conflict with a scheme of regulation
as pervasive as the federal banking laws216 or that stand as an
obstacle to achieving Congress’s purpose in enacting a particular
federal statute217 will be held preempted under the jurisprudence
that has arisen under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
Normal preemption rules do not apply with respect to insurance
regulation, however, because in the 1940s Congress enacted a
special “reverse preemption” regime known as the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.218  Under that regime, general purpose federal
statutes that happen to cause or encounter some interference or
conflict with state insurance laws do not preempt those laws but
are themselves preempted.219  If, however, the federal statute
“specifically relates to the business of insurance,” then the re-
verse preemption rule is inapplicable and, as one would normally
expect, the federal statute preempts the state insurance law.220
The precise contours of what constitutes the “business of insur-
ance” for this purpose are complex and beyond the scope of this
only to the extent that it would prohibit acquisitions of failing thrift institutions, but
not healthy ones, and sustained the statute against the Commerce Clause challenge
as well. Id.  at 928.  No preemption attack predicated on 12 U.S.C. § 92 was involved
in that case, however.
213 “No [Florida licensed] insurance agent . . . who is associated with, . . . owned or
controlled by . . . a financial institution shall engage in insurance agency activi-
ties . . . .” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.988(2) (West Supp. 1996).  The term “financial
institution” was defined for this purpose to include “any bank . . . [except a] bank
which is not a subsidiary or affiliate of a bank holding company and is located in a
city having a population of less than 5,000 . . . .” Id.  § 626.988(1)(a).
214 Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Gallagher, 43 F.3d 631 (11th Cir.
1995).
215 See  Owensboro Nat’l Bank v. Stephens, 44 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding
Kentucky statute preempted); see also  First Advantage Ins., Inc. v. Green, 652 So.
2d 562 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that Louisiana statute was not preempted).
216 See , e.g. , Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).  The un-
derlying notion here is that the scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive that
there is no room for supplementation by state law, and hence one can infer Congres-
sional intent to preempt inconsistent state laws.
217 See , e.g. , Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
218 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994).
219 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
220 Id.
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discussion.221  Nonetheless, if 12 U.S.C. § 92 does not “specifi-
cally relate[ ]” to the “business of insurance,” it is difficult to im-
agine a statute that does.  The Supreme Court in Barnett  reached
the same conclusion.  Deciding first that the state law stood as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the congressional purpose in
enacting § 92,222 the Court found McCarran-Ferguson inapplica-
ble because § 92—which permits national banks to solicit insur-
ance, sell insurance policies across a wide spectrum, and receive
insurance commissions—specifically relates to the business of in-
surance and constitutes an intentional223 federal adjustment of
state insurance regulation.224
Barnett  thus immunized § 92 against state anti-affiliation stat-
utes and, in so doing, established a standard for assessing the vi-
tality of § 92 vis-a-vis other types of state laws:  A state law will
be preempted if it prevents or significantly interferes with or sig-
221 The Supreme Court has evolved somewhat inconsistent frameworks here. See ,
e.g. , Dept. of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491 (1993); Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v.
Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982); Group Life and Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug, 440 U.S.
205 (1979); SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
222 The Court found the same sort of “irreconcilable conflict” in Barnett  as had
been found in Franklin National Bank v. New York , 347 U.S. 373 (1954), where a
state law prohibiting commercial banks from using the word “savings” in their ad-
vertising was held preempted by a federal statute permitting national banks to ac-
cept savings deposits. See  Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S.
25, 34-35 (1996).
223 Relying on one of the expressed statutory statements of purpose, namely that
“silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to
the regulation or taxation of [the business of insurance] by the several States,” 15
U.S.C. § 1011, the Court construed McCarran-Ferguson as being intended to protect
state insurance regulation from inadvertent  federal preemption. Barnett , 517 U.S. at
39.
224 Id.  at 41.  The Court rejected Florida’s argument that § 92 is predominantly
related to banking, not insurance, and therefore did not satisfy McCarran-Fergu-
son’s “specifically relates” formulation:
[A] statute may specifically relate to more than one thing.  Just as an ordi-
nance forbidding dogs in city parks specifically relates to dogs and to parks,
so a statute permitting banks to sell insurance can specifically relate to
banks and to insurance.  Neither the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s language,
nor its purpose, requires the Federal Statute to relate predominantly to
insurance.  To the contrary, specific detailed references to the insurance
industry in proposed legislation normally will achieve the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act’s objectives, for they will call the proposed legislation to the atten-
tion of interested parties, and thereby normally guarantee, should the
proposal become law, that Congress will have focused upon its insurance-
related effects.
Id.  at 41-42; see also id.  at 41 (“The language of [§ 92] is not general.  It refers
specifically to insurance.  Its state regulatory implications are not surprising, nor do
we believe them inadvertent . . . .”).
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nificantly impairs the ability of a national bank to sell insurance
from a town of 5,000.225  As perhaps the only aspect of the pre-
1999 bank-insurance regime that survived enactment of GLEBA,
this standard will continue to have significant implications for
any state law with an impact on small town insurance marketing
activities by national banks.226
B. Resurgence of § 24 (Seventh) and the Efficacy of
“Functional Equivalence” Analysis
Over time, the Saxon  holding rejecting the incidental powers
clause as authority for insurance activities227 became the object
of frequent criticism228 and did not ultimately prove to be an
ironclad bar to national bank insurance activities under the “inci-
dental powers” rationale.  Thus, notwithstanding the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s decision, OCC in 1977 promulgated regulations affirming
its position that national banks could sell credit life insurance by
virtue of the incidental powers clause229 and was upheld on judi-
cial review.230  Building upon this success in the realm of sales ,
OCC took another step when it approved the acquisition by a
national bank of an operating subsidiary which was already en-
gaged in underwriting , as a reinsurer, credit life and credit acci-
dent and health insurance—all predicated on the “convenient or
useful” standard of the restrictive Arnold Tours  interpretation of
12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh).231
Indeed, OCC evolved a narrow interpretation of Saxon  as
prohibiting banks from engaging in insurance activities (other
225 Id.  at 33.
226 The implications extend even more broadly in those states that have “wild
card” statutes permitting state-chartered banks to exercise the same powers as na-
tional banks. See SPARKS, supra  note 171, § 3.03[B][1].
227 See supra  notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
228 E.g. , Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 736 F.2d 468, 477 n.6
(8th Cir. 1984); Indep. Bankers Ass’n of Am. v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164, 1170 (D.C.
Cir. 1979).
229 Disposition of Credit Life Insurance Income, 42 Fed. Reg. 48,518 (Sept. 23,
1977) (codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-2.5 (2001)).  OCC reasoned that credit life insur-
ance was a form of security for loans and thus permissible under as incidental to the
power to lend.
230 Heimann , 613 F.2d at 1170.  Significantly, the court rejected the contention
that § 92 implicitly prohibits national banks from engaging in insurance activities
such as selling credit life insurance apart from the town of 5,000 setting and indi-
cated express disagreement with the Saxon  decision.
231 OCC Interpretive Letter No. 277, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,441 (Dec. 21, 1983).
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than as permitted under § 92, of course) where both  (A) the ac-
tivities were “incidental” to the business of banking (i.e., were
not themselves the business of banking)232 and  (B) the bank did
not act as an “insurance agent.”  In determining what constituted
acting as an insurance agent, OCC identified several factors:  (1)
the existence of an agency agreement; (2) receipt of commissions;
(3) selling a variety of lines of insurance; (4) risk evaluation; (5)
engaging in general insurance counseling; (6) investigation of ap-
plicants; (7) assumption of certain underwriting risks; (8) han-
dling of claims; and (9) issuance of the certificate of coverage.233
Based on this interpretation, OCC incrementally permitted fur-
ther bank penetration of the insurance business, on the ground
that the activities in question were not “agency” activities.234
The road was neither straight nor unobstructed, however, and
OCC suffered occasional setbacks.  For example, criticism of
Saxon  by the Eighth and D.C. Circuits led OCC to believe the
door was open for a further narrowing of its interpretation of
that decision, most notably in the area of title insurance.  Here
again, OCC took the approach, analogous to the one taken with
credit life insurance, of characterizing title insurance as a unique
product directly connected to a national bank’s lending activities,
because lenders typically required mortgage applicants to secure
title insurance in order to protect the lender’s security interest in
the mortgaged property.235  From sales of title insurance, it was
232 This was an important qualification, as it allowed OCC subsequently to catego-
rize certain traditional insurance products as “financial products” and hence part of
the “business of banking” itself under § 24 (Seventh). See infra  notes 170-75 and
accompanying text.
233 OCC Interpretive Letter No. 241, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,405 (Mar. 26, 1982).
234 These included (1) entering into a percentage lease with an unaffiliated insur-
ance agency, OCC Interpretive Letter No. 274, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,438 (Dec. 2, 1983); (2) offering life insurance as an
inducement to customers to open IRAs or certificates of deposit, OCC Interpretive
Letter No. 241, supra  note 233; (3) disseminating health insurance literature with
monthly statements of account, id. ; (4) furnishing an insurance company with lists of
borrowers and active credit card holders, OCC Interpretive Letter No. 316, [1985-
1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,486 (Dec. 4, 1984); and (5)
referring customers to an insurance agency and sharing in any resulting commis-
sions, Unpublished Letter from William B. Glidden, Asst. Dir., OCC Legal Advi-
sory Services Division (May 8, 1986), except that the latter activity could not be
carried on in states with insurance laws prohibiting commission splitting.
235 OCC Interpretive Letter No. 368, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,538, at 77,836 (July 11, 1986).  In addition to the nexus to the core
lending function and increased one-stop shopping for the bank’s customer, OCC
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but a small step to authorizing underwriting by a national bank’s
operating subsidiary under the selfsame rationale.236  This time,
however, after an abortive attempt at judicial review within the
Fifth Circuit237 (brought there, no doubt, to take advantage of
the Saxon  precedent), a challenge to OCC’s approval of a propo-
sal by Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. was sustained by the Second
Circuit, which resuscitated the Saxon  rationale.238
Another, more recent, setback for OCC was its authorization
for national banks to sell crop insurance in connection with loans
to farmers.239  From OCC’s perspective, this was a natural ad-
junct to the “business of banking” (to wit:  agricultural lend-
ing)240 and could be undertaken pursuant to the general
authority of 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh), and therefore without any
of the geographic restrictions of § 92.  The courts took another
view, however:  a result that might well have been averted had
OCC been scrupulous about characterizing the product as some-
thing other than “insurance.”241  Slamming the agency for flout-
ing “both common sense and two traditional rules of statutory
interpretation:  the presumption against surplusage and expressio
unius est exclusio alterius ,”242 the D.C. Circuit, affirming the
noted that thrift institutions were allowed to sell title insurance, thereby calling into
play considerations of competitive equilibrium. Id.  at 77,839.
236 OCC Interpretive Letter No. 377, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,601 (Feb. 6, 1987).
237 The American Land Title Association challenged the ruling not only on Saxon
grounds but also on the ground that the activities were forbidden for operating sub-
sidiaries by the BHCA.  (Interestingly, in another case, the Board felt compelled by
Garn-St Germain to disapprove title insurance activities by bank holding companies,
except in relatively rare cases of grandfathering. See  Am. Land Title Ass’n v. Bd. of
Governors, 892 F.2d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1989).)  The district court declined to address
the merits, however, and dismissed the case on the somewhat dubious procedural
grounds that the OCC interpretive letters, as staff opinions rather than opinions of
the Comptroller himself, did not constitute final agency action subject to judicial
review under the Administrative Procedure Act, and further that the matter was not
ripe for adjudication because OCC had expressed a willingness to consider new facts
bearing on its interpretation, an attitude the court also deemed indicative of a lack
of finality.  Am. Land Title Ass’n v. Clarke, 743 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
238 Am. Land Title Ass’n v. Clarke, 968 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1992).
239 OCC Interp. Letter No. 812, [1997-1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 81,260 (Dec. 29, 1997).
240 OCC authorized sales of crop insurance and hail/fire insurance regardless of
whether insurance proceeds were assigned to the bank as collateral for a loan or
were simply part of the credit underwriting process (i.e., a factor bearing on the
farmer’s ability to repay). Id.
241 See infra  notes 256-57 and accompanying text.
242 Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Hawke, 211 F.3d 638, 643 (D.C. Cir. 2000);
see also id.  at 642 (“Though the OCC is surely familiar with its past defeats, it seems
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lower court’s application of Saxon ,243 refused to defer to OCC
under Chevron  because the court found the language and struc-
ture of the National Bank Act clear and unambiguous.244
Notwithstanding these occasional setbacks, OCC’s non-acqui-
escence in the Saxon  rationale led it to more creative efforts, cul-
minating in what was clearly the most promising (and, to the
insurance industry, doubtless the most threatening) approach of
all: functional equivalence .  Once it can be established that a par-
ticular product that has been marketed as “insurance” is, in fact,
the functional equivalent of a banking or financial product, then
its characterization as “insurance” can successfully be jettisoned
and the Saxon  rationale (and result) averted.  (Clearly, OCC had
made no showing that title insurance or crop insurance were
functional equivalents of any traditional or pre-existing banking
or financial product.)
OCC’s first successful outing in the courts with this more
promising approach was rendered a bit chaotic because of the
temporary intrusion of BHCA issues,245 but the fundamental Na-
determined to repeat them,” referring to Saxon , American Land Title , as well as
holdings to the same effect in Commissioner v. Morris Trust , 367 F.2d 794 (4th Cir.
1966), and First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Commissioner , 436 F.2d 1192 (10th
Cir. 1971), aff’d on other grounds,  405 U.S. 394 (1972)).
243 Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Hawke, 43 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 1999),
aff’d , 211 F.3d 638 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (adopting Saxon  and American Land Title
rationale).
244 Hawke , 211 F.3d at 645 (referring to the Saxon  analysis that § 92 precludes
any possibility of interpreting the “incidental powers” clause of § 24 (Seventh) as
encompassing insurance activities).  The Court relied on similar reasoning in Texas
& Pacific Railway Corp. v. Pottorff , 291 U.S. 245, 257-59 (1934), which held that
national banks had no incidental power under § 24 (Seventh) to pledge their assets
to secure private deposits; had this power existed, there would have been no need
for Congress later to enact 12 U.S.C. § 1290 to provide a limited power to pledge.
The D.C. Circuit also hedged its Chevron  position by concluding that, even if any
statutory ambiguity as to the meaning of “incidental” remained, OCC’s interpreta-
tion was not reasonable, in view of the pedigree of crop insurance as an insurance
product and the fact that the bank is not customarily the beneficiary of such insur-
ance (distinguishing the credit-life product the same court had earlier upheld in In-
dependent Bankers Ass’n of America v. Heimann , 613 F.2d 1164, 1170 (D.C. Cir.
1979)).
245 The issue was whether a subsidiary of a bank controlled by a holding company
could engage in a new activity without prior Board approval.  The original D.C.
Circuit panel reached out to decide an issue not raised by the parties, i.e., that OCC
did not have discretion to fail to condition its approval of Citibank’s proposed acqui-
sition on subsequent approval by the Board under the BHCA, even though no
BHCA application had ever been filed and none was required.  Am. Ins. Ass’n v.
Clarke, 854 F.2d 1405, 1412-13 (D.C. Cir.), vacated in part  by 865 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir.
1988).  Shortly thereafter, however, the panel granted rehearing and ultimately va-
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tional Bank Act analysis enjoyed ready judicial acceptance.  Ci-
tibank proposed to acquire, as an operating subsidiary of the
national bank, the American Municipal Bond Assurance Corpo-
ration (AMBAC), purveyor of a product that had been marketed
as municipal bond insurance.  Citibank’s position was that this
activity was incidental to the business of banking within the
meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh)246 because it was function-
ally equivalent to a traditional banking product, the standby let-
ter of credit.247
Letters of credit, whether commercial or standby, are triangu-
lar relationships.  The purpose of a letter of credit is to facilitate
an underlying transaction by substituting the known credit of a
reputable bank, the “issuer” of the letter of credit, for the more
uncertain (or lesser-known) credit of the bank’s customer, the
“account party.”  This enhances the creditworthiness of the ac-
count party in the eyes of the other party to the underlying trans-
action, the “beneficiary” of the letter of credit.  Each leg of the
triangle represents a separate and independent contract.





cated the BHCA portion of its earlier decision, having concluded that the BHCA
question had not been appropriately before the court.  Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Clarke, 865
F.2d 278, 287-88 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  For discussion of the AMBAC case, see Fisher,
supra  note 196, at 318-23.
246 OCC has a long-standing position that the provision of financial support for
the transactions of others is fundamental to the business of banking. See  Am. Ins.
Ass’n v. Clarke, 656 F. Supp. 404, 409 (D.D.C. 1987), aff’d in part, rev’d in part , 854
F.2d 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Letter from James E. Smith, Comptroller of the
Currency, [1973-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,301, at
81,417 (July 1, 1974)).
247 OCC Interpretive Letter No. 338, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,508 (May 2, 1985).
\\Server03\productn\O\ORE\80-4\ORE403.txt unknown Seq: 55 16-JUL-02 14:19
Orphan of Invention:  Why the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Was Unnecessary 1355
In a standby letter of credit, the contractual undertaking of the
issuer is to pay the beneficiary on the letter of credit upon the
default248 of the account party on the underlying transaction.249
The standby letter of credit is thus a variant that performs the
functions served by a commercial guaranty250 or, more to the
point, an insurance policy.
This similarity lay at the heart of the functional equivalence
approach in the AMBAC case, as shown in the following
diagram.
248 This is the difference between the standby letter of credit and the commercial
letter of credit, where the issuer typically pays on the letter of credit upon presenta-
tion by the beneficiary of documentation tending to show performance of, rather
than default on, the underlying obligation.  For more on letters of credit, the classic
work remains HENRY HARFIELD, BANK CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES (5th ed. 1974).
See also BORIS KOZOLCHYK, COMMERCIAL LETTERS OF CREDIT IN THE AMERICAS:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS (1966).
249 FDIC regulations define a standby letter of credit somewhat more broadly to
include
any letter of credit, or similar arrangement however named or described,
which represents an obligation to the beneficiary on the part of the issuer:
(1) To repay money borrowed by or advanced to or for the account of the
account party, or (2) to make payment on account of any indebtedness
undertaken by the account party, or (3) to make payment on account of
any default (including any statement of default) by the account party in the
performance of an obligation.
FDIC Unsafe and Unsound Banking Practices, 12 C.F.R. § 337.2(a) (2001).  A foot-
note in the regulation clarifies that this definition does not include “commercial let-
ters of credit and similar instruments where the issuing bank expects the beneficiary
to draw upon the issuer, which do not ‘guaranty’ payment of a money obligation of
the account party and which do not provide that payment is occasioned by default
on the part of the account party.” Id.  § 337.2 n.1
250 Indeed, as national banks are forbidden from providing guaranties, the propri-
ety of their issuing standby letters of credit was at one time in doubt. See , e.g. ,
Republic Nat’l Bank of Dallas v. Northwest Nat’l Bank of Fort Worth, 578 S.W.2d
109 (Tex. 1978).
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Here, the notion is that insurance, which pays off only upon the
default of the municipality on its bond obligation, acts as a credit
enhancement to the marketability of bonds issued by municipali-
ties with lower debt ratings that would otherwise find it difficult
to attract investors to their bonds.  In this way, as Citibank urged
and the Comptroller found, the business of municipal bond insur-
ance is the functional equivalent of a banking product, the
standby letter of credit, and therefore was a part of the business
of banking under 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) and permissible activ-
ity for Citibank to engage in via acquisition of AMBAC.  The
reviewing courts had no trouble deferring to the Comptroller’s
conclusion on this point.251
Functional equivalence lay at the heart of an even more signifi-
cant case for bank penetration of the insurance business.
Through interpretive rulings beginning in the 1980s, OCC facili-
tated national bank entry into the lucrative area252 of brokering
and selling fixed and variable annuities.253  Even though issued
by insurance companies, these products were declared not to be
251 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Clarke, 656 F. Supp. 404, 408 (D.D.C. 1987), aff’d in relevant
part , 854 F.2d 1405, 1409-11 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
252 The competitive impact on the insurance industry can be gauged from trade
press articles at the time the judicial challenge to OCC’s interpretations was
mounted. See , e.g. , Annuities Sales by Banks:  An Up and Coming Business , ABA
CONSUMER BANKING DIG., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 4-9 (projecting bank annuity sales for
the following year at $10 billion); Bank Annuity Sales Expected to Double in ’89 ,
NAT’L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH/FIN. SERVICES, Jan. 2, 1989, at 3.
253 OCC Interpretive Letter No. 331, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,501 (Apr. 4, 1985); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 499, [1989-1990
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,090 (Feb. 12, 1990).
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insurance for purposes of § 92 and the Saxon  rationale.  In the
case of variable annuities, of course, there was a securities fea-
ture,254 so that variable products, despite their annuity feature,
were essentially a form of a mutual fund share.255
More fundamentally, however, OCC distinguished annuities in
general from insurance by characterizing the former as contain-
ing a feature that renders them functionally financial instruments
and not classical insurance: the risk was characterized as essen-
tially an investment risk, not an insurance risk.256  Purchasers of
annuities, according to this analysis, seek not a pool of assets
against a catastrophic risk (e.g., death) but a guaranteed, long-
term, and often tax-advantaged return on their assets.  In short,
purchasers of annuities are buying a financial instrument of the
type long brokered by banks and clearly authorized by 12 U.S.C.
§ 24 (Seventh).257
As icing on the cake, OCC further observed that “it is well
recognized that insurance and annuity contracts are significantly
254 See VALIC I , 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
255 OCC Interpretive Letter No. 331, supra  note 253.  This of course made a varia-
ble annuity a security for purposes of the Glass-Steagall Act, but OCC had little
difficulty authorizing brokerage and sale as consistent with the authorization for
agency activities in section 16 of that statute, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh). Cf.  Inv. Co.
Inst. v. Clarke, 793 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding sale of commingled IRA trust
funds permissible); Inv. Co. Inst. v. Conover, 790 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Inv. Co.
Inst. v. Clarke, 789 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1986); see also  OCC Interpretive Letter No.
386, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,610 (June 19,
1987) (authorizing national bank subsidiary to make recommendations to customers
from broad range of secondary market securities and collective investment securities
products, combining discount brokerage and investment advisory services); OCC In-
terpretive Letter No. 403, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 85,627 (Dec. 9, 1987); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 370, [1985-1987 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,540 (Apr. 16, 1986) (approving bank’s
proposal to offer brokerage and investment advisory services); OCC No-action Let-
ter No. 85-1, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,001
(July 30, 1985) (allowing combination of financial planning service and brokerage
service within the bank).
Even with fixed annuity certificates, OCC’s treatment of the product as “financial
investment instruments” (i.e., as securities) necessitated obeisance to section 16 of
Glass-Steagall.  OCC Interp. Letter No. 499, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Bank-
ing L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,090 (Feb. 12, 1990).
256 OCC Interpretive Letter No. 331, supra  note 253.
257 Id.  Relying on the cases critical of Saxon , e.g. , Indep. Bankers Ass’n of Am.
v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v.
Bd. of Governors, 736 F.2d 468, 477 (8th Cir. 1984), OCC reiterated its position that
although 12 U.S.C. § 92 might authorize some otherwise impermissible insurance
activities for small town banks, it does not prohibit a national bank from conducting
“insurance-related” activities if these are otherwise authorized by the National Bank
Act.  OCC Interpretive Letter No. 331, supra  note 253.
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different in their operation and the Supreme Court has stated
that the two are ‘opposites.’”258  In a sense this is true.  In a typi-
cal life insurance situation, the insurer assumes the risk that the
insured will live a briefer life span than actuarial calculations in
mortality tables would predict.  An annuity typically involves
payment by the issuer of income for a period defined by the an-
nuitant’s life, and there the insurance company (or other issuer)
assumes the risk that the annuitant will live a longer life span
than the actuarial calculations would predict.  On the other side
of the transaction, the annuitant is hedging against the risk of a
long life, just as someone who buys a life insurance policy is
hedging against the risk of a short one.  In both situations, mor-
tality risk is of paramount concern, though the two products re-
present opposite sides of the coin.259
OCC’s approval of sales of both fixed and variable annuities
by a national bank operating subsidiary260 was challenged, for
obvious strategic reasons, in the same judicial circuit that decided
Saxon , albeit with some jurisdictional and venue-related maneu-
vering.261  The district court deferred to OCC’s interpretation,262
but the Fifth Circuit, justifying the plaintiff’s venue-based predic-
258 OCC Interpretive Letter No. 331, supra  note 253 (citing Helvering v. Le
Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539-41 (1941) (stating that “[t]he fact remains that annuity and
insurance are opposites”; combined purchase of life insurance policy with annuity
negated the risk transfer inherent in insurance)); Carroll v. Equitable Life Assur-
ance Soc’y, 9 F. Supp. 223, 224 (W.D. Mo. 1934) (“An examination of the authorities
does not warrant the conclusion that an annuity contract is an insurance contract”);
1 JOHN ALLEN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 84 (1981) (“Annuity
contracts must . . . be recognized as investments rather than as insurance.”).
259 VALIC I , 359 U.S. at 71 (“The risk of mortality, assumed here, gives these
variable annuities an aspect of insurance.  Yet it is apparent, not real; superficial, not
substantial.  In hard reality the issuer of a variable annuity that has no element of a
fixed return assumes no true risk in the insurance sense.”).
260 In general, approval by OCC under a § 24 (Seventh) rationale potentially has
wider ramifications, inasmuch as it (A) satisfies (in the case of principal activities)
the requirements of section 24 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831a (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); (B) opens the door for state-chartered banks in
states with “wild-card” statutes to engage in the same activity; and (C) renders it a
permissible nonbanking activity for bank holding companies under section 4(c)(5) of
the BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(5) (1994).  In the particular case of annuities, it was
not long before the Board approved an application for a bank holding company to
act as an agent through a subsidiary in the sale of variable and fixed-rate annuities
based on OCC’s approval for national banks to do so. See  Norwest Corp., 76 Fed.
Res. Bull. 873 (1990).
261 See  Nat’l Ass’n of Life Underwriters v. OCC, No. A90-CA-884 (W.D. Tex.
filed Sept. 12, 1990), refiled sub nom.  Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, No.
H-91-1016 (S.D. Tex. filed Nov. 22, 1991).
262 Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 786 F. Supp. 639 (S.D. Tex. 1991),
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tion, reversed, rejecting OCC’s functional equivalence approach
and holding that annuities were, in fact, insurance within the pur-
view of § 92, thereby setting the stage for adherence to the Saxon
rationale.263  However, the insurance industry’s jubilation was
short-lived since the Supreme Court not only took the case but
resoundingly (and unanimously) reversed.264
Apart from its unanimity, the Supreme Court’s decision was a
tremendous shot in the arm for OCC’s functional equivalence ap-
proach.  Under the deferential Chevron  approach, where the Na-
tional Bank Act was silent on the key issue of what constitutes
insurance for purposes of § 92, the Court was prepared to accord
substantial deference to OCC as the agency charged with inter-
pretation of that statutory scheme.  The Court regarded OCC’s
classification—based on tax deferral and investment features—of
annuities as “at least reasonable” and noted with approval
OCC’s observation that “annuities serve an important invest-
ment purpose and are functionally similar  to other investments
that banks typically sell.”265
The victory of OCC’s functional equivalence approach was
made all the more resounding by the remarkable footnote two in
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court:  “We expressly hold
that the ‘business of banking’ is not limited to the enumerated
powers in § 24 Seventh and that the Comptroller therefore has
discretion to authorize activities beyond those specifically enu-
merated.”266  The Court did, however, point out that OCC’s dis-
cretion is not unbounded:  “Ventures distant from dealing in
financial investment instruments—for example, operating a gen-
eral travel agency—may exceed those bounds.”267  Whatever the
precise outer limits of the “business of banking” may be, it is
clear from this footnote that financial instruments and invest-
rev’d , 998 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1993), rev’d sub nom.  Nationsbank of N.C., N.A. v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995).
263 Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 998 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1993), rev’d
sub nom.  Nationsbank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251
(1995).
264 Nationsbank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251
(1995) [hereinafter VALIC II].
265 Id.  at 263-64 (emphasis added).
266 Id.  at 258 n.2.
267 Id.  The unmistakable reference is to the seminal First Circuit decision in Ar-
nold Tours, Inc. v. Camp,  472 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1972) (holding that operating a
travel agency is not “incidental” to the “business of banking” within the meaning of
§ 24 (Seventh)).
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ment vehicles are well within those boundaries and, in the ab-
sence of any definition of “insurance” for purposes of the
National Bank Act, the Comptroller’s reinterpretation of tradi-
tional insurance products as “financial” or “banking” products
would enjoy nothing less than the imprimatur of the United
States Supreme Court.
Shortly after OCC’s victory in VALIC II , an article co-au-
thored by the agency’s chief counsel proclaimed that defining the
contours of the business of banking was an evolutionary process
that should be sufficiently flexible to respond to changes in the
financial markets and to the needs of bank customers.268  The
article suggested a tripartite inquiry for ascertaining whether a
particular activity should be considered part of the business of
banking:  (1) whether the activity is functionally equivalent to or
a logical outgrowth of a recognized banking activity; (2) whether
the activity is responsive to the needs of customers or otherwise
will benefit the bank or its customers; and (3) whether the activ-
ity involves risks similar in nature to those already assumed by
the bank.269  The first factor embodied the functional equiva-
lence concept, the second intimated that OCC will expand the
scope of the business of banking with changes in technology and
the marketplace, and the third signaled that not merely agency
activities but principal activities might be included.
This approach was subsequently adopted as the official inter-
pretive position of the agency in connection with its authoriza-
tion of the next insurance-related banking power:  reinsurance of
private mortgage insurance.270  Here, the reinsurance function is
not merely an agency activity but a principal activity271 because
the reinsurer takes on underwriting risk.  Nonetheless, OCC’s
analytical approach was to deem that risk the functional
equivalent of the normal credit risk undertaken when a bank un-
derwrites a mortgage loan.  Therefore, this activity was author-
268 Julie L. Williams & Mark P. Jacobsen, The Business of Banking:  Looking to
the Future,  50 BUS. LAW. 783 (1995).
269 Id.  at 785.
270 This product typically is used with so-called “jumbo” mortgage loans (where
the purchaser of the property puts up less than twenty percent of the purchase price
as a down payment) and is designed to protect the investor holding the note against
default by the borrower.  Mortgage lenders frequently purchase the insurance di-
rectly from an insurer and then pass the cost thereof on to the borrower.
271 Hence, for this product, no exercise or interpretation of the § 92 authority
would be availing, as that statute authorizes only agency activity.  12 U.S.C. § 92
(1994).
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ized as being consistent with 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh).272
C. The Terra Incognita of Bank Operating Subsidiaries
The concept of subsidiaries of national banks has always been
surrounded by controversy.  Part of the problem surrounds the
differing interpretations of what constitutes the “business of
banking” under the National Bank Act, which provides, in perti-
nent part, a national bank may exercise
all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the
business of banking ; by discounting and negotiating promis-
sory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of
debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange,
coin, and bullion; by loaning money on personal security; and
by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes according to the
provisions of title 62 of the Revised Statutes.273
The interpretive question is whether the phrases that follow
the emphasized language, and that are separated therefrom by a
semicolon, constitute a delineation of what constitutes the “busi-
ness of banking,” indicating (under an expressio unius est exclusio
alterius  approach) that items not mentioned in the statute are
not  part of that business, or are merely exemplary, indicating
(under an ejusdem generis  approach) that omitted items may
nonetheless be considered part of that business.  The former rep-
resents the so-called “narrow view” of the business of banking,
the latter the so-called “broad view.”274
The narrow view, that national banks are statutory creatures of
limited powers and can exercise only those powers expressly
granted them in the National Bank Act, is analogous to the tradi-
tional view in constitutional law that the federal government is a
government of limited powers and those powers not expressly
granted to the federal government in the Constitution are re-
served to the States and the people.275  Under this view, national
banks are not authorized to have subsidiaries absent a specific
statutory authorization.  Far from providing such an authoriza-
tion, section 5136, as amended by section 16 of the Glass-Steagall
272 OCC Interpretive Letter No. 743, [1996-97 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,108 (Oct. 17, 1996).
273 12 U.S.C.A. § 24 (Seventh) (West 2001) (emphasis added).
274 See  Symons, supra note 174, at 678-80.
275 This is the familiar language of the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion, which has undergone something of a Renaissance in recent years. See , e.g. ,
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992).
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Act, expressly limits the power of a national bank by forbidding
its ownership of stock for its own account.276  If a national bank
cannot own stock for its own account, how can it possibly own a
subsidiary?
The OCC has traditionally taken a more expansive view.  Be-
ginning in 1964, the OCC permitted a national bank to own the
stock of a subsidiary, variously known as an “operations subsidi-
ary” or “operating subsidiary,” provided that it would not per-
form any function that the bank could not perform directly.  In
other words, activities conducted by operating subsidiaries were
treated the same as those conducted directly by the bank itself,
subject to the same limitations and restrictions as were applicable
to the bank.277  These mid-1960s OCC pronouncements on oper-
ating subsidiaries engendered public disagreement on the subject
between OCC and the Board, which took the position that sec-
tion 16 of Glass-Steagall forbade any such subsidiary.278  Ulti-
mately, however, the Board reached an entente with OCC and
reversed its position on the subject:
[A] bank [is permitted] to organize its operations in the man-
ner that it believes best facilitates the performance thereof.
One method of organization is through departments; another
is through separate incorporation of particular operations.  In
other words, a wholly owned subsidiary corporation engaged
in activities that the bank itself may perform is simply a conve-
nient alternative organizational arrangement.279
Consistent with the competition in regulation process that has
long been a hallmark of our dual banking system, similar powers
were granted to subsidiaries of state banks under state law.
Although the House Banking Committee held hearings on this
276 “The business of dealing in securities and stock by the association shall be
limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely
upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own ac-
count  . . . .”  12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (emphasis added).  This language immediately
follows the language quoted supra  in the text accompanying note 273.
277 This, at least, was OCC’s approach prior to the revisionist history position it
adopted in 1994. See , e.g. , 12 C.F.R. § 5.34 (1993) (former OCC operating subsidi-
ary regulation).
278 See Member Bank Purchase of Stock of “Operation Subsidiaries”, 52 Fed. Res.
Bull. 1151 (1966).
279 Fed. Res. Sys. Miscellaneous Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. § 250.141(c) (2001).
The Board even went so far as to oppose legislation that would have prohibited a
national bank from engaging directly or indirectly in any activity that the Board had
determined by regulation or order to be an improper activity for BHCs. See Compe-
tition in Banking Act of 1980:  Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs , 96th Cong. 14 (1980).
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subject,280 Congress never took action to alter OCC’s position
through legislation.  To the contrary, in the 1978 amendments to
the BHCA, when operating subsidiaries were already a common
organizational device, Congress acknowledged the existence of
operating subsidiaries and provided that they were definitely not
within the purview of the Board’s regulatory power under the
BHCA, even where they were second-tier subsidiaries of a
BHC.281  Those amendments added a new section 5(e) to the
BHCA:
[T]he Board may, whenever it has reasonable cause to believe
that the continuation by a bank holding company of any activ-
ity or of ownership or control of any of its nonbank subsidiar-
ies, other than a nonbank subsidiary of a bank , constitutes a
serious risk to the financial safety, soundness, or stability of a
bank holding company subsidiary bank and is inconsistent
with sound banking principles . . ., order the bank holding
company or any such nonbank subsidiaries . . . to terminate
such activities or to terminate . . . its ownership or control of
any such subsidiary . . . .282
Similarly, Congress excluded banks and their subsidiaries from
the cease-and-desist authority granted to the Board under sec-
tion 8(b) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as also amended
in 1978:
Nothing in this subsection [cease-and-desist proceedings] or in
subsection (c) of this section [temporary cease-and-desist pro-
ceedings] shall authorize any Federal banking agency, other
than the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
to issue a notice of charges or cease-and-desist order against a
bank holding company or any subsidiary thereof (other than a
bank or subsidiary of that bank).283
Congress was therefore satisfied with the operating subsidiary
280 See generally Federal Reserve Rules Regarding Loan Production Offices and
Purchases of Operating Subsidiaries:  Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking
and Currency,  90th Cong. (1968).
281 An interesting parallel may be drawn with OCC’s approval of the establish-
ment of a discount brokerage subsidiary by a national bank, which was itself a sub-
sidiary of a BHC, at a time when discount brokerage had not yet been determined to
be a permissible activity under section 4 of the BHCA.  In the litigation engendered
by the discount brokerage applications, it was never suggested that a BHC-owned
bank, which in turn established a subsidiary to conduct an activity that OCC had
determined the bank itself could conduct, would cause the parent BHC to be in
violation of the BHCA. See  Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Comptroller of the Currency, 577
F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d,  758 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
282 12 U.S.C. § 1844(e) (1994) (emphasis added).
283 Id.  § 1818(b)(3) (emphasis added).
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concept as it had been administered by the OCC under the Na-
tional Bank Act and by the state bank supervisors under state
law.  Central to that concept was the treatment of the operating
subsidiary as simply a convenient organizational alternative to a
department of the bank.  Indeed, in the Garn-St Germain
amendments to section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, Con-
gress created the express statutory distinction between loans by a
bank to a subsidiary, which are not treated as loans to an affili-
ate, and loans by a bank’s subsidiary to an affiliate of the bank,
which are treated as loans by the bank  to that affiliate.284
In the mid-1990s, however, OCC announced an expansion on
its already expansive view.  Emboldened by VALIC II,  which
featured the use of an operating subsidiary to sell annuities and
which, as we have seen, suggested that OCC enjoyed significant
latitude in determining what sort of activities might be “inciden-
tal” to the “business of banking” under § 24 (Seventh), OCC
promulgated a revised operating subsidiary regulation285 that
contemplated authorizing activities for such subsidiaries that
were not  permissible for the parent national bank.286
This proposal sent shock waves287 through the financial ser-
284 See  Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, § 410, Pub. L. No.
97-320, 96 Stat. 1469, 1515-16 (amending 12 U.S.C.A. § 371c (West 2001)).
285 Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 61,034
(Nov. 29, 1994).  The revisions to Part 5 of OCC’s regulations originated in 1994 as
part of a comprehensive overhaul of the agency’s regulations in an effort to “update
and streamline” them, pursuant to the mandate of section 303 of the Riegle Commu-
nity Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, 12 U.S.C. § 4803
(1994).
286 OCC proposed to exempt operating subsidiaries from statutory restrictions on
the conduct of certain activities by the parent national bank where the agency be-
lieved the restriction to be not necessarily applicable to the subsidiaries.  Rules, Poli-
cies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. at 61,039.
287 The revised Part 5 operating subsidiary regulation was widely seen to be an
end-run around Glass-Steagall and insurance restrictions, as well as other activities
(e.g., real estate) forbidden to national banks themselves. See generally OCC Seeks
Comment on Easing Bank Rules, Opening Door for New Sub Power Requests,  63
Banking Rep. (BNA) 815 (Dec. 5, 1994). It was even suggested that these rules
would open the door to European-style “universal banking” in the United States.
Robert M. Garsson, OCC’s Paperwork Rewrite Paves the Way for Banks To Expand
Their Powers , AM. BANKER, Jan. 20, 1995, at 3.  These impressions of the potential
breadth and significance of the operating subsidiary proposal persisted even two
years later, when the regulation was ultimately finalized. See  Olaf de Senerpont
Domis, Banks Rush To Embrace New Freedoms, AM. BANKER, Nov. 25, 1996, at 1-2
(describing how, availing themselves of new Part 5 Rules, national banks plan to
propose new or expanded activities involving insurance, equipment leasing, munici-
pal revenue bond underwriting, real estate brokerage, and management and infor-
mation processing).
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vices industries and the halls of Congress and was denounced as
exceeding the scope of OCC’s statutory authority.288  Initially
promulgated in 1994, the operating subsidiary proposal was
shelved in the 104th Congress, partly in response to the wave of
critical reaction and partly in the hopes that it would be mooted
by enactment of a precursor to GLEBA,289 the proposed Finan-
cial Services Competitiveness Act of 1995.290  However, when
banking reform legislation failed to pass with the 104th Con-
gress,291 the proposal was dusted off and issued as a final
regulation.292
There, OCC declared that it would entertain, on a case-by-case
basis, proposals for operating subsidiaries to engage in activities
that, while part of the “business of banking” or “incidental”
thereto, were nonetheless beyond the authority of the parent
banks themselves.  In light of the breadth of the Comptroller’s
discretion after VALIC II  and the judicial deference it would en-
joy thereafter, confining those activities to what constitutes the
“business of banking” and its incidents was no limitation at all—
at least with respect to a broad array of securities and insurance
products and activities.293  The newly constituted operating sub-
288 For a more sympathetic view, see James R. Smoot, Bank Operating Subsidiar-
ies:  Free at Last or More of the Same? , 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 651 (1997).  The rhetoric
from Capitol Hill and various trade associations was decidedly more negative, how-
ever. See id.  at 653, 673-74 (recounting responses from House Banking Committee
Chairman Leach, former House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman
Dingell, and others).
289 See  Olaf de Senerpont Domis, OCC May Get Upper Hand in Bid To Expand
Activities Allowed in Bank Subsidiaries , AM. BANKER, Feb. 12, 1996, at 4 (reporting
OCC Chief Counsel Julie L. Williams as saying the agency was in a “holding pat-
tern” on the proposed Part 5 Rules and was “monitoring what Congress [was]
doing”).
290 See  H.R. 18, 104th Cong. (1995).  One month after his introduction of this
legislation, House Banking Committee Chairman Leach introduced a second ver-
sion of the same bill, H.R. 1062, 104th Cong. (1995), which became the principal
vehicle for banking reform legislation during that session of Congress and the bill
that was marked up by both the House Banking Committee and the House Com-
merce Committee.
291 See  Justin Fox, Hopes for Wider Powers Now Pinned on Courts, Regulators—
Not Congress, AM. BANKER, Jan. 2, 1996, at 1.
292 Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,342
(Nov. 26, 1996).
293 For example, within a year after the regulation was finalized, OCC relied on it
to permit a subsidiary of Zions First National Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah, to engage
in municipal revenue bond underwriting. OCC Conditional Approval No. 262 (Dec.
11, 1997), available at  1997 OCC Ltr. LEXIS 127.  Municipal revenue bonds are
state or local bonds not backed by the full faith and credit of the issuing authority,
and as such could not (at that time, i.e., prior to GLEBA) be underwritten by na-
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sidiary thus represented yet another, and potentially awesome,
weapon in the OCC’s arsenal in aid of moving banks into the
realm of insurance.
In summary, penetration by banks into the insurance business
was proceeding apace, and on three fronts.  The first was the re-
invigoration of the § 92 authority with the demise of state anti-
affiliation laws, the Barnett  “prevent or significantly interfere
with” standard,294 and OCC’s expansive interpretation of what
constitutes a “place of 5,000.”  Impressive as this amount of pro-
gress was in a few short years, it was still linked to a statutory
authority with both geographical restrictions and product restric-
tions (i.e., limited to insurance agency activities).  Nonetheless,
from the perspective of the insurance agents (and their trade as-
sociations and lobbyists), the prospect of fierce competition from
banks, with their already well-developed and extensive retail dis-
tribution networks, was all too real and daunting enough that a
number of established insurance agencies looked for opportuni-
ties to be acquired by banks.
The second front for the advancement of banks into insurance
was the successful marshaling of “functional equivalence” analy-
sis to redefine traditional insurance products—whether they be
municipal bond insurance or annuities—as financial products and
the explicit license from the Supreme Court to consider such
products part and parcel of the business of banking.  From the
perspective of the insurance companies, this was potentially a
dire threat.  Property and casualty companies offered, and were
likely to develop in the future, a variety of products that look like
standby letters of credit, making it relatively easy for banks, us-
ing a functional equivalence analysis, to “poach” on their turf.
Life insurance companies were most concerned about the pros-
pect that banks could not merely sell but also underwrite  fixed295
tional banks, which were limited by § 24 (Seventh) to underwriting only general
obligation state and municipal bonds.  Interestingly, the Act amended that provision
to authorize underwriting, dealing in, and purchasing (i.e., for the bank’s own ac-
count:  purchases as agent were already permitted) various state and municipal reve-
nue bonds, limited obligation bonds, and other obligations that satisfy the
requirements of § 142(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code.  GLEBA § 151, 12
U.S.C.A. § 24 (Seventh) (West 2001).
294 Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996).
295 Underwriting variable annuities was seen as somewhat less of a threat because
they had to be registered as securities, see VALIC I , 359 U.S. 65 (1959), thus making
it impossible for banks themselves under section 16 of Glass-Steagall.  Underwriting
variable annuities would have been quite possible for section 20 affiliates, however,
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annuities and do so outside the purview of insurance regulators
to boot (with annuities having been blessed by no less than the
Supreme Court as a financial, not an insurance, product).  Annu-
ity underwriting was a growth area for the life insurance business
and was widely used in the pension market.  Thus, even though
VALIC II  took no position on national banks underwriting annu-
ities, the road was open for OCC to approve such an application,
and the life insurance industry could foresee its imminence.
The third front was the potentially open-ended authority for
operating subsidiaries of national banks, enlarging upon the
functional equivalence approach, to engage in insurance activi-
ties that would be forbidden to their bank parents.  Anointed
with the imprimatur of the Supreme Court in VALIC II  and Jus-
tice Ginsburg’s famous footnote two, indicating the degree of ju-
dicial deference that could be expected, OCC’s discretion to
delineate the contours of the “business of banking” was easily
broad enough to encompass a vast array of insurance products
and services.
Prior to GLEBA, then, the prospects for banks to continue to




Let us posit, prior to enactment of GLEBA, a commercial
banking organization, which we shall generically label “Hold-
ings.”  Holdings is registered as a bank holding company under
the BHCA by reason of its control of a member bank in the Fed-
eral Reserve System (abbreviated here as “M.B.”).  M.B. has an
operating subsidiary (Op Sub).  In addition, Holdings directly or
indirectly controls one or more securities affiliates engaging in a
variety of securities activities to a limited extent, consistent with
section 20 of Glass-Steagall and the Board’s orders.  Under then-
current law, these activities may have included underwriting and
dealing in commercial paper, municipal revenue bonds, mort-
gage-related securities, consumer receivable-related securities,
and corporate debt and equity securities, as well as providing in-
vestment advisory services, full service securities brokerage, the
albeit subject to gross revenues constraints; and as Part III will demonstrate, that
business could even have been done by a commercial banking organization without
any gross revenues constraints through a disaffiliated underwriting entity.
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provision of any number of back office or support services for a
private label fund, and so forth.  This entity or group of entities,
which would include, at a minimum, a registered broker-dealer
and possibly also a registered investment advisor and other enti-
ties subject to regulation by bodies other than the Board and the
other bank regulatory agencies (e.g., by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD), etc.), could have been structured in any num-
ber of ways (second-, third-, and any higher ordinal number-
tiered subsidiaries) on Holdings’ organization chart.  For present
purposes, we shall conceptualize this company or group of com-
panies as a single, first-tier subsidiary of Holdings which we will
label “Securities Complex.”  (Diagram A.)
DIAGRAM A
Holdings
Securities Complex M.B. 
Op Sub 
Suppose Holdings had wished to unfetter its securities business
from the gross revenues limitation imposed by the Board’s inter-
pretation of the term “engaged principally” in section 20 of
Glass-Steagall.296  This portion of the article will describe how
Holdings could acquire one or more corporations engaged in va-
rious securities activities that could not, under section 16 of the
Act, be performed by M.B. itself or, because they were engaged
296 See infra  note 360 and accompanying text.
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“principally” within the meaning of section 20, by an affiliate of
M.B.
The methodology suggested here contemplates restructuring
certain of Holdings’ first- and second-tier subsidiaries so that
M.B. would not be an “affiliate” (for Glass-Steagall purposes) of
Securities Complex.  This restructuring will be referred to herein
as “disaffiliation.”  As explained in more detail below, the ap-
proach outlined herein is consistent with the rules of statutory
construction297 articulated in numerous cases by the Supreme
Court of the United States and by the lower federal courts, in-
cluding the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit (which is always a permissible venue for seek-
ing judicial review of actions by the Board and the other federal
bank regulatory agencies).298
B. Affiliation
Section 20 of Glass-Steagall generally barred any affiliation be-
tween a member bank and a company engaged principally in cer-
tain securities activities.  An “affiliate” for Glass-Steagall
purposes is a defined term comprised of four components, as de-
lineated in section 2(b) of that statute, which provides:
Except where otherwise specifically provided, the term “affili-
ate” shall include any corporation, business trust, association,
or other similar organization—
(1) Of which a member bank, directly or indirectly, owns or
controls either a majority of the voting shares or more than 50
per centum of the number of shares voted for the election of
its directors, trustees, or other persons exercising similar func-
tions at the preceding election, or controls in any manner the
election of a majority of its directors, trustees, or other per-
sons exercising similar functions; or
(2) Of which control is held, directly or indirectly, through
stock ownership or in any other manner, by the shareholders
of a member bank who own or control either a majority of the
shares of such bank or more than 50 per centum of the num-
ber of shares voted for the election of directors of such bank at
297 The approach described herein was previously incorporated in two requests
for interpretation submitted several years ago by the author on behalf of a client, to
two federal regulatory agencies.  Both agencies analyzed and adopted this “disaffili-
ation” analysis in approving those requests.  As the company involved was not a
bank holding company, no interpretation was sought from the Board.  Suitably re-
dacted copies of these agency interpretations are on file with the author.
298 See , e.g. , 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(2) (1994) (judicial review of enforcement ac-
tions); id.  § 1848 (judicial review of orders under the BHCA).
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the preceding election, or by trustees for the benefit of the
shareholders of any such bank; or
(3) Of which a majority of its directors, trustees, or other per-
sons exercising similar functions are directors of any one mem-
ber bank; or
(4) Which owns or controls, directly or indirectly, either a ma-
jority of the shares of capital stock of a member bank or more
than 50 per centum of the number of shares voted for the elec-
tion of directors of a member bank at the preceding election,
or controls in any manner the election of a majority of the
directors of a member bank, or for the benefit of whose share-
holders or members all or substantially all the capital stock of
a member bank is held by trustees.299
Each of these components independently is sufficient to estab-
lish an “affiliate” relationship for purposes of the Act.  Indeed,
this definition of affiliate is applicable (as one might infer from
the situs of its codification within the Federal Reserve Act and
from the introductory phrase, “Except where otherwise specifi-
cally provided”) to other Federal Reserve Act (but non-Glass-
Steagall) provisions, such as section 24A, governing investments
in bank premises.300
For purposes of clarity, the four categories of relationships de-
lineated in Glass-Steagall section 2(b) are diagramed below, with
each diagram number corresponding to the numbered paragraph
in the section 2(b) definition.
299 Id.  § 221a(b).
300 12 U.S.C. § 371d provides:
No national bank or State member bank shall invest in bank premises, or in
the stock, bonds, debentures, or other such obligations of any corporation
holding the premises of such a bank, or make loans to or upon the security
of the stock of any such corporation . . . unless the bank receives the prior
approval of the Comptroller of the Currency (with respect to a national
bank) or the Board (with respect to a State member bank [or] unless the
aggregate of all such investments and loans, together with the amount of
any indebtedness incurred by any such corporation which is an affiliate of
the bank, is less than or equal to the amount of the capital stock of such
bank. . . .
12 U.S.C. § 371d (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (emphasis added).
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M.B. = member bank S/h = shareholder(s) dirs. = directors
maj. = majority D/I = directly or indirectly v/f/d = voted for directors
shs = shares
DIAGRAM 3 DIAGRAM 4










M.B. = member bank S/h = shareholder(s) dirs. = directors
maj. = majority D/I = directly or indirectly shs = shares
Of the four component paragraphs in the Glass-Steagall defini-
tion of “affiliate,” three (i.e., paragraphs (1), (2), and (4)) revolve
around concepts of share ownership and control (or the coordi-
nate concept of controlling the election of a majority of direc-
tors) and one (paragraph (3)) deals with a majority director
interlock.  As paragraph (3) is not structural, it is the most easily
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dealt with from the point of view of ensuring that Securities
Complex and M.B. are not “affiliates” within the meaning of the
Act.  The interlock in question relates only  to M.B. and Securi-
ties Complex, so the relatively common existence of a majority
director interlock between a bank and its parent holding com-
pany would have no effect.301
C. “Disaffiliation”
1. Impact of Structural Alterations on Statutory Definition
If we return to Diagram A we find that (1) Holdings is an affil-
iate of M.B. and of Securities Complex under section 2(b)(4); (2)
Securities Complex is an affiliate of M.B. under section 2(b)(2);
and (3) Op Sub is an affiliate of M.B. under section 2(b)(1).  The
key affiliation, of course, is that of Securities Complex and M.B.
under section 2(b)(2).
This Glass-Steagall problem would not be alleviated if we
merely interposed an intermediate holding company (“Interme-




Intermediate 1 M.B. 
Op Sub Securities Complex 
301 In short, so long as a majority of directors of M.B. do not also sit as directors
of Securities Complex, section 2(b)(3) of Glass-Steagall does not apply.  We shall
make the simplifying assumption throughout this article that none of the entities
under discussion has a majority director interlock with any other entity under discus-
sion (including M.B. and Holdings), in order that we may focus on the structural
aspects of the “affiliate” definition.
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Under the literal language of section 2(b)(2), Securities Complex
and M.B. are still affiliates, because the former is controlled “di-
rectly or indirectly  . . . by the shareholder[ ] of a member
bank . . .,” i.e., by Holdings.
We now expand on this structure by introducing another first-
tier subsidiary of Holdings (“Intermediate 2”) between Holdings
and M.B. (Diagram C):
DIAGRAM C
Holdings
Intermediate 1 Intermediate 2 
Op Sub Securities Complex 
M.B. 
This relatively simple structural alteration produces a dramatic
result.  Under a careful reading of section 2(b)(2)—and provided
that Intermediate 2 does not exercise (or have the power to exer-
cise) control over Securities Complex by any means different
from stock ownership—Securities Complex is not  an affiliate of
M.B. because control of Securities Complex is not held “directly
or indirectly, through stock ownership or in any other manner, by
the shareholder[ ] of” M.B.302
302 12 U.S.C. § 221a (1994).
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Section 2(b)(2) does not modify the word “shareholder[ ]”
with the phrase “directly or indirectly .”
Therefore the shareholder of M.B. is now Intermediate 2, not
Holdings .  Intermediate 2 does not control Holdings and conse-
quently does not, “directly or indirectly, through stock ownership
or in any other manner,”303 control Securities Complex; hence
any subsidiary of Securities Complex would likewise not be an
affiliate of M.B.
Before embarking on the detailed statutory analysis of disaffil-
iation, it should be noted that the approach set forth here would
only have been necessary for a bank holding company control-
ling one or more member  banks.  It has been clear since 1933
that all of the substantive provisions of Glass-Steagall other then
section 21304 apply only to member banks and not at all to non-
member banks.305  (Thus, if Holdings controlled only State non-
member banks, no disaffiliation would have been necessary.)
2. Construction of Plain Meaning of Section 2(b)(2) of Glass-
Steagall
Of the various control relationships described in the three
paragraphs of section 2(b) under consideration, all but one in-
303 Id.
304 Section 21 of Glass-Steagall, which remains good law even after GLEBA, pro-
hibits any person engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distrib-
uting securities from engaging at the same time in deposit taking.  12 U.S.C. § 378
(1994).  This provision interdicts engaging to any extent whatever—and not merely
“principally” as in section 20, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994) (repealed 1999), or “primarily”
as in section 32, id.  § 78 (repealed 1999)—in the listed securities activities in the
bank itself .  Section 21 has no effect on conducting such activities through affiliates,
which prior to GLEBA were governed by section 20.
305 Actually, there was a brief period (several months in duration) following the
enactment of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 (CEBA), Pub. L. No.
100-86, 101 Stat. 552, when section 20 of Glass-Steagall was made applicable to state
nonmember banks and to thrift institutions.  Section 106 of CEBA established a
moratorium on affiliations between all insured depository institutions and firms
principally engaged in wholesale securities activities.  The method by which Con-
gress effected this moratorium was to apply the provisions of sections 20 and 32 of
the Act to institutions that were not member banks, i.e., state nonmember banks and
thrifts, as though they were member banks for purposes of the Act.  Congress fur-
ther provided that the moratorium would, unless reenacted, sunset by its own terms
on March 1, 1988.  It was during the period between enactment of CEBA (August
10, 1987) and the moratorium sunset date that the interpretations, supra  note 297,
were sought, and each of those interpretations makes reference to, and indepen-
dently construes, the moratorium provision.  On March 1, 1988, however, the mora-
torium and its Glass-Steagall extension sunset and were never reenacted.
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volve the concept of owning or controlling “directly or indi-
rectly.”  The only exception is the relationship of the member
bank and its majority shareholders described in paragraph (2),
even though, in the selfsame paragraph (2), the relationship of
those shareholders and the affiliate  is covered by the “directly or
indirectly” formulation.  Returning to the structure illustrated in
Diagram C, while Holdings would be the controlling shareholder
of Securities Complex, Holdings would not be the shareholder
that owns or controls a majority of M.B.’s shares.  Rather, Inter-
mediate 2 would be the shareholder owning and controlling a
majority of M.B.’s shares.  Furthermore, Intermediate 2, which
would in fact be the sole shareholder of M.B., would not own or
control, directly or indirectly, Securities Complex.
As Congress’s use of the adverbial phrase “directly or indi-
rectly” is critical both to the construction of section 2(b) and to
the validity of this analysis, a bit more elaboration will be useful
here.  Each of paragraphs (1), (2), and (4) of section 2(b) uses the
“directly or indirectly” formulation.  Each also makes use of an
“either . . . or” statutory formulation of the concept of control of
a particular corporate entity,306 i.e., ownership or control of ei-
ther (A) a majority of voting shares or (B) more than fifty per-
cent of the number of shares voted for the election of directors.
For ease of reference in the discussion that follows, let us abbre-
viate this “either . . . or” formulation of the exercise of control, as
though it were a mathematical expression, by placing the word
“CONTROL” in brackets, viz.  [CONTROL].  [CONTROL], as
306 Unlike other federal banking statutes, Glass-Steagall has no formal definition
of “control.”  Other federal banking statutes have definitions of control that largely
track the three-pronged approach of section 2(a)(2) of the BHCA, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(a)(2) (1994).  Indeed, section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, which was
enacted contemporaneously with Glass-Steagall, has a definition that is virtually co-
extensive with that of the BHCA. See  12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(3) (1994) (definition of
control for purposes of section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, governing transac-
tions between a member bank and its “affiliate” (also specially defined in section
23A, see infra  notes 318-23 and accompanying text)); see also id.  § 375b(9)(B) (defi-
nition of control for purposes of section 22(h) of the Federal Reserve Act, governing
extensions of credit to executive officers, directors, and principal shareholders, virtu-
ally identical to the section 23A version); id.  § 1813(w)(5) (Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Act definition of control, cross-referencing to the BHCA definition).
Thus it seems sensible to assume that the section 23A/BHCA definition of “con-
trol” would be the likeliest guide to the meaning of that term in Glass-Steagall.
That, at any rate, would be consistent with the approach the Supreme Court took in
the Bankers Trust commercial paper case. See supra  notes 96-98.
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used in the several paragraphs of section 2(b), is modified, in all
but one instance, by the adverbial phrase “directly or indirectly.”
There is, however, a significant difference between the syntax
of paragraphs (1) and (4) on the one hand and paragraph (2) on
the other.
• Paragraph (1), for example, starts off by using the formula-
tion “directly or indirectly  [CONTROL],” and then finishes
with a final phrase in the disjunctive (“or controls in any
manner the election of a majority of its directors . . .”).  Note
that, syntactically, the final disjunctive phrase is not  modi-
fied by the earlier adverbial phrase “directly or indirectly”
(another adverbial phrase, “in any manner,” has been
substituted).
• Similarly, paragraph (4) starts off by using a lightly trans-
posed but otherwise identical formulation, directly or indi-
rectly  [CONTROL], and concludes—once again, as in
paragraph (1)—with the same phrase in the disjunctive (“or
controls in any manner the election of a majority of its direc-
tors . . .”) that is, as before, not  modified by the earlier ad-
verbial phrase “directly or indirectly.”
Thus the substance of paragraphs (1) and (4) can be syntacti-
cally summarized as follows:
directly or indirectly controls in any manner the
[CONTROL] OR election of a majority of
directors
Contrast paragraph (2).  Here the early adverbial phrase “di-
rectly or indirectly” is not  linked with the [CONTROL] formula-
tion; rather, the [CONTROL] formulation comes later on in the
paragraph.  Thus, for purposes of paragraph (2), only a direct
shareholder relationship with a member bank is provided for in
the language of the statute.  Hence the syntactic summary looks
quite different:
control of affiliate (not by the shareholder(s) of a
member bank) is held, directly member bank who
or indirectly, through stock [CONTROL]
ownership or in any other
manner
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Congress certainly could
“of which control is held,have drafted paragraph (2) dif-
directly or indirectly, by theferently to cover a situation shareholders of a member bank
like that depicted in Diagram who own or control, directly or
C.  For example, Congress indirectly, either a majority of the
shares of such bank or more thancould, in paragraph (2), have
50 per centum of the number ofdescribed a company using the
shares voted for the election oflanguage suggested in the box
directors of such bank.”
at the right:
In short, to include a second- or higher ordinal-tier nonbank
subsidiary of a holding company as an “affiliate” of a member
bank, Congress would have had to include the “directly or indi-
rectly” language in referring to the relationship between the
member bank and the holding company.  But Congress chose not
to do so.
This omission, contextually speaking, was deliberate,307 as
Congress obviously knew how to cover indirect relationships and
did so elsewhere in section 2(b). The effect of the omission is to
exclude from the definition of “affiliate” any entity of which con-
trol is held by a corporation which is only an indirect shareholder
of a member bank , even though that indirect shareholder is itself
an affiliate under the terms of another paragraph of section 2(b),
paragraph (4).  Furthermore, as discussed below, the omission of
language covering indirect ownership of a member bank was de-
monstrably not through inadvertence.
In Diagram C, therefore, every entity is, for
Glass-Steagall purposes, an affiliate of M.B.
except Intermediate 1 and its subsidiary, Securi-
ties Complex.
3. Pertinent Case Law on Construction of Definitions in
Federal Banking Statutes
This interpretation of Glass-Steagall section 2(b) is consistent
with the rules of statutory construction articulated in numerous
cases by the Supreme Court and by the lower federal courts (in-
cluding in particular the United States Court of Appeals for the
307 Precisely how deliberate this was can be appreciated from a comparison of the
Glass-Steagall definition of “affiliate” with the definition of the same term in the
simultaneously enacted section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act. See infra  notes
318-23 and accompanying text.
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District of Columbia Circuit, which has, as noted above, nation-
wide venue in review of federal banking agency decisions and
interpretations).308  First, the law is settled that “the starting
point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute it-
self.  Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the con-
trary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as
conclusive.”309  And, in the oft-quoted language of the leading
administrative law case on statutory construction and deference
to the interpretations of administrative agencies,310 “If the intent
of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress.”311
This rule has been consistently applied by the courts in cases
arising out of bank regulatory matters.  The statutory language of
Glass-Steagall section 2(b) must be taken at its face value be-
cause the literal reading thereof constitutes the best reflection of
the intent of Congress in having chosen those particular words.
Even if there was legislative history that suggested a contrary in-
terpretation (not the case here), that history would not be a more
reliable indicator than the carefully crafted statutory text. As Jus-
tice (then Judge) Scalia has cogently observed in another bank-
ing case:
Legislative history is a second-best indication, not merely be-
cause it is (like the oral statements preceding a written con-
tract) a less formal and authoritative expression of what the
party intended; but because it is in addition, in most of its
manifestations, not even an expression of the relevant party at
all.  In the case of legislation that party consists not of wit-
nesses testifying on the bill, or the speakers debating it, or
even the committees and floor leaders reporting and present-
308 See supra  note 298.
309 Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980); accord  United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 497 (1997); Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 295 (1994); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494
U.S. 827, 835 (1990); United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 604 (1986); Bd. of Gover-
nors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 368; Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70,
75 (1984).
310 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
311 Id . at 842-43; accord VALIC II , 513 U.S. 251, 257 (1995); ETSI Pipeline Pro-
ject v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 517 (1988); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447-
48 (1987); Dimension Fin. Corp. , 474 U.S. at 368; FAIC Sec., Inc. v. United States,
768 F.2d 352, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also  Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,
485 (1917) (“the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the
language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain . . . the sole function of the
courts is to enforce it according to its terms”).
\\Server03\productn\O\ORE\80-4\ORE403.txt unknown Seq: 79 16-JUL-02 14:19
Orphan of Invention:  Why the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Was Unnecessary 1379
ing it; but of all the voting members of both Houses of Con-
gress and (unless the bill has been passed over a veto) the
President.  The best legislative history regarding the intent of
one or another of the legislative participants is at most a clue
as to what the legislating “party” had in mind; the statute itself
is the party’s only sure expression.  Only where that expres-
sion is genuinely ambiguous is the clue likely to shed more
light than the text. See United States v. Missouri Pacific R.R.,
278 U.S. 269, 277-78 (1929); Eagle-Pitcher Industries, Inc. v.
EPA,  759 F.2d 922, 929 & n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1985) . . . .312
Second, that the provision in question is a definitional  provi-
sion makes it more difficult for a regulator to reject a plain mean-
ing construction of the statute in favor of the agency’s own views.
That is to say, it would not have been open to the Board to sub-
stitute its own, conflicting interpretation of the section 2(b) defi-
nition of “affiliate”—an interpretation based on the Board’s
policy-oriented view of the “overarching purpose” of the Act as a
whole—for the interpretation derived from the plain meaning of
the language Congress chose to enact.  As we have seen, the
Board tried that approach once before, in connection with the
so-called “nonbank bank” loophole in the BHCA, and was se-
verely chastised for it by a unanimous Supreme Court in the Di-
mension  case.313
The lower federal courts have likewise been prepared to invali-
date decisions of the federal bank regulatory agencies when they
have sought to substitute their own views of the purposes of par-
ticular regulatory schemes for the language Congress enacted.
Some of the more prominent examples from the D&O crisis in
recent years have included the following decisions:
• rejecting OCC’s contention that it had separate and inde-
pendent authority, under the pre-FIRREA “affirmative ac-
tion” language of 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1), unilaterally to
impose liability upon directors as an adjunct to a cease-and-
desist proceeding, without regard to the requirement in 12
U.S.C. § 93 of instituting suit in the proper district or territo-
312 FAIC Sec. , 768 F.2d at 362.  This is the position most often associated with
Justice Scalia since he ascended to the Supreme Court bench, though, admittedly, he
has not always been successful in persuading his brethren to this point of view. See ,
e.g. , Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 390-91 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
with Thomas, J., concurring).
313 See supra  notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
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rial court;314
• rejecting the Board’s claimed authority to “remove . . . from
office”, under the pre-FIRREA removal and prohibition au-
thority of 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e), a director who had previously
resigned;315 and
• rejecting the OTS’s interpretation of the (post-FIRREA) af-
firmative action provision in 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6)(A) to
require an insolvent savings bank’s holding company and its
stockholders to pay the Government $5.6 million on the
ground that they were subject to a condition imposed in
writing which required them to maintain the savings bank’s
net worth.316
4. Structure and Legislative History of Glass-Steagall and
Contemporaneous Statutes
Even if the plain meaning were unclear and one were to con-
sult the legislative history of Glass-Steagall and of contempora-
neous enactments317 by Congress for guidance in construing
section 2(b), one would come to the same conclusion as is
reached by analyzing the plain meaning of the statutory language
alone.  Consider, for example, section 23A of the Federal Re-
serve Act,318 which was enacted as part of the very same Banking
Act of 1933 that included the provisions that became commonly
known, after the names of the principal congressional sponsors,
as the Glass-Steagall Act.319  In view of their simultaneous enact-
ment, it is enormously significant, from the statutory interpreta-
tion point of view, that section 23A has its own definition of
314 Larimore v. Comptroller of the Currency, 789 F.2d 1244 (7th Cir. 1986) (en
banc).
315 Stoddard v. Bd. of Governors, 868 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  The author
argued that case before the court of appeals.
316 Wachtel v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 982 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
317 The Supreme Court has had occasion to consult contemporaneous financial
regulatory statutes for guidance on the meaning of terms undefined  in Glass-Stea-
gall. See  Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 468 U.S. 137 (1984) (using Securities
Act of 1933 definition of “security” to inform construction of that term in Glass-
Steagall Act).
318 12 U.S.C.A. § 371c (West 2001).  Section 23A places restrictions on certain
transactions (referred to in the statute as “covered transactions”) between a member
bank and its affiliates.
319 Indeed, section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act was enacted as part of the
Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (section 2 of Glass-Steagall was section 2 of
that chapter, and section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act was section 13 of that
chapter).
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“affiliate” that differs in significant respects from that of section
2(b) of Glass-Steagall.
The section 23A definition enumerates several categories of
entities that are subsumed within the term “affiliate,” and then
adds a catch-all provision explicitly giving the Board interpretive
authority—by regulation or by order—to determine that a com-
pany not so enumerated “[has] a relationship with the member
bank or any subsidiary or affiliate of the member bank, such that
covered transactions by the member bank or its subsidiary with
that company may be affected by the relationship to the detri-
ment of the member bank or its subsidiary.”320  The absence of
such “legislative” authority for the Board in the Glass-Steagall
version of “affiliate” indicates that the Board is not permitted to
supplement section 2(b) of the Act with its own notions of what
should be covered therein.  Obviously Congress not only knew
how to grant such authority when it wished to but did so ex-
pressly  in the contemporaneously enacted section 23A.321
Moreover, when one compares the enumerated entities in sec-
tion 2(b) of Glass-Steagall with those in section 23A of the Fed-
eral Reserve Act, one sees a striking difference in the choice of
language.  Section 23A covers, inter alia, three out of the four
components of the Glass-Steagall definition (the one exception
being a subsidiary of a member bank, unless that subsidiary is
itself a bank or the Board makes a determination to include it
pursuant to the section 23A catch-all provision),322 but, in con-
trast to section 2(b) of the Act, is drafted much more expan-
sively.323  A side-by-side comparison is instructive:
320 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(1)(E) (1994).
321 Nor, for that matter, does the Board have in Glass-Steagall an analogue to
section 5(b) of the BHCA, authorizing the agency to prevent “evasions” of the Act,
although, as noted above, the Supreme Court castigated the Board in Board of Gov-
ernors v. Dimension Financial Corp. , 474 U.S. 361, 373 & n.6 (1986), for relying on
that provision to supplement the defined terms that Congress enacted.
322 See  12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(A); supra  note 320 and accompanying
text.
323 Prior to GLEBA, section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act defined “affiliate” as
follows:
For the purpose of this section—
(1) the term “affiliate” with respect to a member bank means—
(A) any company that controls the member bank and any other com-
pany that is controlled by the company that controls the member
bank;
(B) a bank subsidiary of the member bank;
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Section 2(b) of Glass-Steagall defines Section 23A of the Federal Reserve
“affiliate” to mean any corporation or Act defines “affiliate” to mean:
similar entity:
Which owns or controls, directly or [A]ny company that controls the mem-
indirectly, either a majority of the ber bank and any other company that
shares of capital stock of a member is controlled by the company that con-
bank or more than 50 per centum of trols the member bank.  12 U.S.C.
the number of shares voted for the § 371c(b)(1)(A) (1994).
election of directors of a member
bank at the preceding election, or con-
trols in any manner the election of a
majority of the directors of a member
bank, or for the benefit of whose
shareholders or members all or sub-
stantially all the capital stock of a
member bank is held by trustees.  12
U.S.C. § 221a(b)(4) (1994).
Of which a majority of its directors, [A]ny company . . . in which a major-
trustees, or other persons exercising ity of its directors or trustees consti-
similar functions are directors of any tute a majority of the persons holding
one member bank.  12 U.S.C. any such office with the member bank
§ 221a(b)(3). or any company that controls the
member bank. 12 U.S.C.
§ 371c(b)(1)(C)(ii).
Of which control is held, directly or [A]ny company . . . that is controlled
indirectly, through stock ownership or directly or indirectly, by a trust or oth-
in any other manner, by the share- erwise, by or for the benefit of share-
holders of a member bank who own holders who beneficially or otherwise
or control either a majority of the control, directly or indirectly, by trust
shares of such bank or more than 50 or otherwise, the member bank or any
per centum of the number of shares company that controls the member
voted for the election of directors of bank.  12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(1)(C)(i).
such bank at the preceding election, or
by trustees for the benefit of the
shareholders of any such bank.  12
U.S.C. § 221a(b)(2).
Note, in particular, the language from section 23A in the last
(C) any company—
(i) that is controlled directly or indirectly, by a trust or otherwise, by or
for the benefit of shareholders who beneficially or otherwise control,
directly or indirectly, by trust or otherwise, the member bank or any
company that controls the member bank; or
(ii) in which a majority of its directors or trustees constitute a majority
of the persons holding any such office with the member bank or any
company that controls the member bank;
(D) (i) any company, including a real estate investment trust, that is spon-
sored and advised on a contractual basis by the member bank or any sub-
sidiary or affiliate of the member bank; or
(ii) any investment company with respect to which a member bank or
any affiliate thereof is an investment advisor as defined in section 80a-
2(a)(20) of title 15; and
(E) any company that the Board determines by regulation or order to have
a relationship with the member bank or any subsidiary or affiliate of the
member bank, such that covered transactions by the member bank or its
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entry in the right-hand column.  There, Congress used the “di-
rectly or indirectly” adverbial phrase twice , demonstrating be-
yond cavil that Congress knew how to legislate with that level of
precision when it wished to, and in the very same enactment to
boot.  Congress was also well aware that it was simultaneously
enacting in the same bill two separate statutory definitions of the
same term, “affiliate,” for different purposes in two different
statutory schemes.324  The only reasonable inference to be drawn
is that Congress deliberately enacted definitions with different
coverage and chose to define the term “affiliate” for Glass-Stea-
gall purposes without the breadth (and without the possibility of
regulatory gloss by the Board) that was enacted in section
23A.325
subsidiary with that company may be affected by the relationship to the
detriment of the member bank or its subsidiary; and
(2) the following shall not be considered to be an affiliate:
(A) any company, other than a bank, that is a subsidiary of a member
bank, unless a determination is made under paragraph (1)(E) not to ex-
clude such subsidiary company from the definition of affiliate;
(B) any company engaged solely in holding the premises of the member
bank;
(C) any company engaged solely in conducting a safe deposit business;
(D) any company engaged solely in holding obligations of the United
States or its agencies or obligations fully guaranteed by the United States
or its agencies as to principal and interest; and
(E) any company where control results from the exercise of rights arising
out of a bona fide debt previously contracted, but only for the period of
time specifically authorized under applicable State or Federal law or regu-
lation or, in the absence of such law or regulation, for a period of two years
from the date of the exercise of such rights or the effective date of this Act,
whichever date is later, subject, upon application, to authorization by the
Board for good cause shown of extensions of time for not more than one
year at a time, but such extensions in the aggregate shall not exceed three
years . . . .
12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(1)-(2).
324 That awareness is clear from the introductory language of section 2(b) of
Glass-Steagal:  “Except where otherwise specifically provided,  the term ‘affiliate’
shall include . . . .”  12 U.S.C. § 221a(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
325 Congress has used still other formulations for the definition of “affiliate” in
other bank regulatory statutes.  For example, section 2(k) of the BHCA defines the
term, for purposes of that statute, as “any company that controls, is controlled by, or
is under common control with another company.”  12 U.S.C. § 1841(k) (1994).  (Sev-
eral other statutes have incorporated the BHCA formulation. E.g. , 12 U.S.C.
§ 1462(9) (1994) (Home Owners’ Loan Act); id.  § 1467a(a)(1)(H) (Savings and
Loan Holding Company Act (SLHCA)); id. § 1813(w)(6) (Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Act); id. § 3101(13) (International Banking Act); id. § 4502(1) (Government
Sponsored Enterprises Act); see also  Depository Institution Affiliation Act, S. 337,
104th Cong. § 101(a)(4) (1995) (introduced by Senate Banking Committee Chair-
man Alfonse M. D’Amato (R-N.Y.)); H.R. 814, 104th Cong. (1995) (companion bill
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5. Responses to Potential Objections
As discussed above, effecting the disaffiliation of M.B. from
Securities Complex in this manner is premised on a literal read-
ing of the plain meaning of section 2(b)(2) of Glass-Steagall.
Against this approach, a common sense objection may be inter-
posed:  Why, if this construction of the statute existed since its
enactment in 1933, did no one ever advance this interpretation
before?326
The answer to this objection is two-fold, and the two compo-
nents roughly bisect the sixty-six-year history of Glass-Steagall
(up to enactment of GLEBA).  The first one takes us from 1933
introduced by Rep. Richard H. Baker (R-La.))).  The BHCA definition makes use
of two other terms separately defined in the BHCA, “control” and “company”; use
of the latter term makes it arguable that, within the meaning of the BHCA, a “bank”
(as defined therein) cannot be an “affiliate” (i.e., because a “bank” is arguably not a
“company”) and therefore that, even for BHCA purposes, M.B. and Securities
Complex would not be affiliates.  That determination is not, however, necessary to
the disaffiliation analysis herein, or even particularly pertinent thereto other than to
underscore what has already been illustrated with respect to section 23A of the Fed-
eral Reserve Act—namely that Congress has used disparate approaches to defining
the term “affiliate” even within the limited universe of federal banking regulation.
By way of further illustration, Congress adopted yet another, and different, ap-
proach in the Depository Institution Management Interlocks Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 3201-3208 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).  There Congress has defined the term “affili-
ate” to include (A) the relationship between a depository holding company and its
subsidiary or between two “subsidiaries” (as defined in the BHCA or the SLHCA,
as the case may be) of the same depository holding company; (B) the relationship
between two corporations, more than twenty-five percent of the voting stock of each
of which is beneficially owned by the same person or group; (C) the relationship
between a mutual savings bank shareholder and a trust company all of the stock of
which was owned, as of November 10, 1978, by one or more mutual savings banks;
(D) the relationship between an insured, state-chartered bankers’ bank and its bank
shareholders; and (E) the relationship between an insured, state-chartered bankers’
bank and its shareholders who are officers of other banks.  12 U.S.C. § 3201(3).
Under this approach, M.B. and Securities Complex would  be affiliates for Interlocks
Act purposes.
326 This same type of objection was raised by the securities industry trade groups
(the Securities Industry Association and the Investment Company Institute) against
the construction of section 20 of Glass-Steagall advanced by Citicorp, J.P. Morgan &
Co., Inc., and Bankers Trust New York Corporation in connection with their path-
breaking applications under section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA to engage to a limited
extent, through subsidiaries, in underwriting and dealing in certain categories of se-
curities.  The Board rejected the protestants’ objection and concluded that activation
of “until now dormant provisions in section 20” was merely the result of applying “a
statute adopted over 50 years ago in very different circumstances to a financial ser-
vices marketplace that technology and other competitive forces have altered in a
manner and to an extent never envisioned by the enacting Congress.”  Citicorp, 73
Fed. Res. Bull. 473, 475 (1987), aff’d sub nom.  Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors,
839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988).
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to the BHCA Amendments of 1966, and the second takes us to
the Board’s section 20 interpretations, together with court of ap-
peals decisions on petitions for review thereof, dating from the
late 1980s and early 1990s.
First, the advantages of “disaffiliation” used to be all but non-
existent because of an initially enacted but later-repealed provi-
sion of Glass-Steagall, section 19(e).327  Although difficult to
imagine after sixty-five years of expansive, post-New Deal com-
merce clause jurisprudence,328 Congress in 1933 doubted its con-
stitutional authority to regulate bank holding companies because
they were chartered under state law.329  Hence the original defi-
nition of “affiliate” in section 2(b) lacked the present paragraph
(4), which was not added until 1966, ten years after enactment of
the BHCA (when Congress’s authority over bank holding com-
panies was no longer in doubt).330  Back in 1933, however, in or-
der to exert some  control over securities activities of bank
holding companies, Congress enacted section 19(e) of the Act,
which prevented a bank holding company from voting the shares
of a member bank it controlled unless it had first obtained a per-
mit from the Board.  To obtain such a permit, the holding com-
pany had to agree to divest itself, within five years, of ownership
or control of any corporation or similar organization formed for
the purpose of, or engaged principally in, the same litany of se-
curities activities as was found in section 20.331
327 Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162, 188 (formerly codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 61(e)).
328 After 1937, the Supreme Court consistently regarded congressional power
under the Commerce Clause as plenary and upheld federal regulation of even local
activity. See , e.g.,  Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Recl. Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264
(1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937). But cf.  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidat-
ing provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 as seeking to regulate
non-economic activity and thus not within Congress’s commerce power); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990 as not implicating economic activity and therefore exceeding Congress’s com-
merce power).
329 See , e.g. , S. REP. NO. 73-77, at 10 (1933).
330 Section 19(e) of the Act was repealed at the same time. See  Act of July 1,
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 13, 80 Stat. 236, 242.
331 These were, of course, “the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distri-
bution at wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation of stocks, bonds,
debentures, notes, or other securities . . . .”  12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994) (repealed 1999).
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Thus, until 1966, affiliation of a member bank with other sub-
sidiaries of its holding company, including any entity that held
majority control of a member bank directly or indirectly , was
dealt with in a separate and independent statutory provision.
Even if interposition of another corporation between a bank
holding company and a member bank it controlled would have
relieved the original parent from the requirements of section 20,
this effort would have been unavailing because the provisions of
section 19(e) were still stricter.332
Indeed, the presence of section 19(e) in the original structure
of Glass-Steagall demonstrates that Congress did not intend the
combination of section 20 and section 2(b)(2) to regulate rela-
tionships in a multi-tiered holding company system in which a
parent company, such as Holdings, indirectly  owns a member
bank.  Thus Glass-Steagall’s own history supports the literal con-
struction of section 2(b)(2) advanced herein.
Second, this construction of Glass-Steagall would have been of
purely theoretical interest and no practical utility if an attempt to
make use of it could have been vitiated because of the nonbank-
ing prohibitions of the BHCA.  The opportunity to take advan-
tage of this interpretation first arose—for bank holding
companies, at least333—only after the Board determined as a
matter of law, and was sustained by the courts on petitions for
judicial review, that engaging in the congeries of securities activi-
ties listed in section 20 of the Act was permissible for bank hold-
ing companies under the “closely related” and “proper incident”
prongs of section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA.  That determination was
not made, as to commercial paper, municipal revenue bonds,
mortgage-related securities, and consumer receivable-related se-
curities, until 1987 (and sustained by the Second Circuit in
332 The language of section 19(e) with respect to affiliation via a bank holding
company was stricter than that of section 20 with respect to affiliation via a member
bank’s majority shareholders.  Section 19(e) conditioned issuance of a voting permit
on the absence of any interest  in a corporation engaged in section 20 activities; sec-
tion 20 merely prohibited the majority shareholders from having control  of such an
affiliate.
333 The two previously referenced interpretations, supra  note 297, were issued to
a company that was not  a bank holding company within the meaning of the BHCA,
because the bank it owned did not meet the pre-CEBA definition of “bank.”  Thus,
for that company, the opportunity to make use of disaffiliation first arose in the
latter part of 1987, after the validity of nonbank banks had been confirmed by the
Supreme Court in Dimension  and grandfathered (or, as the case may be, enabled,
with the expansion of statutory exceptions to that definitional provision in 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(c)(2)—e.g., credit card banks) by Congress in CEBA.
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1988),334 and, as to corporate debt and equity securities, until
1989 (and sustained by the District of Columbia Circuit in
1990).335
A second potential objection, which shall, for convenience, be
called “reverse control,” raises the question whether, looking at
Diagram C, the Board might draw an arrow (representing the
exercise of control) from M.B. up through Intermediate 2 and
Holdings, then looping over to the left and downward to Inter-
mediate 1 and thence to Securities Complex.  This is a serious
concern that might occur to any experienced bank regulatory
lawyer,336 and it therefore deserves to be addressed.
It is, of course, possible, given the BHCA definition337 of “con-
trol,” for P to control Q and Q simultaneously to control P, but
that situation would seem to arise only where there was mutual
stock ownership.  The mere fact of identically constituted boards
of directors ought not to be enough for mutual control under cir-
cumstances where P controls Q by virtue of ownership of all of
Q’s stock but Q does not own a controlling interest in P’s stock.
In fact, identity of board membership between bank and parent
holding company is quite common throughout the U.S. banking
system, and it would create quite a shock wave were the Board to
assert that each and every one of those banks controlled its
parent.
Moreover, the legal implications of a bank being said to con-
trol its holding company would threaten to stand our system of
banking regulation on its head.  A bank charter is entirely a “dif-
ferent animal” from the charter of a general business corpora-
tion.  Under the laws of most states, a bank, while subject to
certain provisions of the state’s general corporation laws, is sub-
ject to other provisions uniquely applicable to its charter and
may not exercise many of the powers of a general business corpo-
ration.  In particular, there typically are severe restrictions on the
types of activities in which a bank may engage and in the types of
334 Citicorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473, 475 (1987), aff’d sub nom.  Sec. Indus. Ass’n v.
Bd. of Governors, 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988).
335 J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192 (1989), aff’d sub nom.  Sec.
Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 900 F.2d 360 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
336 Indeed, this notion was suggested to the author by a friend and colleague on
the Banking Law Committee of the American Bar Association.
337 As noted earlier, the Glass-Steagall Act has no “control” definition of its own,
but we can assume, arguendo , that the section 23A/BHCA definition of that term is
the likeliest guide to its meaning for Glass-Steagall purposes. See supra  note 306.
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entities a bank may control.  The same is generally true for na-
tional banks under the National Bank Act.  Recall also that,
under the BHCA, a company that controls a bank holding com-
pany is itself a bank holding company.  Thus, if the Board were
suddenly to assert that a bank controlled its parent holding com-
pany, there would be a need for immediate divestitures (1) pur-
suant to the BHCA, because the bank had never applied for
prior approval to own all of the companies owned by the holding
company or to engage in all of the activities in which the holding
company directly or indirectly engaged; and (2) pursuant to the
National Bank Act, because a national bank is simply not permit-
ted to engage in most of those activities.  The potential havoc
wrought by such a theory renders it untenable, even if it is in
some sense theoretically possible.
Moreover, such an assertion would be antithetical to the ratio-
nale underlying the structural firewalls338 established in connec-
tion with the Board’s approval of section 20 affiliates.339
Requiring that underwriting and dealing activities be conducted
in a corporation over which affiliated banks and thrifts have no
ownership and no financial, managerial, or operational control
would simply make no sense if the banks and thrifts were
deemed to control their holding companies.
Finally, cognoscenti of Glass-Steagall jurisprudence might
query whether disaffiliation would run afoul of the “subtle
hazards” invoked by the landmark 1971 Supreme Court decision
in Investment Company Institute v. Camp .340  While noting that
Congress had sought in the Glass-Steagall Act to avoid the obvi-
338 “Firewalls” are limitations designed to mitigate the potential adverse effects of
permitting the affiliation of commercial banks with firms engaged in certain non-
banking activities, such as underwriting and dealing in securities.  These limitations
typically include credit-related, structural, and operational restrictions on the rela-
tionship between the bank and the affiliate in order to guard against potential con-
flicts of interest, unsound banking practices, undue concentration of economic
power, undue risk of loss, and other adverse effects.
339 Firewalls were a prominent feature of the Board’s section 20 orders and em-
braced issues like capital adequacy, credit restrictions, corporate separateness, cross-
marketing activities, investment advisory and fiduciary activity restrictions, disclo-
sure requirements, and restrictions on affiliate transactions.  Moreover, the Board
prohibited reciprocal arrangements with other bank holding companies for the pur-
pose of evading firewall restrictions.  For a list of the firewalls in place as of 1991 and
a comparison with statutory firewalls proposed in various provisions considered (but
not ultimately enacted) in the legislation that ultimately became FDICIA, see
Fisher, supra  note 81, at 264-76.
340 401 U.S. 617 (1971).  The “functional equivalence” significance of Camp  was
discussed supra  notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
\\Server03\productn\O\ORE\80-4\ORE403.txt unknown Seq: 89 16-JUL-02 14:19
Orphan of Invention:  Why the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Was Unnecessary 1389
ous danger of imprudent securities investments by banks that
would impair their capital (a hazard not implicated by the facts in
Camp),341 the Court’s opinion found that Congress also had in
mind a number of so-called “subtle hazards.”  These included the
peril of loss of public confidence in the bank, the risk that the
bank might engage in imprudent or anticompetitive activity (be-
cause the integrity and impartiality of credit judgment could eas-
ily be undermined) occasioned by promotional pressures and the
bank’s “salesman’s stake” in the success of its securities affiliates,
and the danger of conflicts of interest between the promotional
interest of the investment banker and the obligation of the com-
mercial banker to render disinterested investment advice.  Such
conflicts could include the misuse of confidential customer infor-
mation and the threat of the bank being driven to unload exces-
sive or worthless holdings through its trust department.342
However, subsequent pronouncements by the Supreme Court
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit have called into question the continued validity of the subtle
hazards analysis.  In Camp , the Supreme Court relied heavily
upon statements inserted in the legislative history by Senator
Bulkley, but that approach to statutory construction is now disfa-
vored by the Court and has been supplanted by Chevron  and its
progeny, as discussed above.343  In addition, as later judicial deci-
sions have noted, Senator Bulkley was advocating a more com-
plete separation of investment from commercial banking than
Congress actually adopted.  The final version of Glass-Steagall
was a compromise that did not contain certain major provisions
advocated by Senator Bulkley, thereby depreciating significantly
any weight that might otherwise be accorded his remarks.344
341 Investment Company Institute v. Camp  involved a challenge by the ICI to an
OCC interpretation whereby Citibank (then First National City Bank of New York)
could permit common trust fund assets to be comprised of “monies contributed
thereto by the bank in its capacity as managing agent under a managing agency
agreement expressly providing that such monies are received by the bank in trust.”
401 U.S. at 622 n.7 (quoting the then-existing version of 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(a) (1970)).
The bank sought to create and market to investors a fund which the SEC required to
be registered as an open-end investment company under the Investment Company
Act of 1940 and shares of which had to be registered as “securities” for purposes of
the Securities Act of 1933.  The facts presented no cause for concern from the capital
impairment point of view about imprudent bank investments. Id . at 622-23.
342 Id . at 630-38.
343 See supra  notes 310-11 and accompanying text.
344 See , e.g. , Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 847 F.2d 890, 896 (D.C. Cir.
1988).  A similar fate befell remarks of Congressman McFadden, in terms of judicial
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Furthermore, closer analysis reveals that in the various Glass-
Steagall cases considered by the Supreme Court, resort to a “sub-
tle hazards” analysis has been critical only in cases where both
(1) the statutory language did not resolve the question
presented—unlike the case with disaffiliation—and  (2) the
agency decisionmaker failed to furnish an administrative record
to which the Court could defer concerning those hazards.345
Even then, as Judge Bork aptly observed in the Bankers Trust
commercial paper case:
[T]he “subtle hazards” addressed in Camp  and returned to in
[later cases] have never alone caused the Supreme Court to
hold that Glass-Steagall permits or prohibits any particular
banking practice.  Rather, analysis of the hazards in those
cases simply reinforced the Court’s conclusion that, as a mat-
ter of statutory interpretation, Glass-Steagall permitted or
prohibited the questioned practice.346
The post-Camp  case law on “subtle hazards” also reflects the
following principles:
• A subtle hazard need not be “totally obliterated” in order to
make a practice permissible; avoidance of the hazard “to a
large extent” will suffice.347
• Supreme Court cases have “concluded that ‘subtle hazards’
counsel prohibition of a banking practice only when the
practice gave rise to each and every one of the hazards .”348
• Any subtle hazards analysis is subservient to the Chevron
principle requiring deference to reasonable agency construc-
views of their reliability as guides to construction of the Act that bears his name,
between the pre-Chevron  days of statutory construction in First National Bank of
Logan, Utah v. Walker Bank & Trust Co. , 385 U.S. 252 (1966), and the post-Chevron
era in Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass’n , 479 U.S. 388 (1987).
345 See Camp , 401 U.S. at 617; Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 468 U.S. 137
(1984); see also  Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 807 F.2d 1052, 1069 (D.C. Cir.
1986) [hereinafter Bankers Trust] (binding force of Supreme Court’s “subtle
hazards” analysis unclear where agency failed to offer the court any rationale con-
cerning those hazards to which the Court could defer); Bd. of Governors v. Inv. Co.
Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 68 (1981) (distinguishing Camp  on that ground).
346 Bankers Trust , 807 F.2d at 1069.
347 Id . (citing Inv. Co. Inst. , 450 U.S. at 67 n.39).
348 Bankers Trust , 807 F.2d at 1069; accord  Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors,
821 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter NatWest] (affirming Board’s approval of
application by National Westminster Bank PLC and NatWest Holdings, Inc. to form
a de novo subsidiary to provide a combination of portfolio investment advice, securi-
ties brokerage, and general economic information and advice to institutional
customers).
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tion of the statute.349
• The Board may rely on commitments or conditions in ap-
proving a Glass-Steagall application as a means of assuaging
concern about any particular hazard.350
This last point is noteworthy in that to the extent the “subtle
hazards” retain any viability at all, they have been reincarnated
as “firewalls”—the term commonly used to refer to conditions
imposed by the Board to minimize or eliminate perceived risks
associated with combining commercial banking and investment
banking activities under the same holding company umbrella.351
Indeed, firewalls have been a prominent feature of the Board’s
section 20 orders and have embraced issues like capital ade-
quacy,352 credit restrictions,353 corporate separateness,354 cross-
349 See  Inv. Co. Inst. v. Conover, 790 F.2d 925, 931-33 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
350 Inv. Co. Inst., 450 U.S. at 66-67; NatWest , 821 F.2d at 818; Bankers Trust , 807
F.2d at 1067.
351 See supra  note 338.
352 For example, deduction from a bank holding company’s regulatory capital of
(i) the capital investment in the section 20 affiliate and (ii) any credit the bank hold-
ing company or any nonbank subsidiary thereof extends directly or indirectly to the
section 20 affiliate.
353 Examples include prohibitions on (i) credit extended by an insured depository
institution (IDI) to its section 20 affiliate (other than daylight credit in connection
with clearing U.S. and Canadian government securities); (ii) credit for bank-ineligi-
ble securities underwritten or distributed by the affiliate; (iii) credit, during the un-
derwriting period, to a customer of the section 20 affiliate if the credit was secured
by, or for the purpose of purchasing, any bank-ineligible security underwritten by
the affiliate or in which it made a market; (iv) credit to a customer of the section 20
affiliate for the purpose of repaying credit extended by the affiliate; (v) credit or
credit support directed at enhancing the creditworthiness or marketability of any
ineligible securities issue underwritten or distributed by the section 20 affiliate; (vi)
with respect to an issuer of ineligible securities underwritten  by the section 20 affili-
ate, credit to finance payment by the issuer of principal, interest, or dividends on
such securities; and (vii) with respect to an issuer of ineligible securities placed  by
the section 20 affiliate as agent  for the issuer, credit to finance the issuer’s repay-
ment of the principal amount of the securities, unless (A) at least three years had
elapsed since placement of the securities, (B) the credit met prudent and objective
standards, and (C) the lender—whether an insured depository institution (“IDI”) or
other affiliate of the bank holding company—maintained detailed documentation
with respect to the credit, the collateral, and compliance with section 23B of the
Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 371c-1 (West 2001).
In addition, the Board required the holding company to implement appropriate
procedures with respect to the exposure of the holding company on a consolidated
basis to any issuer of securities underwritten or dealt in by the section 20 affiliate,
and proscribed discriminatory treatment with respect to unaffiliated securities firms
(e.g., where an IDI extended or denied credit to create a competitive advantage for
its section 20 affiliate).
354 The Board required separate offices for the bank and the section 20 affiliate
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marketing activities,355 investment advisory and fiduciary activity
restrictions,356 disclosure requirements,357 and restrictions on af-
filiate transactions.358
Regardless of whether firewalls, either individually or as a
group, were good public policy, it seems fairly clear—given the
way more onerous restrictions in GLEBA have been embraced
by the banking industry—that a bank holding company, like
Holdings, would have been willing to commit voluntarily to some
firewalls (pursuant to the “proper incident” prong of BHCA
§ 4(c)(8)) in order to avail itself of the manifest benefits of disaf-
filiation in terms of largely unfettered participation in the securi-
ties business.  Also, it was unlikely that the Board would have
imposed more draconian firewalls than those imposed on section
20 affiliates.  This is so for two reasons.
First, doing so would stand athwart a trend toward relaxing,
rather than augmenting, the restrictions on section 20 affili-
and went beyond the requirements of section 32 of Glass-Steagall by proscribing any
officer, director, or employee interlocks between the section 20 affiliate and any IDI
within the holding company system.  Section 32 prohibited such interlocks where the
securities affiliate was “primarily engaged” in the “issue, flotation, underwriting,
public sale, or distribution, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation,
of stocks, bonds, or other similar securities.”  12 U.S.C. § 78 (1994) (repealed 1999).
The firewall went beyond section 32 in two respects:  (A) section 32 by its terms
applied only to member banks, whereas the firewall extended to any IDI, and (B) by
definition, no section 20 affiliate was “primarily engaged” in these activities, because
the Board had construed that phrase and “engaged principally” (for section 20 pur-
poses) in pari materia .
355 Examples include prohibitions on marketing activities by an IDI on a section
20 affiliate’s behalf and on active or passive distribution of prospectuses or other
sales literature.
356 The Board prohibited an IDI from advising or expressing opinion on the value
or advisability of the purchase or sale of ineligible securities underwritten or dealt in
by the section 20 affiliate and forbade the purchase of such securities for fiduciary
accounts during the underwriting period and for sixty days thereafter.
357 The Board required disclosure describing to the section 20 affiliate’s customers
the difference between the affiliate and any IDI(s) controlled by the bank holding
company and explaining that securities sold, offered, or recommended by the affili-
ate were not insured deposits.  The Board also limited disclosure from an IDI to its
section 20 affiliate of nonpublic customer information, except where the customer
consented.
358 Examples include prohibiting (i) a section 20 affiliate underwriting ineligible
securities from selling to any affiliated person during the underwriting period and
for sixty days thereafter (except for simultaneous cross-border underwritings); (ii)
the purchase (for its own account or the account of a subsidiary) by any IDI or
nonbank subsidiary of the bank holding company of securities underwritten by a
section 20 affiliate; and (iii) the purchase (by the holding company and nonbank
subsidiaries only) of more than fifty percent of an issue of securities placed by a
section 20 affiliate as agent for an issuer.
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ates.359  With respect to the gross revenues percentage demar-
cating “engaged principally” for section 20 purposes, the Board
began at five percent,360 then increased that level from five to ten
percent, then loosened the restriction further by permitting sec-
tion 20 affiliates to elect an indexed revenue test to measure
compliance with that ten percent limitation,361 and subsequently
was willing to supplement the gross revenues measure by adding
as an alternative  either asset values or sales volume or a combina-
tion of the two.362  The Board ultimately raised the gross reve-
nues ceiling to twenty-five percent.363
Other developments of a liberalizing nature have included (1)
permitting a broker-dealer subsidiary of an affiliated bank to act
as a riskless principal or broker for customers in buying and sell-
ing bank-eligible securities that the section 20 affiliate under-
writes or deals in,364 (2) acting as a dealer-manager in connection
with cash tender and exchange offer transactions,365 and (3) a
combination of (1) plus (2) plus the following:  (A) acting as a
broker or agent with respect to transactions in interest rate and
currency swaps, caps, floors, collars, and swap derivative prod-
ucts, (B) acting as an advisor to institutional customers regarding
financial strategies involving such financial instruments, (C) act-
ing as principal in the resale of bank-ineligible securities pursu-
ant to SEC Rule 144A, (D) offering FCM execution, clearance,
359 Indeed, the Board had under consideration for several years the wish-list of
the (then) Association of Bank Holding Companies with regard to section 20 affili-
ates, and that wish-list contemplated the dismantling of a number of the firewalls.
See  Notice, 55 Fed. Reg. 28,295-02 (July 10, 1990).  The Board ultimately did so. See
Notice, 61 Fed. Reg. 57,679 (Nov. 7, 1996).
360 See , e.g. , Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 138, 140 (1987); Chase
Manhattan Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 367, 367 (1987), aff’d sub nom . Sec. Indus.
Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 847 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Citicorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull.
473, 475 (1987), aff’d sub nom.  Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 839 F.2d 47
(2d Cir. 1988).
361 Under that indexed revenue test, current interest and dividend revenues from
eligible and ineligible securities were adjusted to approximate the revenues that
would have been derived if interest rate conditions were those that existed in Sep-
tember 1989.  Accordingly, interest and dividend revenues for each quarter were
increased or decreased by an adjustment factor provided by the Board according to
the average duration of a section 20 affiliate’s eligible and ineligible securities port-
folios. See  Order Approving Modifications to Section 20 Orders, 79 Fed. Res. Bull.
226, 227 (1993).
362 See  Notice, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,516 (July 12, 1994).
363 Notice, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,750 (Dec. 30, 1996).
364 BankAmerica Corp., 79 Fed. Res. Bull. 1163 (1993); Chem. Banking Corp., 80
Fed. Res. Bull. 49, 50 n.5 (1994).
365 Id .
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and advisory services, and (E) engaging in certain options, fu-
tures, and options on futures transactions in bank-eligible and
bank-ineligible securities for hedging purposes in accordance
with the Board’s policy statement on derivative transactions.366
Note, incidentally, that all of this chipping away at the Glass-
Steagall barrier between commercial and investment banking re-
mained subject, of course, to the gross revenues limitation of sec-
tion 20, which, during most of that period, was pegged at ten
percent.  For most commercial banking organizations, this was
rather like commanding a large army but being pinned down by
smaller but better positioned forces.  The advantage of disaffilia-
tion is that it would have eliminated section 20 altogether, which,
to continue the military analogy, would be rather like General
Patton in World War II Sicily, breaking out from the position
where his army had been pinned down and beating Field Mar-
shall Montgomery to Palermo.
Second, the Board deemed the existing battery of firewalls suf-
ficient to satisfy the “proper incident” prong of the analysis
under section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA.  The firewalls comprehen-
sively covered various components of that analysis.367  By agree-
366 Saban, S.A., 80 Fed. Res. Bull. 249 (1994).
367 Many of the firewalls constituted a structural framework established in order
that securities underwriting and dealing activities be conducted in a corporation over
which affiliated banks or thrifts had no ownership and no financial, managerial, or
operational control.  Thus, those activities were required to be conducted in a com-
pany that was controlled by the parent holding company and not by the affiliated
bank or thrift institution, that did not have any officer, director, or employee in
common with the bank or thrift affiliate, that had separate offices from any affiliated
bank or thrift, and that maintained capitalization in accordance with securities in-
dustry norms (which capitalization was provided by the parent holding company
from its own funds and not from the resources of its bank or thrift subsidiaries or,
indeed, from the resources that the holding company, under the Board’s “source of
strength” doctrine, needed to support those bank or thrift subsidiaries).  Other
firewalls were designed to prevent conflicts of interest and unfair competition, e.g.,
by preventing certain credit or credit support by a bank or thrift for the section 20
affiliate, its customers, or the issuers of securities it underwrote; prohibiting the
transfer of confidential customer information; prohibiting credit treatment of an un-
affiliated securities firm less favorable than that accorded an affiliated underwriting
subsidiary unless the extension or denial of credit were based on objective criteria
and was consistent with sound business practices; and requiring disclosure to cus-
tomers of the section 20 affiliate concerning the lack of federal deposit insurance
with respect to securities sold, offered, or recommended by that affiliate.  Yet an-
other category of firewalls was addressed to safety and soundness considerations and
mandated the implementation by the affiliated banks and thrifts of policies and pro-
cedures designed, inter alia, to limit overall exposure, on a consolidated holding
company basis, to any single underwriting client of the section 20 affiliate as well as
to limit aggregate exposure to all such borrowers.
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ing to conduct the activities of the disaffiliated securities firm in a
manner consistent with those firewalls, Holdings would clearly
have defused any and all legitimate “proper incident” concerns
the Board might have, with the possible exception—but only in
the event of a major  acquisition of a securities firm—of unfair
competition and undue concentration of resources.368  Address-
ing those factors might have entailed some antitrust analysis in
Holdings’ application.369
In that connection, it should be remembered that the securities
business is an international business, so the relevant geographic
market should have been no smaller than the entire United
States and arguably much larger, e.g., the U.S. + Canada + West-
ern Europe + most of Asia.  Moreover, the securities business is
likely to be relatively unconcentrated, even when examined on
the basis of U.S. firms alone.  The transaction that resulted in the
formation of Citigroup conjoined Citicorp’s pre-existing securi-
ties business with the combination of Salomon Brothers and
Smith Barney, with nary a raising of competitive eyebrows.370
Using modes of legal analysis that, while not unsophisticated,
368 Those factors of the “proper incident” analysis did not need to be addressed by
any firewalls because the section 20 affiliates’ entry into the securities business was
de novo and because, given the ten percent gross revenues limitation, the likelihood
that any bank holding company would be able to achieve market domination was
virtually nil.  In addition, there was no evidence that in the areas where banking
institutions competed with securities firms, such as underwriting Eurobonds and the
private placement of securities, banking institutions had achieved a dominant
position.
It should be recalled, moreover, that in the original section 20 order, the Board
imposed, in addition to the gross revenues limitation, a market share limitation.  Cit-
icorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473, 474 (1987), rev’d sub nom.  Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of
Governors, 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988).  However, that market share limitation was
challenged by the applicants and struck down on appeal.  Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of
Governors, 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988).
369 Note that there has been a fair amount of confusion as to the standard to be
applied by the Board when evaluating the undue concentration of resources factor
for purposes of section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA.  In many instances, the Board has
lumped this together with traditional competitive considerations.  There is, however,
authority for the proposition that “undue concentration of resources” is not limited
to antitrust considerations, so that it is possible for the Board to find a concentration
of resources problem without finding an antitrust violation. See , e.g. , Ala. Ass’n of
Ins. Agents v. Bd. of Governors, 533 F.2d 224, 251 (5th Cir. 1976), amended and
reh’g denied , 558 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1977); Citicorp, 64 Fed. Res. Bull. 321 (1978)
(concerning application to retain control of Advance Mortgage Corporation, the
fourth largest mortgage company in the country).  Nevertheless, with respect to dis-
affiliation the underlying concerns appear to have been addressed fairly comprehen-
sively by the existing regime of firewalls.
370 Travelers Group, Inc., 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 985, 988 (1988).
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were certainly not unusual in financial institutions circles, this
section has demonstrated that disaffiliation technique would
have yielded commercial banking organizations essentially unfet-
tered access to the securities business, free from the strictures of
Glass-Steagall and, even if (in a worst-case analysis) subject to
certain firewalls, without the enormous (and to a certain extent
still incalculable) regulatory burdens and costs that accompanied
GLEBA’s grant of congruent securities powers.  The following
section will summarize key GLEBA provisions and provide an
intimation of those regulatory burdens and costs.
IV
Signed into law on November 12, 1999 (but with effective dates
for various provisions staggered thereafter over more than two
years), GLEBA effected sweeping changes to several federal reg-
ulatory schemes and removed prohibitions against the combina-
tion of banking, securities, and insurance.371  While the Act
covers a broad statutory landscape,372 this section will naturally
focus only on those provisions of GLEBA that are pertinent to
the topics under consideration.
A. Financial Holding Companies
The Act contemplates a bifurcated structure for commercial
banking organizations to diversify into other (mainly financial)
activities but permits complete373 financial services diversifica-
tion only through a holding company structure, adapting the ex-
isting model of holding company-level regulation familiar to
cognoscenti of the BHCA.  The primary scheme amends the
BHCA to permit a qualifying bank holding company to elect to
371 These provisions are found in Title I of the Act.  Titles II and III of the Act
focus on so-called “functional” regulation of bank-affiliated securities and insurance
enterprises.
372 The Act suspended further diversification via the unitary savings and loan
holding company vehicle, GLEBA § 401(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1467a(c)(9) (West 2001),
while, at the same time, effecting the first breach in the wall between banking and
commerce by allowing, for the first time, commercial banking organizations to en-
gage in merchant banking activities.  GLEBA § 103(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(k)(4)(H)
(West 2001).  Furthermore, the Act took what appears to be the initial legislative
step in creating comprehensive regulation of financial privacy, as adumbrated in Ti-
tle V.
373 Less than complete diversification is possible through the use of bank subsidi-
aries. See infra  notes 423-61 and accompanying text.
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become a “financial holding company” (FHC)374 and thereby en-
gage, directly or through a nonbank subsidiary, in any activity
that is “financial in nature”375 or that is incidental or complemen-
tary thereto.376  To qualify for these expanded powers, each and
every one of the depository institutions controlled by the bank
holding company must meet three criteria:  Each must be (1)
“well capitalized” (within the meaning of standards adopted
under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act377) for the “Prompt
Corrective Action” provisions thereof,378 (2) “well managed,”379
374 GLEBA § 103(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(l)(1)(C)(i) (West 2001).
375 See infra  notes 384-96 and accompanying text.
376 See infra  notes 397-98 and accompanying text.
377 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1835a (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
378 GLEBA § 103(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(l)(1)(A).  As used in the prompt correc-
tive action provisions of section 38 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA),
which were added by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvements Act
of 1991 (FDICIA), Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 131, 105 Stat. 2236, 2253-67, a bank is
“well capitalized” if it has and maintains capital equal to or exceeding those pre-
scribed by each and every applicable capital adequacy regulation or guideline appli-
cable to the bank.  12 U.S.C. § 1831o  (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).  Thus, for example,
under the Board’s capital regulations applicable to state member banks, to be “well
capitalized” each such bank must have leverage capital of at least five percent, Tier I
risk-based capital of at least six percent, and total risk-based capital of at least ten
percent, and must not be subject to any supervisory agreement or action related to
capital adequacy.  Fed. Res. Sys. Membership of State Banking Institutions in the
Federal Reserve System (Regulation H), 12 C.F.R. § 208.43 (2001).  For more de-
tailed discussion of the terminology and methodology of bank capital regulation, see
generally 2 KENNETH M. LAPINE ET AL., BANKING LAW ¶¶ 23.01-.09 (1986 & Supp.
2000) and KEITH R. FISHER, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS OF BANKS AND SAVINGS
INSTITUTIONS § 3.16 (1993).
Note that the Act does not mandate any consolidated capital at the holding com-
pany level as a precondition to qualifying as a FHC.  In contrast, the Board’s Regu-
lation Y contains capital standards applicable at the holding company level. See
Fed. Res. Sys. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control (Regulation
Y), 12 C.F.R. pt. 225, apps. A-E (2001).  To the extent that every FHC is also a bank
holding company, this creates something of an ambiguity, though arguably the
Board should, given the evident intent of Congress in the Act, seek to avoid disqual-
ifying a bank holding company from FHC status that otherwise meets the statutorily
prescribed standards in new section 4(l) of the BHCA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(l) (West
2001).  Indeed, given that the “well capitalized” factor for the depository institutions
is an element of the statutory definition, any more stringent requirement might ar-
guably be invalid under Board of Governors v. Dimension Financial Corp.,  474 U.S.
361 (1986).
379 GLEBA § 103(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(l)(1)(B).  Management is one of the fac-
tors assessed by bank examiners in the safety and soundness examination, which
uses a five-tier rating system—known as a CAMEL rating based on an acronym for
separate ratings of Capital Asset Quality, Management, Earnings, and Liquidity—
with “1” as the highest rating and “5” as the lowest.  A bank is “well managed”
within the meaning of the Act if in its most recent examination it has received a
composite CAMEL rating of 1 or 2 and  the management component of that rating
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and (3) possessed of a Community Reinvestment Act380 rating of
“[s]atisfactory” or better381 at its most recent CRA examina-
tion.382  To implement these powers, the bank holding company
need only file a certification and declaration with the Board, af-
ter which—and without having to await any formal or informal
regulatory approval—the new FHC may directly or indirectly en-
gage in any of the congeries of permissible expanded activities,
either de novo or by acquisition.383
The expanded scope of activities permissible for FHCs (i.e.,
activities that are “financial in nature,”) is significantly broader
(the “M” in the CAMEL acronym) is also a 1 or 2. See  12 U.S.C. § 1841(o)(9) (1994
& Supp. IV 1998).
380 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2901-2907 (West 2001).  For a synopsis of the Community Re-
investment Act (CRA) and its applicability to bank and bank holding company ac-
quisitions, see FISHER, supra  note 376, §§ 3.6, 3.18; ROLAND E. BRANDEL & DAVID
E. TEITELBAUM, THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT:  POLICIES AND COMPLI-
ANCE §§ 7.01-.04 (2d ed. 1994).
In contrast to the “well capitalized” and “well managed” eligibility criteria for a
FHC, which are set forth in paragraph (1) of new section 4(l) of the BHCA, 12
U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1), and which therefore constitute the exoskeleton of the statutory
definition of “financial holding company” set forth in section 103(c) of GLEBA (ad-
ding new section 2(p) of the BHCA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841(p) (West 2001)), the CRA
criterion is set forth in paragraph (2) thereof, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(l)(2), and thus is
not an element of that statutory definition.
381 GLEBA § 103(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(l)(2).  Note that, pursuant to new
§ 1843(l)(2)(B), this requirement is inapplicable to acquiring ownership interests in
companies pursuant to the Act’s merchant banking or insurance company invest-
ment provisions in new section 1843(k)(4)(H)-(I).  Section 103(b) of GLEBA also
adds a new section 804(c) to the CRA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 2903(c) (West 2001), that man-
dates rejection of a notice of election to become a FHC where any depository insti-
tution (DI) controlled by the would-be FHC does not have at least a “Satisfactory”
CRA rating.  A statutory exception is created for a would-be FHC that flunks this
CRA test because of a DI that was acquired within the previous twelve months, so
long as the holding company has submitted an “affirmative plan” to bring that DI up
to at least a “Satisfactory” rating to the “appropriate Federal banking agency” (as
that term is defined in section 3(q) of the FDIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q) (1994)) and
that agency has accepted the plan (hereinafter referred to as AFBA).  GLEBA
§ 103(b), 12 U.S.C.A. § 2903(c)(2).
Unlike the one-to-five scale used for the CAMEL rating and its components,
CRA is judged under a four-tiered system, with possible ratings of “Outstanding,”
“Satisfactory,” “Needs Improvement,” and “Substantial Noncompliance.”
382 CRA ratings are usually given not as part of the periodic safety and soundness
examination but as part of a separate compliance examination of the bank.
383 GLEBA § 161.  On January 25, 2000, the Board, acting pursuant to explicit
statutory authority in the Act, issued interim and proposed regulations setting forth
the procedures for FHC elections.  Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank
Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 3785 (Jan. 25, 2000).  These have since been finalized. See
Fed. Res. Sys. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control (Regulation
Y), 12 C.F.R. § 225.82 (2001).
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than the scope of activities permissible to bank holding compa-
nies under the “closely related to banking”/”proper incident to
banking” standard of section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA384  In fact,
certain activities previously385 impermissible386 for bank holding
companies under the BHCA are enumerated in the Act as incon-
trovertibly387 “financial in nature.”  These include:
• underwriting or dealing in securities (including market-mak-
ing), without gross revenues limitations;388
• organizing, sponsoring, distributing, or advising a mutual
fund;389
• merchant banking—i.e., investing as principal in businesses
without regard to the separation of banking and commerce
384 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(c)(8) (West 2001).  Note, however, that any activity previ-
ously determined by the Board, by regulation or order, to be permissible for bank
holding companies under the section 4(c)(8) standard, as of the day before enact-
ment of GLEBA, is also among the enumerated activities in the Act that are defini-
tively deemed “financial in nature.”
385 Even after enactment of GLEBA, these activities are still  impermissible for
those bank holding companies that do not elect FHC status or fail to qualify therefor
(or, having previously qualified and elected, subsequently fail to maintain those
qualifications and ultimately lose FHC status).
386 Certain previously permissible activities are also enumerated in the Act as
among the congeries of activities that are “financial in nature.”  These include previ-
ously approved activities under section 4(c)(8) of BHCA, see supra  note 384; provid-
ing financial, investment, or economic advisory services (including advising an
“investment company” as that term is defined in section 3 of the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)); and, of course, famil-
iar banking and custodial activities such as lending, exchanging, transferring,
investing as agent, and safeguarding money or securities.
387 Because these activities are specifically listed in the statute and represent a
congressional determination as to their essentially “financial” character, there is no
requirement for the Board and the Secretary of the Treasury to pronounce them as
such pursuant to the consultative regulatory process spelled out in the Act for activi-
ties not so listed. Compare  new BHCA § 4(k)(4), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(k)(4)
(enumerating activities determined by Congress  to be financial in nature), with  new
BHCA § 4(k)(2)-(3), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(k)(2)-(3) (establishing consultative process
and mandating factors to be considered therein).
388 See  new BHCA § 4(k)(4)(E), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(k)(4)(E).  Section 101(a) of
the Act repeals section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994) (re-
pealed 1999), containing the “engaged principally” standard that is the source of the
gross revenues limitations previously imposed by the Board on bank holding com-
pany securities affiliates. See  Citicorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473 (1987), aff’d sub nom.
Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988); J.P. Morgan &
Co., Inc., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192 (1989), aff’d sub nom.  Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of
Governors, 900 F.2d 360 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
389 See  new BHCA § 4(k)(4)(C)-(E), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(k)(4)(C)-(E).
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wrought by the BHCA;390
• underwriting insurance (including title insurance) and issu-
ing annuities;391
• selling insurance as agent or broker (including title insur-
ance);392 and
engaging in the United States in any activity which has previously
been permissible overseas under the International Banking Act
of 1978393 or the Board’s Regulation K394 and has, pursuant to
section 4(c)(13) of the BHCA,395 been determined by the Board
to be usual in connection with the transaction of banking or
other financial operations abroad (e.g., management consulting).
Other activities that are not so enumerated in the Act may
likewise be determined—albeit administratively, by regulation or
order—to be “financial in nature” if either the Board or the Sec-
390 Thus, subject to the limitations on merchant banking imposed by the Act, a
FHC may invest in any type of business enterprise (hereinafter referred to as a
“portfolio company”), regardless of the form in which it is organized (corporation,
partnership, joint venture, etc.) and regardless of the activities in which the business
is engaged.  Merchant banking activity must be conducted through a securities or
insurance affiliate or another appropriate nonbank affiliate of the FHC. See  new
BHCA § 4(k)(4)(H), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(k)(4)(H).  The merchant banking authority
may not, however, be used to acquire more than a five percent interest in a bank,
bank holding company, or thrift. Compare id., with  12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(3) (1994)
(prohibiting bank holding company acquisition of more than five percent of the vot-
ing shares of a bank), and id.  § 1843(c)(6) (exemption from nonbanking activity
prohibition for ownership of five percent or less of the voting shares of any
company).
Whereas under section 4(c)(6) of the BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6), a BHC could
only invest without restriction in less than five percent of another company, the level
of investment pursuant to the merchant banking authority is unrestricted.  However,
if a FHC’s merchant banking investment in a portfolio company exceeds fifteen per-
cent of the company’s equity capital, the portfolio company is presumed to be an
“affiliate” for purposes of section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 371c (West 2001).  GLEBA § 121(b), 12 U.S.C.A. § 371c(b)(11).  As a conse-
quence, the ability of a depository institution controlled by the FHC to extend credit
to that portfolio company would be correspondingly circumscribed.
391 See  new BHCA § 4(k)(4)(B), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(k)(4)(B).
392 Id.
393 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3101-3111 (West 2001).
394 Fed. Res. Sys. International Banking Operations (Regulation K), 12 C.F.R.
§ 211.1-211.604 (2001).  Permissible overseas activities for U.S. banks under Regula-
tion K include travel agency; real estate brokerage for the leasing of real property;
management consulting; underwriting, dealing and distributing debt and equity se-
curities (subject to certain limitations); and underwriting life, annuity, pension fund-
related, and other types of insurance (again, subject to certain limitations). See gen-
erally  12 C.F.R. § 211.5 (2001).
395 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(13) (1994).
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retary of the Treasury, each acting in consultation with the other,
initiates the process.396  The same is true for activities that, while
not themselves financial in nature, are “incidental” thereto.397
Furthermore, an FHC may engage in activities that are “comple-
mentary” to financial activities, so long as the Board determines
that they do not pose a substantial risk to the safety or soundness
of IDIs controlled by the FHC or of the financial system in
general.398
Nothing in the Act compels  an existing bank holding company
to elect FHC status.  Those that do not will, of course, continue
to be regulated by the Board as bank holding companies (“tradi-
tional BHCs”), and the scope of their permissible nonbanking
activities will continue be limited to those that are authorized by
the exceptions399 enumerated in section 4(c) of the BHCA.  Sig-
396 GLEBA § 103(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(k)(4).  Furthermore, without  consulta-
tion with the Treasury, the Board is directed to define (by regulation or order),
“consistent with the purposes of [the] Act,” certain activities as “financial in nature”
that had been included on a list of pre-approved “financial” activities by the House
Banking Committee while considering an earlier (1997) avatar of the legislation that
ultimately became GLEBA.  The activities included (i) “[l]ending, exchanging,
transferring, investing for others, or safeguarding financial assets other than money
or securities”; (ii) “[p]roviding any device or other instrumentality for transferring
money or other financial assets”; and (iii) “[a]rranging, effecting, or facilitating fi-
nancial transactions for the account of third parties.”  GLEBA § 103(a),  12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1843(k)(5).  These three activities were made subject to this special treatment,
placed on the spectrum in the Act in between statutory enumeration and the con-
sultative process with Treasury, because, while undoubtedly “financial” by any rea-
sonable definition of that word, they were subject to concerns by the Board relating
to the potential scope of the relationships and activities that might be subsumed
within the sphere of permissibility if a blanket approval was enacted in the statute.
397 There is a long history in federal banking law of regulatory agencies making
similar determinations:  OCC for activities that are “incidental” to the business of
banking under the principal powers provision of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 24 (Seventh) (West 2001), e.g. , Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245 (1934)
(holding that pledging assets to secure private deposits not incidental because not
“necessary to carry on the business of banking . . . by receiving deposits”); Arnold
Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1972) (holding that travel agency business
not incidental to the business of banking); M & M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First
Nat’l Bank, 563 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that automobile leasing incidental
to the business of banking), and the Board for activities that are so closely related to
banking as to be a proper incident thereto under section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA, 12
U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8), e.g. , Fed. Res. Sys. Bank Holding Companies and Change in
Bank Control (Regulation Y), 12 C.F.R. § 225.28 (2001) (setting forth Regulation Y
laundry list of permissible nonbanking activities).
398 The Act purports to look after the integrity of the deposit insurance system by
prohibiting the use of deposit insurance funds to benefit any shareholder, subsidiary,
or affiliate (other than a depository institution) of a FHC.  GLEBA § 117, 12
U.S.C.A. § 1821(a)(4)(B) (West 2001).
399 These are exceptions to the general prohibition against nonbanking activities
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nificantly, however, the most important of those exceptions—the
“closely related/proper incident to banking” exception in section
4(c)(8)400—will not continue to evolve through Board orders and
regulations,401 as it has since its original enactment in the BHCA,
but will remain in effect only as applied and interpreted by perti-
nent Board orders and regulations in effect on November 11,
1999.402  Thus, in a sense, GLEBA has, to borrow Professor
Michael Malloy’s felicitous phrase, “shifted the center of gravity
in the BHCA from the ‘closely related’ exemption of section
4(c)(8) to the ‘financial in nature’ concept of the FHC authoriza-
tion.”403  Notwithstanding this “shift,” a variety of circumstances
remain in which a holding company would prefer to file a section
4(c)(8) application rather than avail itself of the FHC provision
alternatives.404
(i.e., a prohibition against a bank holding company acquiring direct or indirect own-
ership or control of any voting shares of any “company” that is not a “bank,” as
those terms are defined in the statute) set forth in section 4(a) of the BHCA, 12
U.S.C. § 1843(a) (1994).
400 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(c)(8) (West 2001) (activities the Board has determined by
regulation or order to be “so closely related to banking or managing or controlling
banks as to be a proper incident thereto”).  This statutory phrase evolved into a two-
pronged inquiry.  The first, or “closely related,” prong “ask[ed] only whether the
activities in question are generally of a kind that Congress, having concluded that
‘banking and commerce should remain separate,’ forbade bank holding companies
to engage in, without regard to the merits of such engagement in a particular case.”
Nat’l Courier Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 516 F.2d 1229, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1975).  The
second, or “proper incident,” prong did reach the merits of the particular case and
required the Board to determine that performance of this particular  activity by this
particular  applicant, in the words of the pre-GLEBA version of the statute, could
“reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the public such as greater conve-
nience, increased competition, or gains in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse
effects, such as undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competition,
conflicts of interest, or unsound banking practices.” Id.  at 1232.  An activity that
was found to be “closely related” to banking could nonetheless be found not to have
been a proper incident thereto.  For an outmoded application of this distinction, see
D.H. Baldwin Co., 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 280, 287 (1977) (denying acquisition of healthy
thrift institutions, although their activities are closely related to banking, because
operation thereof found not to be a proper incident to banking).
401 E.g. , 12 C.F.R. § 225.28 (providing amendments to the Board’s Regulation Y
“laundry list” of permissible nonbanking activities).
402 GLEBA § 102(a).  Thus, the scope of permissible nonbanking activities under
section 4(c)(8) for traditional BHCs is frozen as of the day prior to the date of enact-
ment of the Act.
403 See  Michael P. Malloy, Banking in the Twenty-First Century,  25 J. CORP. L.
787, 801 (2000).
404 Acquisitions made under the FHC authority enacted by GLEBA implicate an-
titrust review by not just the Board and the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice but by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as well, with pre-merger notifi-
cation filings required under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
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The consequences of a FHC’s failure to maintain the above-
described eligibility criteria will differ depending upon the nature
of the regulatory default.  Failure to maintain “well capitalized”
and “well managed” status for all depository institutions as set
forth in section 4(l)(1) is, as one would expect, more serious than
failure to maintain a satisfactory CRA rating.
The Act requires the Board to notify a FHC that fails to satisfy
the two section 4(l)(1) requirements of the conditions giving rise
to the noncompliance,405 and the FHC then has forty-five days406
to enter into an agreement with the Board to correct the per-
ceived deficiencies.407  Until those corrections have been made,
the Board is authorized to “impose such limitations on the con-
duct or activities of that [FHC] or any affiliate of that company
as the Board determines to be appropriate under the circum-
stances and consistent with the purposes of [the BHCA].”408  If
the deficiencies have not been corrected within six months,409
however, the Board may require the FHC either (A) to divest
control of its DI’s or, (B) at the FHC’s option, to cease any activ-
1976 § 201, 15 U.S.C.A. § 18a (West 1997 & Supp. 2002). See  GLEBA § 131, 12
U.S.C.A. § 1849(b)(1) (West 2001) (amending the BHCA to reflect FTC waiting
periods for certain section 4 applications); GLEBA § 132, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828(b)
(providing for interagency data sharing with the FTC in M&A transactions and
specifying confidentiality requirements for the information involved); GLEBA
§ 133, 15 U.S.C.A. § 417 note (West Supp. 2001), 15 U.S.C.A. § 18a(c)(7)-(8) (clari-
fying FTC jurisdiction and making conforming amendments to Hart-Scott-Rodino).
This is clearly part of the price of reform exacted by GLEBA. See infra  note 417.
Filings under section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA, in contrast, are exempt from Hart-Scott-
Rodino, and thus have the virtue of saving the applicant considerable expense.
405 The Board turns the tables in its financial holding company regulations and
requires the FHC to provide notification to the Board as soon as the FHC becomes
aware that any of its DI’s is no longer in compliance with the “well capitalized” or
“well managed” requirements.  12 C.F.R. § 225.83(b).
406 The Board has authority to grant an enlargement of this time period. Id.
§ 225.83(c).
407 GLEBA § 103(b), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(m)(2) (West 2001) (adding new section
4(m)(2) of the BHCA).  In its regulation, the Board adds that the agreement in
question must be “acceptable to the Board.” See  Bank Holding Companies and
Changes in Bank Control, 66 Fed. Reg. 400, 403 (Jan. 3, 2001) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 225).
408 GLEBA § 103(b), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(m)(3) (adding new section 4(m)(3) of
the BHCA).
409 More precisely, the actual time period is 180 days after the date the FHC has
received the notice under new section 4(m)(1) of BHCA.  The Board also has discre-
tion to enlarge this time period for compliance with the supervisory agreement.
GLEBA § 103(b), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(m)(4) (adding new section 4(m)(4) to the
BHCA).
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ities not permissible for “traditional” BHCs.410  Any of the ac-
tions taken by the Board under this new section 4(m) of the
BHCA must be done in consultation with “all relevant Federal
and State regulatory agencies and authorities.”411
Less potentially draconian consequences attend failure to
maintain a satisfactory or better CRA rating.  In that situation,
the only disability imposed on the FHC412 will be on expanding,
directly or indirectly, into any new financial activities413 (either
de novo or via direct or indirect acquisition of control of a com-
pany or DI, subject to certain exceptions)414 until CRA noncom-
pliance has been cured.  In contrast to default on the safety and
soundness eligibility criteria, there is no prescribed curative pe-
riod and no disability when it comes to making additional portfo-
lio investments under the merchant banking, investment
banking, or insurance company investment authority granted to
FHCs under GLEBA.415
Though on its face apparently less severe a consequence than
that attending failure to maintain “well capitalized” or “well
managed” status, the CRA noncompliance disability—unlike the
notice and remedial action via agreement with the Board, which
might very well be a fairly mild curative—yields no leeway for
410 Id.  The actual statutory language refers only to “an activity that is permissible
for a bank holding company under subsection (c)(8),” though presumably any  per-
missible nonbanking activities under the other paragraphs of section 4(c) of BHCA
ought to be unobjectionable. Id.
411 GLEBA § 103(b), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(m)(5) (adding new section 4(m)(5) of
the BHCA). See  discussion infra  notes 462-500 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of functional regulation.
412 The Board is not the sole enforcement authority here.  Instead, the disability
imposed can be either at the holding company level or at the IDI level and will be
done by the AFBA.
413 These include any new activity authorized under new sections 4(k) or 4(n) of
the BHCA, new section 5136A(a) of the U.S. Revised Statutes (added by GLEBA
§ 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(a) (West 2001), and relating to so-called “financial
subsidiaries” of national banks, see infra  notes 423-61 and accompanying text), or
new section 46(a) of the FDIA (added by GLEBA § 121(d) and relating to compa-
rable investment authority for insured state-chartered banks, see infra  notes 438-42
and accompanying text).  GLEBA § 103(b), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(l)(2) (adding new
section 4(l)(2) of the BHCA).
414 New BHCA § 4(l)(2)(B), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(l)(2)(B).  The exceptions are for
investments made pursuant to the merchant banking and insurance company portfo-
lio investment provisions of new section 4(k)(4)(H)-(I) or under section 122 of
GLEBA (contemplating the addition, no sooner than five years after date of enact-
ment, of merchant banking authority for “financial subsidiaries” of banks, compara-
ble to that permitted to their FHC affiliates under section 4(k)(4)(H)).
415 See  new BHCA § 4(k)(4)(H)-(I), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(k)(4)(H)-(I).
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agency discretion, as it is an automatically imposed statutory bar.
No comparable bar on engaging in new “financial” activities is
necessarily implicated in the remedial action for capital or mana-
gerial deficiencies, unless the Board imposes such restrictions in
the supervisory agreement.
Having described the “payoff” for electing FHC status, one
can now begin to appreciate the extent of the “price tag.”  Apart
from the novel financial privacy provisions of GLEBA, which
themselves entail significant new compliance costs (costs which
may, in fact, become enormous if state privacy laws and regula-
tions evolve in a manner that causes a balkanized privacy compli-
ance landscape),416 and the substantial additional costs (and
uncertainty) associated with pre-merger notification to the FTC
under Hart-Scott-Rodino,417 there is the onus of maintaining a
416 Title V of GLEBA imposes a brand new “affirmative and continuing obliga-
tion” upon all firms engaging in financial services, including not only DIs but also
securities firms, insurance companies, and others, but excluding farm credit institu-
tions and entities subject to the jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission or the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation, see  GLEBA § 509(3), 15
U.S.C.A. § 6809(3) (West Supp. 2002)—and firms engaging in activities “incidental”
to financial activities to safeguard the privacy of consumers by establishing detailed
policies and procedures and by providing privacy disclosures about the sharing of
“nonpublic personal information” with affiliates and with third parties, together with
affording the consumer an “opt-out” for disclosure of information to unaffiliated
third parties. See generally  GLEBA §§ 501-503, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 6801-6803 (West
Supp. 2002).  The Act requires each of the pertinent federal regulatory agencies (in-
cluding the bank and thrift regulators, the National Credit Union Administration,
the Secretary of the Treasury, the SEC, and the Federal Trade Commission) to pro-
mulgate, after consultation with representatives of the State insurance regulators
designated by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, regulations de-
signed to carry out the privacy provisions of Title V.  GLEBA § 504(a), 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 6804(a) (West Supp. 2002).  Detailed regulations have already been promulgated
by those agencies, and regulated institutions were expected to be in full compliance
by July 2001.
GLEBA also is explicit that its privacy provisions do not supercede, alter, or affect
any state law or regulation in the area, except to the extent inconsistent with the
provisions of the Act, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency.  GLEBA
§ 507(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6807(a) (West Supp. 2002).  For this purpose, however, “a
State statute, regulation, order, or interpretation is not inconsistent  with the provi-
sions of [the Act] if the protection such statute, regulation, order, or interpretation
affords any person is greater  than the protection provided under [the Act] . . . .”
GLEBA § 507(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6807(b) (emphasis added).  The states remain free,
therefore, to create financial privacy protections for consumers well in excess of
what is required under federal law and regulation.
The breadth and implications of these new financial privacy requirements are be-
yond the scope of this article, other than to note that they are obviously part of the
political price that financial institutions had to pay for the increased powers granted
to FHCs.
417 The fee for filing a Premerger Notification and Report Form is currently
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careful watch upon the capital adequacy, managerial, and CRA
compliance areas for each and every DI under the holding com-
pany umbrella and, in the (far from unlikely) event of a default
some day, the open-ended nature of what the Board may require
by way of remedial action.  The agreement required in new sec-
tion 4(m)(2) must, as noted above, be “acceptable to the Board.”
Nothing prevents the Board from imposing in that agreement re-
quirements above and beyond what is necessary to cure the regu-
latory default.418  While the “club” of divestiture may only be
applicable to failure to correct only the conditions that gave rise
to the default,419 the agreement with the Board is, after all, a
“written agreement entered into with the agency” within the pur-
view of section 8 of the FDIA,420 and failure to comply with
other provisions the Board might impose therein would subject
the FHC to the full panoply of enforcement authority under that
statute,421 as well as under the BHCA itself.422
B. Financial Subsidiaries
GLEBA also contemplates a less complete diversification
through the bank itself, on a track that is largely, but not com-
pletely, parallel to that of the FHC structure, and without the
necessity of making a FHC election.423  The Act amends the Na-
tional Bank Act by adding to the Revised Statutes a new section
$45,000 if the size-of-transaction is valued at greater than $50 million but less than
$100 million; $125,000 if the size-of-transaction is valued at $100 million or greater
but less than $500 million; and $280,000 if the size-of-transaction is valued at $500
million or greater. The acquiror is responsible for the payment of the fee at the time
of filing by electronic wire transfer or, if necessary, by bank cashier’s check or certi-
fied check. See  The Most Frequently Asked HSR Questions, at  http://www. ftc.gov/
bc/hsr/faq.htm (last visited May 24, 2002).
418 Indeed, the statute grants the Board the rather open-ended authority to “im-
pose such limitations on the conduct or activities [of the FHC] or any affiliate
[thereof] as the Board determines to be appropriate under the circumstances  and con-
sistent with the purposes  of this [Act].”  New BHCA § 4(m)(3), 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1843(m)(3) (West 2001) (emphasis added).  The “purposes” of the Act are multifa-
rious and, like Scripture, are susceptible to interpretations of enormous latitude.
419 New BHCA § 4(m)(4), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(m)(4).
420 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
421 E.g. , id.  § 1818(b) (cease-and-desist authority); id.  § 1818(e) (removal and
prohibition authority); id . § 1818(i)(2) (civil money penalties).
422 See  12 U.S.C. § 1847 (1994) (enforcement provisions of the BHCA).
423 This is so because the “financial subsidiary” is authorized not under the
BHCA but under a separate statute, the National Bank Act, with parallel authoriza-
tion under the FDIA for state-chartered banks.  GLEBA § 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 24a (West 2001) (amending the National Bank Act); GLEBA § 121(d), 12
U.S.C.A. § 1831w (West 2001) (amending the FDIA).
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5136A424 authorizing the creation of a new type of subsidiary of a
bank known as a “financial subsidiary.”425  The format is substan-
tially similar to the FHC model.426  These financial subsidiaries,
which are subject to size limitations,427 are authorized only for
national banks that are “well capitalized” and “well managed,”
provided that all of their depository institution affiliates428 are
likewise “well capitalized” and “well managed”429 (using those
concepts in pari materia  with the coordinate requirements gov-
erning FHC qualifications430) and that have a CRA rating of at
least “[s]atisfactory.”431
Banks meeting these criteria may engage through financial
424 Section 121(a)(1) of GLEBA redesignated the pre-existing section 5136A of
the Revised Statutes as section 5136B, and 121(a)(2) of GLEBA enacted an entirely
new section 5136A of the Revised Statutes.
425 Section 121(a)(2) of GLEBA defines a “financial subsidiary” as a company
controlled by one or more insured depository institutions, other than (A) a national
bank operating subsidiary (in the statutory language, a subsidiary engaged “solely in
activities that national banks are permitted to engage in directly and are conducted
subject to the same terms and conditions that govern the conduct of such activities
by national banks”) or (B) a subsidiary authorized under sections 25 or 25A of the
Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 601-604, 611-631, or the Bank Service Company
Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1867.  GLEBA § 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(g)(3).
426 Compare  GLEBA § 121(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(a)(2)(A)(I) (authorizing na-
tional bank to control a financial subsidiary that engages in “activities that are finan-
cial in nature or incidental to a financial activity”), with  GLEBA § 103(a), 12
U.S.C.A. § 1843(k)(1)(A) (West 2001) (authorizing a FHC to engage in any activity
that the Board determines “to be financial in nature or incidental to such financial
activity”).
427 The aggregate consolidated assets of all of a bank’s financial subsidiaries may
not exceed the lesser of forty-five of the parent bank’s consolidated total assets or
$50 billion.  GLEBA § 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(a)(2)(D).
428 For this purpose, the term “affiliate” is defined (as, for that matter, are the
terms “company,” “control,” and “subsidiary”) by cross-referencing the definitional
provisions of the BHCA.  GLEBA § 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(g)(1); see also  12
U.S.C. § 1841(k) (1994) (defining “affiliate”).
429 GLEBA § 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(a)(2)(C) (imposing requirement), 12
U.S.C.A. § 24a(g)(5)-(6) (defining terms).
430 Compare  GLEBA § 103(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(l)(1)(A)-(B) (West 2001),
with GLEBA § 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(a)(2)(C) (adumbrating “well-capital-
ized” and “well managed” requirements).  Note that for capital adequacy compli-
ance purposes, the bank must deduct from assets and tangible equity the amount of
its outstanding equity investment, including retained earnings, in all financial subsid-
iaries, GLEBA § 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(c)(1)(A), and is prohibited from con-
solidating the assets and liabilities of financial subsidiaries with those of the bank,
GLEBA § 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(c)(1)(B).  Furthermore, this information
must be separately laid out in any publicly disclosed financial statement of the na-
tional bank.  GLEBA § 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(c)(2).
431  GLEBA § 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(a)(7) (cross-referencing new section
4(l)(2) of the BHCA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(l)(2)).
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subsidiaries in most, but not all, of the activities that are “finan-
cial in nature” or those that are “incidental to a financial activ-
ity.”432  Those activities that are available to FHCs433 but
prohibited for financial subsidiaries are underwriting insurance
or providing or issuing tax-deferred annuities,434 real estate in-
vestment and development,435 insurance company portfolio in-
vestments,436 and merchant banking.437  National bank financial
subsidiaries thus possess a range of powers somewhere in the
middle of the continuum between the powers authorized to na-
tional banks themselves and those authorized to FHCs.
State banks may have financial subsidiaries too (assuming they
are permissible under state law).438  GLEBA adds a new “safety
and soundness” provision to the FDIA mandating that a state
bank with a subsidiary that “engages in activities as principal that
would only be permissible for a national bank to conduct through
a financial subsidiary” meet four of the requirements applicable
to national banks with such subsidiaries:  (1) the state bank (and
all DI affiliates) must be well-capitalized (after the requisite capi-
tal haircut in the next item);439 (2) the state bank complies with
the same capital deduction and financial disclosure require-
ments;440 (3) the state bank complies with the same risk manage-
ment requirements;441 and (4) the state bank’s financial
subsidiary will have the same treatment for purposes of the re-
432 GLEBA § 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(a)(2)(A)(i).
433 Compare  GLEBA § 103(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843(k)(4) (detailing financial ac-
tivities of FHCs), with  GLEBA § 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(a)(2)(B)(i) (specify-
ing financial activities of bank’s financial subsidiaries).
434 GLEBA § 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(a)(2)(B)(i).  A tax deferred annuity is
an annuity the income of which is subject the tax treatment accorded under I.R.C.
§ 72.
435 GLEBA § 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(a)(2)(B)(ii).
436 GLEBA § 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(a)(2)(B)(iii).
437 Id.  Merchant banking may, however, become an authorized activity for finan-
cial subsidiaries in the not-too-distant future.  The Act authorizes the Board and the
Secretary of the Treasury, five years after enactment, to decide to permit financial
subsidiaries to engage in merchant banking activities, subject to such conditions as
the Board and the Secretary may jointly impose by regulation.  GLEBA § 122; see
also  12 U.S.C.A. § 1843 (West 2001).
438 Many states have long permitted their banks to have subsidiaries, and often to
engage through those subsidiaries in activities not permissible for the banks them-
selves.  This has long been a feature of our dual banking system.  At times, it has
erupted into controversy. See , e.g. , Citicorp v. Bd. of Governors, 936 F.2d 66 (2d
Cir. 1991).
439 GLEBA § 121(d), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831w(a)(1) (West 2001).
440 GLEBA § 121(d), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831w(a)(2); see also supra  note 430.
441 GLEBA § 121(d), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831w(a)(3); see also infra  note 453.
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strictions on transactions with affiliates.442
A few noteworthy special rules apply to financial subsidiaries.
First, the Act makes transactions between a national bank and a
financial subsidiary subject to the affiliate transaction restrictions
of sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act.443  Nor-
mally, as we have seen,444 a subsidiary of a bank is not deemed
an “affiliate” as defined in those provisions,445 but GLEBA
treats a financial subsidiary as an “affiliate” and not a “subsidi-
ary” for these purposes.446  Nonetheless, section 23A’s limitation
on covered transactions with a single affiliate447 is not applicable
to covered transactions with a financial subsidiary.448  The Act
also contains an “anti-evasion provision” reconfiguring any
purchase of or investment in the securities of a financial subsidi-
ary by an affiliate of the bank as a purchase or investment by the
bank itself,449 and authorizing the Board to determine that an
extension of credit by an affiliate of the bank in the financial sub-
sidiary shall be considered as an extension of credit by the bank
itself.450  Moreover, GLEBA treats a financial subsidiary as an
affiliate of the holding company for purposes of the anti-tying
provisions of the BHCA.451
Unlike the counterpart FHC provisions, which posit merely an
election of FHC status by qualifying BHCs and a notice regime
(i.e., no prior Board approval) thereafter for all activities that are
“financial in nature,” the national bank must receive the prior
approval of OCC for the financial subsidiary to engage in such
activities.452  In addition, the national bank must implement risk
management safeguards as a condition to establishing or main-
taining a financial subsidiary.453  The financial subsidiary author-
442 GLEBA § 121(d), 12 U.S.C. § 1831w(a)(4); see also infra  notes 443-50 and
accompanying text.
443 GLEBA § 121(b)(1) (amending the coverage of 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1
(1994)).
444 See supra  note 322 and accompanying text.
445 See  12 U.S.C.A. § 371c(b)(2)(A) (West 2001).
446 GLEBA § 121(b)(1), 12 U.S.C.A. § 371c(e)(1)-(2).
447 That limitation is ten percent of capital and surplus. 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 371c(a)(1)(A).
448 GLEBA § 121(b)(1), 12 U.S.C.A. § 371c(e)(3)(A).
449 GLEBA § 121(b)(1), 12 U.S.C.A. § 371c(e)(4)(A).
450 GLEBA § 121(b)(1), 12 U.S.C.A. § 371c(e)(4)(B).
451 GLEBA § 121(c), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1971 (West 2001).
452 GLEBA § 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(a)(2)(F) (West 2001).
453 These safeguards are designed to assure that:
(1)  the procedures of the national bank for identifying and managing fi-
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ity is also subject to certain debt rating requirements when
engaged in by the nation’s largest banks.454
Regulatory default in the case of a national bank’s financial
subsidiary leads to similar consequences.  Failure to maintain ei-
ther of the capitalization and management criteria, or the risk
management safeguards,455 would result in issuance of a notice
by OCC identifying the deficiency or deficiencies in question and
initiating a similar forty-five-day period in which to execute an
agreement with OCC.456  Until the deficiencies are cured, OCC
“may impose such limitations on the conduct or activities of the
national bank or any subsidiary [thereof] as [OCC] determines to
be appropriate under the circumstances and consistent with the
purposes of this section,”457 and failure to correct the problem
within six months may result in required divestiture of any finan-
cial subsidiary.458  Finally, with respect to the debt rating require-
ments applicable to the 100 largest banks,459 failure to maintain
such ratings will disable the national bank from purchasing or
acquiring, directly or indirectly, any additional equity capital460
nancial and operational risks within the national bank and the financial
subsidiary adequately protect the national bank from such risks;
2)  the national bank has, for the protection of the bank, reasonable poli-
cies and procedures to preserve the separate corporate identity and limited
liability of the national bank and the financial subsidiaries of the national
bank; and
3)  the national bank is in compliance with this section.
GLEBA § 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(d).
454 Each of the top fifty insured banks, to have a financial subsidiary, must have at
least one issue of outstanding eligible debt currently rated within the three highest
investment grade rating categories.  GLEBA § 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 24a(a)(3)(A)(i).  Banks among the second fifty largest must meet either the same
eligible debt criterion or any alternative criteria established by the Board and the
Treasury.  GLEBA § 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(a)(3)(A)(ii).
455 See supra  notes 428-30, 453 and accompanying text.  Also, by virtue of the new
provision codified at 12 U.S.C. § 24a(a)(7), failure to meet the CRA eligibility crite-
rion will be treated the same as in the FHC context:  Such failure will not result in
OCC taking any remedial action but will disable the bank from expanding into new
financial activities until a “Satisfactory” or better rating is restored.
456 GLEBA § 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(e)(1)-(2).  Any affiliated state-
chartered DI must execute an agreement with the AFBA (i.e., the Board in the case
of a state member bank, the FDIC in the case of a state nonmember bank).
GLEBA § 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(e)(2).
457 GLEBA § 121(a)(2), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(e)(3)(A).  Likewise, the AFBA may
impose similar limitations on the conduct or activities of any relevant state-chartered
IDI affiliate or subsidiary thereof.  GLEBA § 121(a)(2),  12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(e)(3)(B).
458 GLEBA § 121(a)(2),  12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(e)(4).
459 See supra  note 454.
460 For this purpose, “equity capital” is defined to include not only any equity
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of any financial subsidiary until the bank is again in compliance
with the rating requirement.461
Thus, the price tag of financial reform under GLEBA to the
banking industry includes not only the eligibility maintenance
and other criteria outlined above but also forgoing much (if not
all) of the potential for expanded powers under the approach
taken in OCC’s 1996 Op. Sub. regulation.  This limitation on
functional equivalence and other creative approaches arises from
the new statutory definition of “financial subsidiary” in the
Act.462
C. Functional Regulation
GLEBA implements a regime of “functional regulation,” an
approach reflecting the conviction that similar activities should
be regulated by the same sort of regulator regardless of where
those activities may be conducted.  This was not traditionally the
case.  Prior to GLEBA, for example, bank securities activities
were not regulated by the SEC because of exemptions enacted
into the federal securities laws.463  Under functional regulation,
by contrast, in whatever nook or cranny of the holding company
structure that an activity may be housed or conducted, it will be
subject, if it is a securities activity, to regulation by the SEC (and
occasionally state securities regulators); if a banking activity, it
will be subject to regulation by the appropriate federal and state
bank regulators; if an insurance activity, it will be regulated by
state insurance regulators; if a commodities activity, it will be
subject to regulation by the Commodities Futures Trading Com-
instrument but also “any debt instrument issued by a financial subsidiary, if the in-
strument qualifies as capital of the subsidiary under any Federal or State law, regula-
tion, or interpretation applicable to the subsidiary.”  GLEBA § 121(a)(2),  12
U.S.C.A. § 24a(f)(2).
461 GLEBA § 121(a)(2),  12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(f)(1).
462 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(g)(3).  The wording of this definition suggests that, besides a
financial subsidiary, the only types of subsidiaries that may legitimately exist for
national banks are subsidiaries that “engage[ ] solely in activities that national banks
are permitted to engage in directly and are conducted subject to the same terms and
conditions that govern the conduct of such activities by national banks[,]” id .
§ 24a(g)(3)(A), or those “specifically authorized by the express terms of a Federal
statute [other than § 24a], and not by implication or interpretation,” such as an Edge
Corporation or Agreement Corporation (pursuant to sections 25 or 25A of the Fed-
eral Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-604 (West 2001)) or a bank service corpora-
tion (pursuant to the Bank Service Company Act, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1861-1867 (West
2001)), 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(g)(3)(B).
463 See supra  notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
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mission and appropriate state regulators, and so forth.464
The Act embroiders the functional regulation concept by
anointing the Board as the “umbrella supervisor” of diversified
financial services organizations that are BHCs or FHCs.  This
means that the Board can examine the holding company and can
also, albeit under limited circumstances, examine the functionally
regulated components of the holding company.  Normally, how-
ever, the Board is required to rely upon reports from the func-
tional regulators.465
One of the corollaries of functional regulation under the Act in
the securities arena is that the bank exemptions under the federal
securities laws have largely been repealed.  Thus, for example,
GLEBA basically eliminates the bank exemption from the defi-
nitions of “broker” and “dealer” under the 1934 Act,466 but re-
tains a few exemptions for the purpose of facilitating certain
traditional bank activities.467  GLEBA also renders unto banks
that which is banking by expressly permitting banks to continue
to effect transactions in “identified banking products.”468  How-
464 For an insightful critique of GLEBA’s functional regulation model, see Lissa
L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance:  Before and After the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,  25 J. CORP. L. 723, 776-84 (2000).
465 GLEBA § 111, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1844(c)(1)-(2) (West 2001).
466 GLEBA §§ 201-202, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(4)-(5) (West Supp. 2002).
467 Id.  Examples include trust activities, sweep accounts, private placements,
safekeeping and custodial services, issuing asset-backed securities, derivatives trans-
actions, third party networking arrangements, and so forth. See GLEBA § 221, 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 77c(a)(2), 78c(a)(12)(A)(iii) (establishing treatment of bank common
trust funds under the 1933 Act and 1934 Act, respectively).  Note in that connection
that GLEBA exempts from the definition of “broker” a bank that effects transac-
tions in a fiduciary capacity in a department (which may or may not be the bank’s
trust department) that is subject to examination for compliance with fiduciary regu-
lations and standards, but only so long as (A) the bank is “chiefly compensated” for
these transactions via pre-set fees (e.g., trust administration fees), a percentage of
assets under management, flat or capped per order fees (representing the bank’s
cost of execution), or any combination thereof; and (B) the bank does not publicly
solicit brokerage business other than by advertising, in connection with marketing of
its trust services, that it effects transactions in securities for customers.  GLEBA
§ 201, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(4)(B)(ii)(I)-(II).  Similarly, the Act exempts from the
definition of “dealer” a bank that purchases or sells securities for investment pur-
poses, whether for its own account or as agent for a trust customer.  GLEBA § 201,
15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(5)(C)(ii).
468 These include various forms of deposit account (including certificates of de-
posit and other deposit instruments issued by a bank); banker’s acceptances; letters
of credit; debit accounts from credit card originations or similar arrangements; loan
participations, but only those where the bank or an affiliate that is not a broker or
dealer participates and where the participation is sold to a “qualified investor” or
other sophisticated person that has the opportunity to review and assess any mate-
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ever, with respect to new products that may functionally be hy-
brids of banking and securities,469 the Act establishes what
congressional staff referred to as a “jump ball” procedure
whereby the SEC may, after consultation with the Board, initiate
a rulemaking proceeding designed to declare the hybrid a “secur-
ity.”470  This may have the effect of “acing” a sympathetic regula-
tor like OCC out of the process of declaring something with
security-like characteristics a “banking” product.
GLEBA has replaced securities laws definitional exemptions
for a type of institution (i.e., banks) with exemptions for speci-
fied bank products and services.  A corollary to this new ap-
rial information and the capacity to evaluate it, cf.  Banco Español de Credito v. Sec.
Pac. Nat’l Bank, 973 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1992); and swap agreements (including credit
or equity swaps) where the swap is sold only to a qualified investor, GLEBA § 206,
15 U.S.C.A. § 78c note.
The term “qualified investor” is defined to include a variety of institutional inves-
tors, such as registered investment companies; issuers exempt from the definition of
investment company under section 3(c)(7) of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998); banks; savings associations; securities brokers and dealers
(whether or not registered with the SEC); insurance companies; business develop-
ment companies (as defined in section 2(a)(48) of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(a)(48) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)); small business investment companies; state-spon-
sored employee benefit plans and ERISA employee benefit plans (but not including
individual IRAs), the investment decisions for which are made by a bank, savings
association, insurance company, or registered investment advisor as fiduciary; trusts
with investment discretion reposed in one of the entities just listed; market in-
termediaries exempt under section 3(c)(2) of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(2)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998); associated persons (other than a natural person) of a bro-
ker-dealer; foreign banks; foreign governments; government entities and political
subdivisions thereof that invest on a discretionary basis at least $50 million; and
multinational or supranational entities or agencies and instrumentalities thereof.
See  15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(54) (West Supp. 2002).  The term also includes corpora-
tions, companies, partnerships, or natural persons that own and invest on a discre-
tionary basis at least $25 million, or $10 million if in connection with loan
participations and transactions involving certain asset-backed instruments. Id .
469 Examples of such products include those that were neither subjected to SEC
regulation as “securities” prior to GLEBA nor “identified banking products” as de-
fined by GLEBA. See supra  note 468.  Also, equity swaps (within the meaning of
section 206(a)(6) of GLEBA) do not qualify as a “new hybrid product” under the
Act.
470 GLEBA § 205, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(i) (West Supp. 2002).  In the pre-rulemak-
ing consultation, the Commission “shall consider” the Board’s views and the impli-
cations for the banking industry of declaring the product a security.  Such a
declaration, following a rulemaking, may be challenged by the Board in the D.C.
Circuit, with such a challenge having the effect of staying the SEC’s determination
until the case is adjudicated; however, neither agency’s views are to be accorded
deference by the court. Id.  Other parties besides the Board may, if aggrieved by
the rulemaking, also challenge the Commission’s determination, but that challenge
does not effect an automatic stay. Id.
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proach is that banks that have conducted a broader range of
brokerage or dealing will have to “push out” those kinds of activ-
ities into an affiliated broker-dealer, inasmuch as compliance
problems arising from regulatory conflicts between the federal
banking laws and the federal securities laws (e.g., the SEC’s net
capital rule for broker-dealers) would render their retention in
the bank impractical.
Banks have also lost certain exemptions and exclusions under
the 1940 Act and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers
Act).471  The SEC has been given authority to regulate (after
consultation with, and taking into consideration the views of, the
federal banking agencies) the hitherto largely unregulated prac-
tice of a bank serving as custodian of an affiliate management
investment company or affiliated unit investment trust472 and
bank loans to an affiliated investment company.473  Moreover,
the pre-existing prohibition on a majority of the directors of an
investment company being persons who are officers, directors, or
employees of any one bank has been extended to cover affiliates
and subsidiaries of the bank or any one bank holding company
and its affiliates.474  In addition, the 1940 Act’s definition of “in-
terested person”475 has been expanded to cover any person (or
affiliated person thereof) that during the preceding six-month pe-
riod executed any portfolio transaction for, engaged in any prin-
cipal transaction with, distributed shares of, or loaned any money
to, (1) the investment company, (2) another investment company
having the same adviser, or (3) an account over which the invest-
ment company’s adviser has brokerage placement discretion.476
Finally, GLEBA eliminates the exclusion of banks and bank
holding companies from the key definition of “investment ad-
viser” in the Advisers Act,477 thereby requiring banks and bank
holding companies performing this function to register with the
Commission (or else to register a separately identifiable depart-
ment or division if appropriate and if adequate to constitute com-
471 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (West 2001).
472 GLEBA § 211, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-17(f), 80a-26 (West Supp. 2002).
473 GLEBA § 212, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-17(a).
474 GLEBA § 213(c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-10(c) (West Supp. 2002).
475 See supra  note 150.
476 GLEBA § 213(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A) (West Supp. 2002).  Con-
forming changes were also made to the definition of “interested person” of an in-
vestment adviser and principal underwriter.  GLEBA § 213(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-
2(a)(19)(B).
477 GLEBA § 217(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-2(a)(11).
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pliance).478  The Commission and the AFBA are directed to
share with each other reports of examination and similar infor-
mation relating to the investment advisory activities of banks and
bank holding companies.479
Functional regulation on the insurance side of the house
means, of course, regulation and supervision by state insurance
commissioners.480  Thus, regardless of whether insurance activi-
ties are being conducted out of banks or their subsidiaries (e.g.,
pursuant to the “town of 5,000” authority),481 out of securities
firms, or out of traditional insurance companies or agencies, state
regulation will prevail.
Once again, these provisions exact a price on the industry.  Ac-
tivities that commercial banking organizations might have pre-
ferred to continue to carry on in the banks must, because of the
loss of securities act exemptions, be “pushed out” into affiliates,
and regulatory compliance costs attributable to the multiplicity
of regulation and regulatory regimes are undoubtedly higher.
Furthermore, the Act effectively forecloses the possibility that
national banks or their subsidiaries might engage in insurance ac-
tivities as principal,482 apart from a handful of “authorized bank-
ing products”483 and the limited “competitive equality” exception
for national banks selling title insurance only where state law au-
thorizes state banks to do so.484  Nor is an “end run” around
478 GLEBA § 217(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-2(a)(26).
479 GLEBA § 220, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-10(a) (West Supp. 2002).
480 GLEBA § 301, 15 U.S.C.A. § 6711 (West Supp. 2002).
481 The Act makes explicit reference to the town of 5,000 authority under § 92 (“a
national bank exercising its power to act as agent under the eleventh undesignated
paragraph of section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act”). Id.
482 GLEBA § 302(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6712(a) (West Supp. 2002).
483 GLEBA § 302(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6712(b).  An authorized banking product is
one that OCC had officially determined, as of January 1, 1999, to be something a
national bank could provide as principal (or where, as a matter of practice, national
banks were in fact lawfully providing said product), provided that no court had over-
turned such an OCC determination by that date and provided further that neither
title insurance (somewhat superfluously, given the Second Circuit’s pre-January
1999 decision in American Land Title Ass’n v. Clarke , 968 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1992))
nor a tax-advantaged annuity can qualify as such a product. Id.  The only possible
benefit of this provision to national banks would be the resurrection of crop insur-
ance, given that the court decisions overturning OCC’s determination in that regard
were rendered after the cut-off date of January 1, 1999 and might therefore be re-
garded as legislatively overruled by this provision. See supra  notes 239-44 and ac-
companying text.
484 GLEBA § 303(b)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6713(b)(1) (West Supp. 2002).  The state
law in question must be an affirmative authorization, however.  State wild card stat-
utes do not constitute the requisite authority.  GLEBA § 303(b)(2), 15 U.S.C.A.
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these provisions by OCC (or any other bank regulator) to ex-
pand what banks themselves may offer via resort to a “functional
equivalence” approach any longer available.  As the discussion in
Part I of this Article has established, functional equivalence
treatment is frequently negated by the adoption of statutory defi-
nitions.  So too here, where, for the first time, a statutory defini-
tion of “insurance” has been enacted that is binding on the
federal bank regulatory agencies.
GLEBA enacted a three-part definition of insurance that in-
cludes (1) “any product regulated as insurance as of January 1,
1999, in accordance with the relevant State insurance law, in the
State in which the product is provided”;485 (2) any product first
offered thereafter that a state insurance regulator determines to
be insurance because it “insures, guarantees, or indemnifies
against liability, loss of life, loss of health, or loss through damage
to or destruction of property, including, but not limited to, surety
bonds, life insurance, health insurance, title insurance, and prop-
erty and casualty insurance,”486 subject to an exception for cer-
tain statutorily enumerated bank products;487 or (3) “any annuity
contract, the income on which is subject to tax treatment under”
I.R.C. § 72.488  The definition is expanded even further by a so-
called “rule of construction” providing that offshore insurance or
§ 6713(b)(2).  This is reminiscent of the old Douglas Amendment to the BHCA, 12
U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1988), which, prior to its repeal by the Riegle-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338,
required that interstate ownership or control of banks by bank holding companies
acting pursuant to state law authorization be pursuant to a state statute with “lan-
guage to that effect and not merely by implication.”
485 GLEBA § 302(c)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6712(c)(1).
486 GLEBA § 302(c)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6712(c)(2)(A).  This includes “private
passenger or commercial automobile, homeowners, mortgage, commercial mul-
tiperil, general liability, professional liability, workers’ compensation, fire and allied
lines, farm owners multiperil, aircraft, fidelity, surety, medical malpractice, ocean
marine, inland marine, and boiler and machinery insurance.” Id.
487 This bank products exception excludes from the statutory definition of insur-
ance any bank product or service that is “(i) a deposit product; (ii) a loan, discount,
letter of credit, or other extension of credit; (iii) a trust or other fiduciary service;
(iv) a qualified financial contract (as defined in or determined pursuant to [FDIA
§ 11(e)(8)(D)(i), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8)(D)(i))]; or (v) a financial guaranty.”
GLEBA § 302(c)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6712(c)(2)(B).  This exception is inapplica-
ble, however, with respect to certain products that include an “insurance compo-
nent” and that, if offered by a bank as principal, would either qualify as a life
insurance contract under I.R.C. § 7702 or (in the case of any product other than “a
letter of credit or other similar extension of credit, a qualified financial contract, or a
financial guaranty”) for treatment of losses under I.R.C. § 832(b)(5). Id.
488 GLEBA § 302(c)(3), 15 U.S.C.A § 6712(c)(3).  This component of the defini-
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reinsurance “that insures, guarantees, or indemnifies insurance
products provided in a State or that indemnifies an insurance
company with regard to insurance products provided in a State”
is deemed to be providing insurance as principal in that State.489
Thus, hearkening back to our syllogism, even if an insurance
company product X is the functional equivalent of a banking
product Y, the presence of a new statutory definition of X as
insurance  forecloses a different regulatory treatment by OCC or
any other bank regulator.
Throwing salt in the wound caused by the surgical excision of
functional equivalence as a regulatory tool to expand bank pene-
tration of the insurance business, GLEBA has not only pre-
served—indeed, reaffirmed—the primacy of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act reverse preemption regime490 but has also largely
eliminated the possibility that banks can rely on judicial defer-
ence to federal banking agency interpretations in this area.491
Thus, in the case of a regulatory conflict over insurance and re-
verse preemption issues between a state insurance regulator and
a federal regulator, either side may, subject to a special statute of
limitations,492 seek expedited493 judicial review in the appropri-
ate federal circuit court, but such review must be “without une-
qual deference.”494  In general, the deference issue was a political
“hot button” and led to this compromise position, though the im-
tion legislatively overrules that portion of VALIC II  that found that annuities are
not “insurance.”
489 GLEBA § 302(d), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6712(d).
490 GLEBA § 104(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6701(a) (West Supp. 2002) (stating that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act “remains the law of the United States”); see also supra
notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
491 Recall the level of deference accorded by the Supreme Court in VALIC II  to
OCC’s determination that annuities were financial products, not insurance products.
See supra  notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
492 A special, and rather abbreviated, limitations period is provided for.  No chal-
lenge to an order, ruling, determination, or other action of a state insurance regula-
tor or a federal regulator may be filed after the later of the end of (i) the twelve-
month period beginning on the date the first public notice of such order, ruling,
determination, or other action is made in its final form, or (ii) the six-month period
beginning on the date when such order, ruling, determination, or other action be-
comes effective.  GLEBA § 104(d), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6714(d) (West Supp. 2002).
493 The court of appeals has no more than sixty days to render its judgment, unless
all parties stipulate to an enlargement.  GLEBA § 304(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6714(b).
Any petition for Supreme Court review of the appellate court’s judgment “shall be
filed . . . as soon as practicable after such judgment is issued.”  GLEBA § 304(c), 15
U.S.C.A. § 6714(c).
494 GLEBA § 304(e), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6714(e).  The court must decide the matter
“based on its review on the merits of all questions presented under State and Fed-
\\Server03\productn\O\ORE\80-4\ORE403.txt unknown Seq: 118 16-JUL-02 14:19
1418 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80, 2001]
plementation of a functional regulation regime, the enactment of
a federal definition of “insurance,” and the reaffirmation of Mc-
Carran-Ferguson already made it clear that the federal bank reg-
ulators495 would have a much more difficult time approving bank
entry into insurance without the regulatory input of state insur-
ance commissioners.  Be that as it may, it is clear that under such
a “without unequal deference” standard, no longer will the bank-
ing industry be able to benefit from cases like VALIC II .
Deference still plays a part, however, with respect to state laws
dealing with the solicitation, sale, or cross-marketing of insur-
ance, at least those laws that were enacted prior to September 3,
1998.  Disputes may still arise between a federal banking agency
and state insurance regulators with respect to state laws that
might seek to restrict insurance sales activities by commercial
banking organizations.  GLEBA preserves the Barnett  standard
to a degree496 and provides that such state laws may not “pre-
vent” or “significantly interfere” with the insurance sales activi-
ties of commercial banking organizations,497 a determination by
the appropriate regulatory agency that is entitled to normal
Chevron  deference.  With respect to such state laws that were
enacted after September 3, 1998, however, the “no unequal def-
erence” regime applies.498
Furthermore, the possibility of federal banking law preemp-
tion of state insurance laws—another “hot button” for the vari-
ous trade associations representing the banking and insurance
industries lobbying Congress during its consideration of the
Act—has been cut back by the enactment of a safe harbor for
thirteen categories of state insurance laws.  These laws are not
subject to preemption even though they may discriminate against
commercial banking organizations.499
eral law, including the nature of the product or activity and the history and purpose
of its regulation under State and Federal law.” Id.
495 By its terms, section 304 of GLEBA applies only to cases brought by a regula-
tor and does not specify the scope of review applicable to cases brought by private
litigants.  GLEBA § 304(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6714(a).
496 GLEBA § 104(d)(2)(C), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6701(d)(2)(C) (West Supp. 2002).
497 In a way, this is a slight expansion of Barnett , inasmuch as that decision
seemed to cover only federal instrumentalities like national banks, whereas the Act
covers state banks, holding companies, and holding company affiliates engaged in
these insurance activities as well.
498 GLEBA § 304(e), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6714(e).
499 GLEBA § 104(d)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C.A. § 6701(d)(2)(B).  The thirteen areas in
which the states have carte blanche  to regulate include (i) protecting against rejec-
tion of insurance policies required in connection with lending transactions solely
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There is an ironic and somewhat sad postlude to this mixed
bag of differential standards of agency responsibility, judicial def-
erence, and preemption.  Far from clarifying the situation,
GLEBA has engendered only more uncertainties about the
scope of preemption, the parameters of the “prevent or signifi-
cantly interfere with” standard, and the applicability of the thir-
teen so-called “safe harbors.”  Instead of reconciling the law in
this area, GLEBA has merely shifted the battleground.  National
and state trade associations of insurance agents remain in conflict
with banking trade associations.  Already there have been dis-
putes in several states:  Ohio, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and
West Virginia.500
One of these is actively in litigation, and another seems headed
in that direction.  In Ohio, the battle is over two state licensing
requirements, and the case is pending in the Sixth Circuit.501  In
because the insurer is not affiliated with the lender; (ii) prohibiting extra charges on
such required insurance if purchased from unaffiliated agents; (iii) restricting adver-
tisements or other promotional materials that might misrepresent the status of any
insurance product as being federally insured or guaranteed; (iv) imposing licensing
requirements on anyone receiving a commission or brokerage fee from the sale of
insurance; (v) prohibiting referral fees to unlicensed providers; (vi) regulating the
disclosure of insurance information to third parties without the insured’s express
written consent; (vii) prohibiting the use of health information from the insured’s
health records without express written consent; (viii) implementing anti-tying re-
gimes; (ix) requiring anti-tying disclosures; (x) requiring disclosure that the product
is not a deposit, is not insured or guaranteed by the federal government or by any
financial institution or affiliate and, where appropriate, involves investment risk; (xi)
mandating separate documentation for credit and insurance transactions; (xii)
prohibiting the inclusion of credit insurance premiums in the primary credit transac-
tion without the customer’s consent; and (xiii) mandating the maintenance of sepa-
rate books and records relating to insurance transactions, including consumer
complaints, and the availability of such books and records for inspection by state
insurance regulators. Id.
500 OCC has requested public comment on whether insurance laws and regula-
tions in these states are preempted. See , e.g. , Notice of Request for Preemption
Determination, 65 Fed. Reg. 57,427 (Sept. 22, 2000) (Rhode Island); Notice of Re-
quest for Preemption Determination, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,827 (July 14, 2000) (Massachu-
setts); Notice of Request for Preemption Determination, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,420 (June
2, 2000) (West Virginia). The Rhode Island dispute clearly antedates GLEBA, how-
ever. See  Preemption Determination, 62 Fed. Reg. 1950 (Jan. 14, 1997) (initial re-
quest for comments regarding Rhode Island); Preemption Determination, 62 Fed.
Reg. 12,883 (Mar. 18, 1997) (further request for comments regarding Rhode Island).
501 See  Ass’n of Banks in Ins., Inc. v. Duryee, 55 F. Supp. 2d 799, 809 (S.D. Ohio),
aff’d and remanded by  270 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that compliance with
the Ohio statute might “entail a substantial financial expense which could weigh
significantly against the expected revenue from the sale of insurance in [a town of
5,000], and therefore significantly impair the bank’s ability to sell insurance”); see
also  Scott A. Sinder, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and State Regulation of the Busi-
\\Server03\productn\O\ORE\80-4\ORE403.txt unknown Seq: 120 16-JUL-02 14:19
1420 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80, 2001]
West Virginia, the battle is over eight provisions of state law, and
in October 2001 OCC concluded that four of these are pre-
empted and another one is partially preempted.502
The net result is that commercial banking organizations are ar-
guably worse off under the GLEBA regime of functional regula-
tion, McCarran-Ferguson primacy, and “no unequal deference”
than they would have been basking in the glow of OCC’s pre-
emption victories and the open-textured language of Supreme
Court decisions like Barnett  and VALIC II .
CONCLUSION
Necessity may be the mother of invention, but, from the bank-
ing industry’s point of view, there was no necessity for the enact-
ment of GLEBA.  All that commercial banking organizations
could possibly want in the realm of securities activities was avail-
able to them under the pre-existing Glass-Steagall framework,
particularly in view of the possibility of “disaffiliating” securities
firms from member banks.  Moreover, aggressive and innovative
ness of Insurance—Past, Present and . . . Future? , 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 49, 72 &
n.107 (2001).
502 See  Preemption Opinion, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,502 (Oct. 9, 2001).  The opinion,
dated September 24, 2001, construed sections 33-11A-6, 33-11A-8 to 33-11A-11, and
33-11A-13 to 33-11A-14 of the West Virginia Code.  Found preempted were provi-
sions (1) requiring financial institutions to use separate employees for insurance so-
licitations; (2) restricting the timing of bank employees’ referral or solicitation of
insurance business from customers with pending loan applications; (3) restricting
sharing with bank affiliates (for the purpose of soliciting or offering insurance) infor-
mation acquired in the course of a loan transaction; and (4) requiring segregation of
the place of solicitation or sale of insurance from deposit-taking and lending areas.
The three provisions that OCC concluded were not preempted (1) prohibited re-
quiring or implying that the purchase of an insurance product from a financial insti-
tution is required as a condition of a loan; (2) prohibited offering an insurance
product in combination with other products unless all products are available sepa-
rately; and (3) required that insurance and credit transactions be completed inde-
pendently and with separate documentation where obtaining the insurance is a
condition to loan approval.  The partial preemption determination was made with
respect to disclosure requirements:  Requirements as to contents of disclosures and
obtaining a written acknowledgment, in a separate document, from the customer
that the disclosures were made are not preempted, but provisions mandating the
manner and timing of certain required disclosures are. Id.
The Independent Insurance Agents of America, a frequent litigant against OCC
on insurance powers, claims that this preemption opinion is “too important to con-
sumer protection and fair competition for independent agents to leave unanswered.”
See  Richard Cowden, Comptroller Opinion Says GLBA Preempts Some WV Limits
on Bank Insurance Sales , 77 Banking Rep. (BNA) 538 (Oct. 8, 2001).  Litigation has
already commenced. See  Lee Ann Gjertsen, Suit Tests GLB and OCC’s View on
Insurance Sales , AM. BANKER, Nov. 15, 2001, at 11.
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initiatives by OCC, particularly using the “functional equiva-
lence” approach, had already resulted in significant penetration
of the insurance business, as well as in impressive Supreme Court
victories containing broad and deferential language auguring
well for future innovation and development.
GLEBA established an alternate framework for commercial
banking organizations to engage in securities and insurance activ-
ities but exacted rather a high price.  The Act vitiated much of
the regulatory flexibility that underlay OCC’s initiatives and
largely curtailed further development through functional equiva-
lence approaches.  In addition, the availability of expanded fi-
nancial services powers for commercial banking organizations is
subject to strict eligibility criteria requiring elevated capital, man-
agerial, and CRA ratings for each and every depository institu-
tion under the holding company umbrella; loss of organizational
flexibility with the repeal of bank exemptions from the federal
securities laws (the “push out” provisions); increased complexity
and costs of compliance with the multiplicity of federal and state
regulatory regimes occasioned by functional regulation and the
addition of the FTC to the mix; and the dawn of a new era of
financial privacy regulation with high current compliance costs
and the spectre of untold future costs.  With all these additional
burdens for scant (if any) additional benefit, GLEBA may truly
be said to be an orphan of invention.
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